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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Introduction 
The objective set for this PhD thesis is to explore the link between sovereign risk and 
financial sector stability. At the outset of the research process, main themes included financial 
contagion between developed and emerging countries, contagion between the sovereign and 
banking sectors across countries, and the link between bank and sovereign ratings. To date, 
empirical articles in these fields investigate predominately the determinants and interactions 
of asset prices, multilateral exposures of banks in different countries, or behavior of portfolio 
flows around crisis episodes. As far as research on sovereign debt is concerned, the bulk of 
empirical articles is dedicated to fundamental determinants of CDS prices or sovereign credit 
spreads, for instance Longstaff et al. (2011), Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2011), and 
Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011), or sovereign debt default and restructuring, e.g. Kruger 
(2003), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). However, the structure and dynamics of investor 
holdings of government debt has remained broadly unexplored. To fill in this gap in the 
research literature I constructed a new database of holdings of government debt by foreign 
and domestic investors for a broad and representative set of developed and emerging 
economies. In the first article I use the dataset to determine the drivers of changes in bond 
holdings through the prism of fundamentals, yields and risk aversion. In the second article I 
investigate whether changes in ratings are associated with changes in bond holdings, 
specifically whether rating downgrades qualify as a trigger for debt selloff. 
The composition and dynamics of the investor base deserves attention for at least four 
reasons. First, investor demand for government debt most likely determines the financing cost 
for the government on the primary market, hence measuring and understanding the evolution 
of the investor demand can help steer the issuance policy in the long term. Second, monitoring 
the investor base is crucial in terms of risk management and financial stability, as investor 
base composed of potential yield seekers pumping “hot money” can potentially increase the 
possibility of capital outflows and surging bond yields which would weaken country’s 
refinancing capacity. Third, stability of the domestic financial system depends on the 
exposure of domestic institutional investors, in particular banks and insurers, to government 
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debt at home and abroad. Fourth, the share of foreign private and foreign official investors 
may determine the country’s decision whether to default.  
The initial scope of the PhD was centered on emerging economies located in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and Asia. As the banking and sovereign crisis between 2007 and 2011 
concerned mainly the developed economies, I have extended the scope to Eurozone 
economies and several relevant developed economies. As a result, this PhD thesis provides a 
complete picture of the globalization of sovereign debt markets. 
Throughout the second half of XXth century numerous developing economies have 
experienced painful banking, currency and sovereign crisis. In certain cases these crisis 
occurred in form of twined or triple crisis, as outlined by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
Typically the source of these crises lied in the combination of foreign currency borrowing 
with unstable banking sector, opening of the financial account and high external vulnerability. 
Having learned a painful lesson in the past, several emerging economies have successfully 
overhauled their institutions and set monetary and fiscal policy into the path of stability and, 
as a result, they are currently undergoing an important and wide-spread process of developing 
local currency markets. Following this lead, I identified two research themes that have been 
relatively unexplored and deserve particular attention. First theme investigates the impact of 
political risk, inflation and macroeconomic fundamentals on government bond yields 
denominated in local currencies compare to bonds issued in foreign currencies, as described 
in Article 3. Second theme concentrates on the macroeconomic development of local currency 
bond markets and foreign participation, as outlined in Article 4. 
II. History of government debt and financial globalization  
Direct lending by banks was the key source of funding for sovereigns in the past and 
historical evidence shows that this form of sovereign lending was common already in 
medieval times. Based on over 400 lending contracts from late sixteenth century Drelichman 
and Voth (2011) demonstrate that King  Philip II of Spain who was at war for most of his 
reign defaulted four times, yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again 
within a year or two of each default. Interestingly, upon each default the Genoese bankers 
who provided the majority of funding showed solidarity and high cohesiveness by forming 
into lending groups and determining the terms of new loan contracts.  
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Starting from late seventeenth century sovereign lending started to evolve towards issuance of 
tradable government bonds with Bank of England being among the first sovereign issuers. 
Flandreau (2013) shows evidence that already in the first half of XIX century international 
bond markets in England were active and prosperous. Moreover, during this time the 
bondholder committees at the London Stock Exchange set up a system of Collective Action 
Clauses to protect their interests and attract new investors. In their book on history of 
international lending Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2006) examine data on sovereign bonds 
issued by borrowing developing countries between 1870 and 1913 when the trade and 
issuance of international bonds was at its peak, maturities of developing countries exceeded 
20 years and Russia succeeded in placing a bond with 80 year maturity. Investor were so 
confident about the functioning framework that they even accepted bonds with redemption 
clauses and countries’ future export or tax revenues were used as collateral to enhance the 
credit quality. The reason why such conditions were accepted goes back to the development 
of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders that helped bondholders cooperate in case of 
distress. Finally, authors demonstrate that global crises or contagion are a feature of the 1990s 
which was hardly known in the previous era of globalization. Authors refer to Goetzmann 
(2001) who showed that cross-country co-movement of equity markets increased in the 1990s 
and, in consequence, investors willing to diversify had to enlarge the range of countries.  
The First and Second World Wars brought a wave of default in advanced and emerging 
countries and for several decades international investors focused on bonds of key developed 
countries, while emerging economies relied on direct lending from banks. It continued until 
the debt crisis in 1982 when a number of countries in Latin America, confronted with high 
interest rates and low commodities prices, admitted their insolvency towards international 
commercial banks. Over the next decade several of those countries attempted to restructure 
and reschedule debt, but eventually the only viable solution came with the 1988 Brady plan 
that assumed debt relief and, most importantly, a switch from loans to tradable bonds.  
It is widely considered that from this moment governments were incentivized to issue bonds 
rather than loans and financial globalization of emerging economies completed the process. 
Graph 1 shows that between 1988 and 1995 the level of weighted-average financial openness 
of emerging economies, as measured by Chinn and Ito (2008), almost doubled going from 
23% do almost 40%. As developing economies experienced high growth in the 1990s 
onwards, it turned out that gradual macroeconomic stabilization was not coupled with rising 
levels of public debt as it was in the developed economies, as indicated in Graph 3. This effect 
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is believed to be related to the global imbalances between savings and investment, in 
particular in the capital being channeled from emerging economies seeking to allocate rising 
FX reserves to developed economies that offer bonds considered as safe assets, as explained 
in Bernanke (2005) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) among others. In a nutshell, the 
last two centuries converted emerging economies from capital importers into capital exporters 
and the central banks and sovereign wealth funds of emerging economies have become an 
integral part of demand for developed market bonds.  
Finally, recent developments of local currency bond markets in emerging economies have 
become a new important aspect of the financial globalization. As numerous developing 
economies achieved macroeconomic stability and reduced external vulnerabilities while 
maintain high rates of economic growth, national treasuries seized the opportunity to issue 
sovereign debt in local currencies. As the yields on local currency debt remained considerably 
higher than in advanced economies, foreign investors from advanced economies began to 
invest in the bonds of emerging countries, which in a sense completed the investment-
issuance loop between these two groups.  Still, important differences accompanied this 
process, as illustrated in Graphs 4 and 5. First, it is a well-known fact that emerging 
economies have greater savings than investment while advanced economies are characterized 
by lower investment than savings ratios. Second, while the government debt increased in line 
with savings and investment in emerging economies, from 2004 onwards growth of 
indebtedness in developed markets completely outpaced the savings and investment. 
III. The link between sovereign debt and financial institutions as 
the key element for the global financial stability  
Both empirical and theoretical literature on sovereign debt tends to classify bondholders into 
two categories: domestic and foreign investors. Yet, among investors dealing with 
government bonds we may find central banks, sovereign wealth funds, commercial banks, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds and even non-financial companies and 
households.  
The Eurozone crisis has shown that the link between governments and banks is 
fundamental not only for financial stability of one country, but for the stability of the region. 
Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2012) demonstrate that this link is particularly dangerous in 
constellation with sovereigns acting as lenders of last instance on one side, banks moving 
close to illiquidity and banks holdings government bonds of deteriorating quality. As a result, 
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in absence of resolution mechanisms investors tend to panic and sovereign and credit spreads 
surge. Acharya and Steffen (2013) demonstrate that, in the second case, banks that are in 
financial difficulties are likely to “gamble on resurrection” by investing in risky government 
bonds which often makes their situation even more miserable in the end. Finally, empirical 
results by Arslanalp and Takahiro (2012) also show that foreign banks and other private 
foreign investors are very likely to sell bonds under stress. 
IV. Summary of research articles and research contribution 
In this section I briefly summarize the motivation, empirical methodology, analytical results and 
conclusions of the four articles.  
IV.1. Article 1: Drivers of foreign and domestic demand for 
sovereign bonds in developed and emerging economies: 
fundamentals vs. market sentiment 
The objective of this paper is to introduce the bondholding dataset, gain a broader perspective 
of the global demand for government debt and explain the dynamics of investor behaviour 
through the prism of observable macroeconomic and fiscal factors, bond yields, influence of 
rating agencies and market sentiment. To analyse the differences in demand drivers I 
introduce a new dataset on government bond holdings in 28 emerging and developed 
economies based on national sources. Within each country I am able to track between 3 and 
20 years of history and distinguish between private and official non-resident holders and 
different categories of domestic banks, investment funds, pension funds and insurance 
companies and domestic central banks.  
In terms of methodology I apply panel specification similar to Mehl and Reynaud (2010) 
and Emanuele Baldacci and Kumar (2010) to analyse the macroeconomic, fiscal and market 
determinants of holdings of different investor groups. The novelty of my approach compared 
to previous studies lies in using the change in bondholdings by specific investor as dependent 
variable and employing macroeconomic, fiscal, institutional and market-related indicators as 
explanatory variables.  For each of the five investor groups (private non-residents, official 
non-residents, domestic banks, domestic pension and insurance funds, domestic for 
investment funds) I regressions by temporal subsamples, one for the entire time period 2001 
to 2012, one for the pre-crisis period 2001 to 2007 and one for crisis period 2007 to 2012.  I 
apply either pooled estimation for the full sample and country groups while controlling for 
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cross-section dependence, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) method.  
The key findings are the following. While the global amount of outstanding government 
debt more than tripled between 2001 and 2011, the share of foreign holdings across countries 
increased from 20% to 28% indicating that rising indebtedness might be coupled with 
spreading financial globalization. Interestingly, foreign central banks have been stocking 
government debt at a greater pace than international private investors and at the end of 2011 
central banks’ holdings were only slightly below private stocks. Investor structure varies 
strongly across countries. While foreign investors hold between 40% and 90% of government 
debt issued by Eurozone countries with Germany, France and Netherlands being most 
exposed to external demand, 90% of Japanese and 70% of US, UK and Danish debt is held 
domestically. Finally, the share of foreign investors holding emerging market debt has been 
consistently rising over the last ten years reaching record levels in May 2013. 
Econometric findings indicate that prior to the crisis that international private investors, 
banks and investment funds were return seekers purchasing government bonds when bond 
prices increase. Not surprisingly, risk perception by international investors evolved over time. 
Prior to the crisis private international investors tend were purchasing debt of countries with 
higher growth, rising public indebtedness and higher yields. From 2007 onwards international 
private flows were directed to countries with lower yield levels and, perhaps more 
importantly, private inflows are significantly related to falling sovereign yields in some 
countries while outflows are associated with increasing yields in others. In turn, foreign 
central banks purchase bonds at low yields and better credit ratings, and sell under rising 
spreads or rating downgrades. Econometric results show also that before 2007 the demand by 
domestic investors was significantly associated with rising public indebtedness and appears to 
be uncoupled from credit or business cycles.  
After the crisis purchases by both domestic and foreign investors appear to be 
associated with credit growth rather than public indebtedness. In terms of sensitivity of 
domestic investors to global risk aversion, I find that investment funds in Safe Haven 
countries tend to purchase domestic bonds when uncertainty rises, while rising risk pushes 
domestic asset managers in Emerging Economies sell domestic bonds. As for private non-
resident investors, results for the crisis period indicate that under high global risk aversion 
they sell bonds of Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging Markets and purchase debt of Core 
Eurozone countries. However, I find no evidence for flight-to-safety effects in Safe Haven 
countries.  
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Last but not least, what is surprising is that bond purchases by foreign central banks 
are significantly associated with waves of global risk sentiment. As financial crisis escalated 
foreign central banks suddenly sold bonds of Peripheral Eurozone countries and bought bonds 
of Safe Haven and Core Eurozone.  
IV.2. Article 2: Impact of sovereign credit downgrades on 
investor holdings of government debt in developed and 
emerging economies 
Credit rating agencies have played a crucial role in shaping global financial markets over 
the last two decades providing objective and valuable information on riskiness and repayment 
probability of sovereigns. To date empirical research focused mainly on measuring the 
reaction of asset prices to changes in credit ratings, but the changes in capital flows around 
these events remain unexplored. The objective of this study is to analyze the impact of rating 
changes on both bond yield and the actual holdings of government for different investor types. 
For the purpose of this paper a new dataset has been compiled to gauge the holdings of non-
resident private investors, non-resident central banks as well as domestic banks, domestic 
pension and insurance funds, and domestic investment funds. The data has been compiled 
from national sources for a set of 24 countries from Core and Peripheral Eurozone, so-called 
Safe Haven developed countries, and emerging economies of different size and level of 
development. Econometric analysis is conducted under consideration for different country 
types and rating agencies, anticipative effects related to rating outlooks, and general vs. serial 
rating changes vs. multi-notch rating changes.  
Studies on the impact of rating actions typically apply event studies on asset prices or 
exchange rates in daily frequency, yet in this case I need to undertake a different approach to 
account for data frequency, rating changes being preceded by rating outlooks, and rating 
actions being anticipated by the markets and effects appearing ahead of up- and downgrades. 
To take into account those factors I adapt framework of analysis applied by Broner et al. 
(2013) to analyze behavior of capital flows around crisis episodes in a cross-country setting. 
Specifically, for each country I examine the relationship between the change in bond holdings 
of a given investor groups over the period of two months ahead and two months following the 
rating action, i.e. altogether five months. On the technical side I am confronted with serial 
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autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, cross-section dependence and use clustering method on 
country level and fixed time effects. 
Findings for the full sample indicate that upgrades exert no consistent and significant impact 
neither on investor holdings nor on bond yields, no matter whether they are preceded by an 
outlook warning or not. However, in case of Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging Economies 
rating upgrades pushed domestic asset managers and pension funds to change their allocation 
to domestic government bonds. In contrast, results for downgrades for the full sample of 
countries indicate that sovereign yields and all types of domestic investors are affected by 
rating downgrades, in particular those preceded by negative outlooks. In case of Eurozone 
Periphery and Emerging Economies, foreign private investors and sovereign yields were 
influenced in particular by the second and third downgrades over two-year horizon. 
Downgrades by S&P and Moody's in Peripheral Eurozone were associated not only with 
significant changes in holdings among non-resident private investors and non-resident central 
banks, but also with intensification of yield volatility. In Emerging Economies, downgrades 
by Fitch affected the holdings of foreign investors, domestic banks and pension funds, and 
sovereign bonds. Last but not least, investors in Emerging Economies reacted differently to 
1st and 3rd downgrades over a two year horizon and to multi-notch downgrades. 
IV.3. Article 3: Do local or foreign currency bonds react 
differently to shocks local risk factors? 
 
The bulk of government debt has been historically issued by advanced economies has 
been denominated in home currencies, while emerging economies were stigmatized as 
unreliable borrowers and limited to borrowing in foreign currencies (FC). Over the last two 
decades numerous countries overcame this reputation and successfully developed local 
currency (LC) bond markets, yet FC issuance remains an important source of funding for 
numerous emerging economies. As emerging economies opened up their capital accounts and 
LC government bonds became liquid, tradable and accessible for international investors, 
foreign participation in LC bond markets increased to significant levels. As a result, in certain 
countries both LC and FC bonds are held by international investors. 
The objective of this article is to identify and compare the drivers of LC yields and FC 
yields in countries with different level of economic development, different credit ratings and 
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different investor base. Specifically, we analyse how integral elements of sovereign risk such 
as political risk, inflation and credit rating determine the LC and FC yields and the FX-hedged 
difference between them. The novelty of our approach consists in comparing LC bonds with 
FC bonds using a broad dataset of individual bonds that covering both developed and 
emerging countries. On top of that, we analyse how the reactivity of yields evolves under 
different currency structures of government debt and different levels of foreign participation 
in local currency bonds. 
The novelty of our methodology consists in matching LC bonds with FC bonds into 
one dataset which allows us to track the effects for the entire range of the yield curve. Since 
FC yields are not available in form of yield indices we ran an extensive search in the 
Bloomberg database and identified representative historical data for 1350 FC bonds issued by 
20 emerging economies and 10 advanced countries. We subsequently match the yields 
between FC bonds and LC yields taking into account differences in maturities and duration 
and, in addition, for each LC bond we match its maturity with a synthetic currency forward in 
order to calculate the FX hedge. In terms of the econometric approach we employ panel 
configuration with standard errors adjusted using Prais–Winsten method to correct for 
heteroskedasticty, contemporaneous correlation across panels and autocorrelation within 
panels. As the dependent variable test separately: unhedged LC yields, hedged LC yields, FC 
yields and, the spread between FX-hedged LC yields and FC yields. All results are robust to 
regressions without the financial rating and to smoothing over 6 months or not smoothing at 
all. Empirical findings reveal three major patterns. 
First, statistical patterns indicate that governments in emerging economies continue to 
issue in FC because FC yield are by 1% to 3% lower than the unhedged LC yield and the 
average maturity of FC bonds remains considerably higher than local currency bonds. When 
we compare the econometric determinants of the yields it turns out that in emerging 
economies political risk has significant and similar impact on LC and FC yields. In turn, 
inflation, current account balance and debt to GDP are significant and have stronger effects on 
unhedged LC yields than on FC yields. 
Second, empirical results suggest that sovereign risk on FC debt might be perceived 
differently from sovereign risk of LC debt. The spread between FC yields and FX-hedged LC 
yields is marginally low in developed countries and investment grade-rated emerging 
economies, yet it becomes high in countries such as Greece, Spain, Russia or Turkey. 
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Econometric results for all countries indicate that the spread between FC yield and FX-hedged 
LC Yield is significantly and positively related to credit ratings and political risk. 
Interestingly, both rising inflation and debt to GDP significantly increase the FC hedged-LC 
spread for emerging economies, but decrease the spread for advanced economies.  
Third, in emerging countries with high share of LC debt and high share of foreign 
participation the estimated coefficients for political risk, inflation, credit rating and current 
account are significant and considerably stronger than for the unrestricted sample. Also, under 
high foreign participation and high share of LC debt, the reactivity of LC yields is stronger 
than for FC yields. These findings suggest that not only higher foreign participation, but also 
more developed local currency bond markets render LC yields more prone to local risk 
factors. 
IV.4. Article 4 : The Growth of Local Currency Emerging 
Market Debt 
Over the last two decades numerous emerging economies successfully developed local 
currency bond markets and limited their currency exposure. As macroeconomic stabilization 
and opening up to capital flows advanced, international investors started to regain confidence 
and, in result, between 1996 and 2013 foreign investor participation in local currency debt 
markets increased from 5% to 21% on average. The objective of this study is to determine 
empirically what shapes domestic bond markets on one hand and what attracts foreign 
investors on the other. The novelty of our approach consists in using a new broad dataset on 
foreign holdings of government debt in 20 emerging economies. 
In terms of methodological approach, we set the total local currency-denominated 
sovereign debt to GDP as the key dependent variable, while as regressors we focus on foreign 
participation as well as variables representing domestic investor demand. The fundamental 
challenge in this setting lies in the joint determination of the total local currency–denominated 
sovereign debt and the share debt owned by foreign investors. For this reason, we use two-
stage least squares (2SLS) with country fixed effects using several plausible instruments. 
Empirical results show that foreign demand is a key driver of the growth of local currency 
debt in emerging markets, and that the main culprit of that increased demand is the low 
interest rate environment brought about by the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary 
policy. The second motive of foreign currency participation is speculative, as foreign currency 
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interventions of central banks in emerging economies tend to attract foreign investors willing 
to benefit from currency appreciation. While growth and inflation forecasts remain important 
indicators for both the development of local currency debt market and foreign participation 
therein, we find that institutional factors like political risk, bondholder protection or central 
bank independence play a very limited role in both processes. In the light of monetary policy 
normalization in advanced economies our results are highly relevant for investors, issuing 
governments and policymakers. 
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I. Introduction 
L’objectif initial de cette thèse met en avance l’analyse du lien entre le risqué souverain et la 
stabilité du système financier, les axes principales s’étendant sur la contagion financière entre 
les pays émergents et développés, contagion entre le souverain et le secteur bancaire ainsi que 
le lien entre les banques et les notations des souverains. La littérature empirique existante est 
concentrée sur les déterminantes et les interactions des prix d’actifs, les expositions 
multilatérales des banques et le comportement des flux de portefeuille autour des épisodes de 
crise. En ce qui concerne l’état de recherche sur la dette souveraine, les articles empiriques se 
focalisent principalement sur les déterminantes des prix des contrats CDS ou les spreads 
souverains, par exemple Francis A. Longstaff et al. (2011), Aizenman, Hutchison, and 
Jinjarak (2011), Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011), ou bien le défaut souverain et la 
restructuration, par exemple Kruger (2003), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). Néanmoins, la 
nature et l’évolution des détentions des obligations souveraines n’ont pas été explore en 
profondeur par les scientifiques. Afin de remplir cet espace vide j’ai construit une nouvelle 
base des données sur les détentions des obligations souveraines par les investisseurs 
domestiques et étrangers. Profitant du spectre relativement large de la base qui inclue les pays 
développés et émergents et les séries historiques longues, j’ai rédigé quatre articles de 
recherche dont deux co-écrits avec les autres chercheurs. Dans le premier article j’ai pour bout 
d’expliquer le changement dans les détentions par le prisme des fondamentaux, taux d’intérêt 
et l’aversion au risque. Le deuxième article est consacré à la relation entre les changements 
dans les notations souveraines et la dynamique de la base d’investisseurs, en particulier les 
effets des downgrades. 
La composition et dynamique de la base d’investisseurs mérite de l’attention pour quatre 
raisons. D’abord, l’ampleur de demande de la dette souveraine peut influencer le prix 
d’émission des obligations sur le marché primaire c’est qui implique que la compréhension et 
le suivie de l’évolution de la demande pourrait être bénéficiaire pour la politique d’émission à 
long terme. Deuxièmement, le suivi de la base d’investisseurs est fondamental de point de vue 
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de gestion des risques et de la stabilité financière. Dans le cas où les obligations sont détenues 
par les investisseurs étrangers opportunistes il existe un fort risque d’une sortie des capitaux et 
hausse de taux d’intérêt ce qui mettrait au péril la capacité de refinancement de souverain. 
Troisièmement, la stabilité du système financier du pays est influence par les expositions des 
grands investisseurs institutionnelles, en particulier les banques et les compagnies 
d’assurance, aux obligations souveraines domestiques et étrangères. Quatrièmement, les 
participations des investisseurs étrangers privés et officiels, comme par exemple le FMI qui 
bénéficie du statut de préteur ‘super-senior’, peut affecter la prise de décision sur le défaut 
souverain. 
Le périmètre initial de cette thèse s’étendait sur les économies émergentes localises en 
Amérique Latine, l’Europe de l’Est et l’Asie, mais comme la crise bancaire et puis souveraine 
a touche surtout les pays développés j’ai décidé d’élargir le spectre incluant différents pays de 
la Zone Euro et les autres pays développés représentatifs. En conséquence, la thèse projette 
une image complète de la globalisation des marchés de la dette souveraine. 
Au fil de XXeme siècle nombreux économies en voie de développement ont subi les crises 
bancaires, souveraines et de change, parfois même en forme de deux ou trois crises à la fois, 
comme explique par Kaminsky et Reinhart (1999). Typiquement la source des crises était à 
l’origine d’endettement en monnaie forte, secteur bancaire instable, l’ouverture du compte 
financier et vulnérabilité externe élevée. Après celles lésons douloureuses, plusieurs 
économies émergentes ont remis leur politique fiscal et monétaire sur la voie de stabilité ce 
qui engendrait le processus de développement de la dette souveraine en monnaie locale. 
Comme cette problématique n’a pas encore été explore en profondeur, j’ai identifié et initié 
deux projets de recherche avec les co-auteurs spécialisés dans ce domaine. Le premier thème, 
soit l’article trois de la thèse, vise à mesurer l’impact des facteurs déterminants pour le risque 
souverain comme le risque politique, l’inflation et les fondamentaux macroéconomiques sur 
les taux obligataires libellées en monnaie locale et monnaie étrangère. Le dernier article se 
focalise sur les facteurs déterminants le développement du marché de la dette en monnaie 
locale et de la participation des investisseurs étrangers. 
II. Dette souveraine et la globalisation financière 
L’évidence historique montre que déjà pendant les âges moyens les banques finançaient 
directement les souverains. En se basant sur 400 contrats des prets datant de la fin de XVIeme 
ciecle, Drelichman et Voth (2011) démontrent que, malgré les quatre défauts et une reine 
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dotée de plusieurs guerres, le roi d’Espagne Philip II n’a jamais perdu l’accès au financement 
et pouvait s’endetter de nouveau en moins de deux ans suite au défaut. Ce qui est intéressant 
c’est que les banquiers de Gênes, étant l’appui financier principal du roi, montraient la 
solidarité et sens de coopération exceptionnel dans les négociations des termes des nouveaux 
prêts royaux.  
A partir de XVIIeme siècle le financement des souverains a évolué en faveur des obligations 
souveraines ‘échangeables‘, la Banque d’Angleterre étant parmi les premiers émetteurs. 
Flandreau (2013) présente l’évidence que le marché international de la dette souveraine en 
Grande Bretagne était en plein essor déjà en première moitié de XIXeme siècle. En plus, à 
cette époque les comités des investisseurs de la London Stock Exchange ont établi un système 
des Clauses d´Action Collective afin de protéger leurs intérêts et attirer les nouveaux 
investisseurs. Dans le livre sur l´histoire de la finance internationale Mauro, Sussman, et 
Yafeh (2006) analysent les donnes historiques sur les obligations souveraines émises par les 
pays en voie de développement entre 1870 et 1913 et ils mettent en avant l´hypothèse selon 
laquelle la première globalisation du marché obligataire a trouvé lieu pendant cette période-là. 
Ils constatent qu´à cette époque le marché de la dette était en pleine croissance, les maturités 
dépassaient souvent 20 ans et la Russie a même réussi d´émettre une obligation avec l´horizon 
de 80 ans. Les investisseurs étaient tellement confiant qu´ils acceptaient même les obligations 
portant les clauses de rachat par l´émetteur et dans certains cas les pays émetteurs pouvaient 
même utiliser les revenus provenant des exportations ou impôts futurs comme garantie. C´est 
qui est très intéressant de point de vue des régulateurs dans la finance contemporaine c´est que 
la confiance d´investisseurs pendant ce période peut être expliquée par le développement de 
l´Association des Investisseurs Etrangers qui avait pour mission de coordonner les intérêts des 
préteurs au cas de défaut. Finalement, les auteurs démontrent empiriquement que l´effet de 
contagion est un phénomène des années 1990 qui n´était pas connu pendant la dernière 
globalisation financière.  
Le changement du régime économique pendant les deux guerres mondiales a poussé 
nombreux pays à travers du globe au défaut. En conséquence pendant plusieurs décennies les 
investisseurs internationaux se sont focalises sur les obligations des pays développés alors que 
les gouvernements des pays émergeants exploitaient les canaux de financement direct par les 
banques domestiques et internationales. Ce mécanisme continuait jusqu´à la crise de dette en 
1982 quand les pays d´Amérique Latine, confrontes avec les taux d´intérêt élevés et prix de 
matières primaires bas, ont déclaré faillite envers les banques américaines. Parmi ces pays 
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quelques-uns ont réussi de restructurer leur dette malgré la manque de confiance des 
investisseurs et ce n´était qu´en 1988 quand le plan de soulagement, libelle “plan Brady”, a 
été mis en place pour donner une nouvelle chance aux souverains en difficulté. Ce plan a 
engendré le processus de remplacement des prêts bancaires internationaux par les obligations 
échangeables. 
Il est considéré qu´à partir de ce moment-là les c´était dans l´intérêt des gouvernants 
émergeants d´émettre la dette plutôt que se limiter aux conditions des banques alors que 
l´ouverture des pays émergeants a complété le processus de globalisation financière. Graphe 1 
indique que selon la mesure de Chinn et Ito (2008) entre 1988 et 1995 le niveau de l´ouverture 
financière a presque double passant de 23% à 40%. Comme illustre le Graphe 3, 
contrairement aux économies développées les gouvernements des pays émergeants ont réussi 
de garder les ratios d´endettement stables. Cet effet est en partie lie aux déséquilibres globaux 
entre l´épargne et l´investissement, plus spécifiquement le capital flottant des pays émergeants 
qui cherchent d´élargir leurs réserves de change vers les économies avancées qui offrent les 
actifs considères ´surs´, l´argument qui a été évoqué entre autres par Bernanke (2005) et 
Caballero et Krishnamurthy (2009). Autrement dit, pendant les dernières deux décennies les 
économies émergentes se sont transformés des importateurs de capital vers exportateurs de 
capital tandis que les banques centrales et fonds souveraines dans ces pays ont atteint un statut 
important parmi les investisseurs obligataires.  
Finalement, le développement des marches de la dette locale est devenu un aspect important 
dans la globalisation financière. Suite à la stabilisation macroéconomique et modération des 
vulnérabilités externes dans les années ’90 et ‘2000 les agences du trésor ont saisi 
l‘opportunité pour émettre les obligations en monnaie locale. Comme les taux obligataires sur 
celles-là étaient beaucoup plus élevés par rapport aux taux dans les pays avancés, les 
investisseurs internationaux venant surtout des pays avancés ont commencé d´y prendre 
l‘intérêt. Cette évolution a complété les relations d´émission et d´investissement entre les 
deux groupes des pays. Néanmoins les relations macroéconomiques qui ont accompagné cette 
évolution restent très différentes dans les deux groupes des pays, comme indiqué dans les 
graphs 4 et 5. D´abord, les économies avancées continuent d´avoir le niveau d´épargne aligné 
avec le niveau d´investissement alors que dans les pays en voie de développement l´épargne 
reste supérieur à l´investissement. Deuxièmement, tandis que les économies en voie de 
développement restent relativement peu endettés, entre 2004 et 2012 l´accumulation de la 
dette dans les pays avancés a dépassé la croissance de l´épargne et d´investissement. 
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III. Le lien entre la dette souveraine et les institutions financières 
en tant que un element clé pour la stabilité du systeme 
financier global 
 
Dans la vaste littérature sur la dette souveraine, défauts et restructuration on trouve presque 
partout une distinction simple et universelle entre les investisseurs domestiques et étrangers. 
Pourtant, parmi les investisseurs obligataires on peut distinguer entre les banques centrales,  
les fonds souverains, les banques commerciales et d´affaires, les fonds mutuels, les 
compagnies d´assurance, les fonds de pension, les entreprises non-financières et même les 
individus. Dans cette thèse j´aimerais jeter une nouvelle lumière sur les différents types 
d´investisseurs. 
La crise européenne a montré que le lien entre les gouvernements et les banques est 
fondamental pour la stabilité financière d´un pays, mais pour la zone monétaire entière. 
Acharya, Drechsler, et Schnabl (2012) montrent que ce lien est particulièrement dangereux 
dans la constellation où les souverains jouent le rôle de préteur de dernière instance, les 
banques souffrent des problèmes de liquidité et en même temps les banques détiennent les 
obligations souveraines de mauvaise qualité ou émises par le gouvernement domestique. 
Quand la tension sur le marché augmente les investisseurs ont tendance de paniquer dans 
l´absence des mécanismes de résolution efficaces et en résultat les spreads de crédit des 
banques et de souverains s´écartent. Acharya and Steffen (2013) élargissent cette chaîne des 
relations avec l’hypothèse que les banques en difficulté financière sont susceptible d´acheter 
les obligations souveraines douteuses pour maximiser le profit en améliorant les ratios de 
liquidité ce qui renforce le lien entre les banques et les souverains et rendent la situation plus 
risquée. Finalement, les résultats empiriques présentés par Arslanalp and Takahiro (2012) 
indiquent aussi que les banques étrangères ont la tendance de vendre les obligations d´état en 
cas de détresse. 
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IV. Le résumé des articles et l’apport scientifique 
Dans les paragraphes suivants je présente un résumé de la motivation scientifique, le plan 
méthodologique, les résultats empiriques et les conclusions de chaque article de recherche. 
 
IV.1. Article 1: Les déterminants de la demande interne et 
externe pour la dette souveraine dans les économies 
avancées et émergentes: les fondamentaux contre le 
sentiment de marché 
 
Les objectifs de cet article sont multiples. L´article introduit d´abord la base des données sur 
les détentions des obligations souveraines, il présente la structure et dynamique de le demande 
pour la dette d´état et finalement il présente l´analyse de comportement des investisseurs 
obligataire en fonction des indicateurs macroéconomiques et financiers, taux obligataires, 
notation souveraines et sentiment du marché. 
Afin d´analyser les différences dans les déterminantes de la demande pour la dette j´introduis 
une nouvelle base des données basée sur les sources nationales comportant 28 pays 
développées et émergents. La base inclut entre 3 et 20 ans de couverture par pays et permet de 
suivre les détentions des institutions étrangères privées, banques centrales étrangères, banques 
commerciales, fonds d´investissement, fonds de pension et compagnies d´assurance et des 
banques centrales domestiques.  
En ce qui concerne la méthodologie empirique, pour analyser les déterminantes de demande 
de chaque groupe d´investisseurs  j´applique la spécification similaire à celles de Mehl et  
Reynaud (2010) ou bien de Baldacci et Kumar (2010). La nouveauté de mon approche 
compare aux études précédentes consiste en retournement des variables dans l´équations, 
c’est-à-dire j´analyse les changements des détentions par type d´investisseur comme la 
variable à expliquer et j´utilise les taux d´intérêts ou les indicateurs financiers en tant que 
variables explicatives. Pour chaque groupe d´investisseurs je conduis l´analyse sur la période 
2001-2012 et séparément pour les sous-périodes 2001-2007 et 2007-2012, je divise le spectre 
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par groupe des pays. J´utilise la méthode de panel développé par Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
pour corriger les effets de hétéroscédasticité, autocorrélation et dépendance entre les sections. 
Les résultats statistiques sont les suivants. Tandis que le montant global de la dette 
gouvernementale a plus que triplé entre 2001 et 2011, la participation des investisseurs 
étrangers est passée de 20% à 28% ce qui peut indiquer que le processus d´endettement peut 
être lié à la globalisation financière. Ce qui est surprenant c´est que les banques centrales 
étrangères ont accumulé les obligations souveraines plus rapidement que les investisseurs 
internationaux privés et à la fin de 2011 les détentions des deux groupes étaient presque 
comparables. La structure des investisseurs varie fortement entre les pays. Les investisseurs 
étrangers détiennent entre 40% et 90% de la dette allemande, française et néerlandaise alors 
que aux Etats-Unis, Royaume-Uni et Danemark moins de 30% est détenu par les acteurs 
externes et moins de 10% en Japon. Finalement, la participation des investisseurs étrangers 
dans la dette locale des pays émergeants a significativement augmenté pendant la dernière 
décennie et atteint le niveau record en Mai 2013. 
Les résultats économétriques indiquent qu’avant la crise financière les investisseurs étrangers 
privés, les banques et les fonds d´investissement se comportaient de manière opportuniste en 
achetant les obligations souveraines quand les prix augmentaient et vendant quand ils 
baissaient. Avant la crise les investisseurs étrangers privés  La perception du risque souverain 
a évolué dans le temps, car avant la crise les investisseurs étrangers privés achetaient la dette 
des pays avec la croissance élevée, les déficits budgétaires importants et les taux plus élevés. 
A partir de 2007 la demande des investisseurs internationaux s´est dirigé vers les pays avec 
les taux bas, soit les obligations considérées comme valeurs refuges. Ce qui est remarquable 
de point de vue des régulateurs c´est que les flux internationaux sous-jacents sont 
significativement liés à la baisse des taux obligataires dans certains pays et hausse des taux 
dans les autres. Par contre, les banques centrales étrangères ont la tendance d´acheter les 
obligations au taux bas et notations élevées et vendre lors d´augmentation du spread ou des 
downgrades.  
Les résultats montrent aussi qu´avant 2007 la demande des investisseurs domestiques était 
liée au niveau d´endettement et relativement découplé des indicateurs de crédit ou d´activité.  
Après la crise les achats d´obligations par les investisseurs domestiques et étrangers paraissent 
de suivre la croissance de crédit privé plutôt que l´endettement publique. En ce qui concerne 
l´aversion au risque des investisseurs domestiques, les résultats montrent que les fonds 
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d´investissement dans les pays avancés achètent les obligations domestiques quand 
l´incertitude augmente alors que les fonds d´investissements actifs dans les pays émergents 
vendent les valeurs domestiques. Les résultats économétriques indiquent aussi que suite à 
l´augmentation de l´aversion au risque les investisseurs internationaux vendaient les 
obligations de la Périphérie de la Zone Euro et les Émergents et ils achetaient les obligations 
de pays Euro ´Core´. Je ne trouve pas des résultats pour confirmer les effets de vol des 
capitaux vers les valeurs refuges. Finalement, les résultats démontrent que les achats 
d´obligations par les banques centrales étrangères sont menés par  le sentiment global du 
marché. La hausse de l´aversion au risque a poussé les banques centrales non-résidentes à 
remplacer les obligations des pays périphériques de la zone euro par les actifs de pays Core et 
les autres pays avancés.     
 
IV.2. Article 2: Impact des downgrades de la dette 
souveraine sur les detentions obligataires dans les 
économies avancées et émergantes 
Pendant les dernières deux décennies les agences de notation ont joué un rôle primordial dans 
la formation des marchés de la dette souveraine. La littérature empirique dans cette 
thématique est focalisée sur l´impact de changement des notations sur les prix d´actifs, mais la 
dynamique des flux des capitaux autour de ces évènements n´a pas été exploré jusqu´ici. 
L´objectif de cette étude est d´analyser l´impact des changements des notations souveraines 
sur les taux obligataires et les détentions des obligations gouvernementales pour les différents 
types d´investisseurs. Pour arriver à cette fin j´ai construit une base des données pour les 24 
pays avancés et émergents. L´analyse économétrique met en lumière l´impact par type 
d´agence, les effets d´anticipation, les notes publiées par les agences, les changements des 
notations consécutives et par plusieurs crans.  
Les articles scientifiques sur les changements des notations typiquement appliquent la 
méthode d´étude d´évènement pour analyser l´impact sur les prix d´actif avec la fréquence 
quotidienne. Dans mon cas je suis confronté avec la fréquence des données basse, les 
changements des ratings étant précédés par les avertissements et les changements des 
notations étant anticipés en avance par les marchés financiers. Pour prendre en compte ces 
facteurs j´utilise le cadre d´analyse similaire développé par Broner et al. (2013) pour analyser 
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le comportement des flux des capitaux autour des épisodes crises pour un vaste panel des 
pays. Sphériquement, pour chaque pays j´analyse la relation entre le changement des 
détentions par type d´investisseur et les taux deux mois avant et deux mois après chaque 
évènement. Pour adresser les problèmes résultant de hétéroscédasticité, autocorrélation et 
dépendance entre les sections j´utilise la méthode de clustering au niveau de pays et les 
temporels fixes. 
Les résultats économétriques pour l´échantillon complet indiquent que l´amélioration de la 
note (upgrade) n´affecte pas les détentions ou les taux obligataires de la manière consistante. 
Néanmoins, dans la Peripherie de la Zone Euro et les pays émergents suite aux upgrades les 
fonds d´investissement et de pension domestiques ont changé leur allocation vers les 
obligations domestiques. 
Les résultats pour l´échantillon total suggèrent que les taux obligataires et les types 
d´investisseurs sont impactés par les downgrades, en particulier si c´est précédé par un 
outlook négatif. Dans la Peripherie de la Zone Euro et les pays émergents les abaissements 
consécutifs ont significativement affectés les détentions des étrangers privés et les taux 
obligataires.  
Finalement, les downgrades par S&P et Moody´s dans la Périphérie de la Zone Euro étaient 
associés pas seulement au changement des détentions des non-résidents privés et des banques 
centrales étrangères, mais aussi avec l´intensification de la volatilité des taux. Dans les 
économies émergentes les downgrades par Fitch ont impacté les détentions des étrangers, 
banques domestiques et fonds de pension domestiques ainsi que les taux obligataires.  
Les résultats présentés mettent en évidence que les downgrades jouent un rôle important pas 
seulement pour les taux obligataires, mais aussi pour la structure d´investisseurs et ainsi le 
financement d´état à long terme. 
 
IV.3. Article 3: La sensibilité des taux obligataires en 
monnaie locale et forte aux facteurs de risque 
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Tandis que la grande partie de la dette gouvernementale des pays avancés a été émis dans la 
monnaie locale (ML), les pays émergents étaient longtemps stigmatisés comme les préteurs 
peu fiables et effectivement limités à la dette en monnaie étrangère (ME). Pendant les 
dernières deux décennies certains pays émergents ont réussi de surmonter le manque de 
confiance en développant un marché de la dette locale.  Accompagné par la stabilisation 
macroéconomique et l’ouverture de compte des capitaux, graduellement les obligations 
souveraines sont devenues plus liquides, facilement échangeables et accessibles aux 
investisseurs internationaux. Par la suite la participation des étrangers a augmenté et 
actuellement dans les cas de plusieurs pays la dette en ML et ME reste dans les mains des 
investisseurs globaux.  
L´objectif de cet étude est d´identifier et comparer les déterminantes des taux obligataires en 
ML et ME pour l´ensemble des pays ayant un niveau de développement diffèrent, les 
notations différentes et une base d´investisseur distincte. Spécifiquement on analyse comment 
les facteurs expliquant le risque souverain comme le risque politique, l´inflation et les 
notations déterminent les taux en ML et ME ainsi que la différence entre le taux couvert en 
ML et le taux en ME. On analyse aussi la réactivité des taux pour différents niveaux 
d´endettement extérieur et de participation des étrangers dans la dette locale. 
La nouveauté de notre approche méthodologique consiste en comparaison des taux en ML et 
ME utilisant les obligations individuelles pour les pays développées et émergents. Pour 
obtenir les séries historiques longues et fiables on a effectué une recherche approfondie dans 
la base des données Bloomberg et identifié plus de 1350 obligations libellées en ME émises 
par 20 pays émergents et 10 avancés. Par la suite à chaque taux obligataire en ME on a 
attribué un taux en ML en ajustant les maturités et la duration. En plus pour chaque taux 
obligataire en ML on détermine la couverture de taux  de change passant par le taux forward. 
En ce qui concerne l´approche économétrique, on utilise le panel avec les erreurs ajustées 
avec la méthode Prais-Winsten pour résoudre les problèmes de hétéroscédasticité, dépendance 
entre les panels et l´autocorrélation à l´intérieur des panels. Pour assurer universalité et 
robustesse de notre approche dans chaque étape d´analyse on effectue quatre tests avec les 
variables à expliquer différentes : taux en ME, taux en ML, taux en ML couvert avec le 
forward de taux de change, différence (spread) entre le taux en ME et le taux en ML couvert. 
Les régressions ont été vérifié avec et sans notation souveraine et le lissage sur six mois. Les 
résultats clés peuvent être classifie dans trois groupes. 
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D´abord les résultats statistiques indiquent que les gouvernements dans les pays émergents 
ont intérêt d´émettre la dette externe car les taux en ME sont en moyenne entre 1% et 3% plus 
bas que les taux en ML et la maturité des obligations en ME restent plus élevée que les 
obligations en ML. Les résultats économétriques montrent que dans les économies 
émergentes  le risque politique exerce un impact significatif et assez comparable sur les taux 
en ME et en ML. Par contre le taux en ML sont plus sensibles aux risques d´inflation, la 
balance du compte courant et la dette publique que les taux en ME.  
Deuxièmement, l´évidence empirique suggère que le risque souverain sur la dette en ME soit 
distincte de celui sur la dette en ML. Le spread entre les taux en ME et les taux en MC 
couverts sont extrêmement bas dans les économies développées et les émergents de bonne 
notation (investment grade), mais cette différence devient importante dans les pays à risque 
comme Grèce, Espagne, Russie et Turquie. Les résultats économétriques pour tous les pays 
indiquent que le spread entre le taux en ME et le taux en ML couvert est significativement et 
positivement lié aux notations souveraines et au risque politique. Ce qui est surprenant c´est 
que l´augmentation de l´inflation et la dette publique fait écarter le spread pour les pays 
émergents, mais compresse le spread pour les économies développées.   
Troisièmement, les tests sur les sous-échantillons en fonction de la structure de la dette 
révèlent des faits stupéfiants. Dans les pays émergents avec la dette souveraine émise 
principalement en ML et la détention par les étrangers est élevée, les coefficients de 
régression pour le risque politique, l´inflation et le compte courant sont significatifs et plus 
forts que pour l´échantillon général. En plus, dans cette constellation on observe aussi que les 
taux en ML montrent une sensibilité au risque plus forte que le taux en ME. Pour conclure, les 
résultats empiriques indiquent que la participation des étrangers plus élevée et le structure de 
dette plus orientée vers la dette domestique  peuvent exposer les taux en ML au risque 
macroéconomique et politique. Ce message est particulièrement important pour les agences de 
trésor, les investisseurs et les régulateurs travaillent sur les pays émergents ayant un risque 
souverain élevé.  
 
IV.4. Article 4: Développement du marché de la dette 
locale dans les pays émergents 
 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 
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Marqués par une histoire dure des crises et défauts souverains, pendant les dernières deux 
décennies certains parmi les pays émergents ont réussi de développer les marchés de la dette 
locale où les gouvernements peuvent s´endetter sans engendrer le risque de taux de change. 
Grace à la stabilisation sur le plan macroéconomique les investisseurs internationaux ont 
gagné confiance et, comme l´ouverture du compte de capitaux a significativement progressé 
dans l´entretemps, la participation des étrangers dans la dette souveraine locale a augmenté de 
5% en 1996 à 21% en 2013. 
L´objectif de cet étude est de déterminer empiriquement les facteurs qui construisent le 
marché de la dette domestique d´un part, d´autre part d´identifier que est-ce qui attire les 
investisseurs étrangers sur ce marché. La nouveauté de notre approche consiste en utilisation 
d´un nouvelle base de données sur les détentions de la dette par les investisseurs étrangers 
dans 20 pays émergents. La spécification empirique met en avant la dette en monnaie locale 
relative au PIB en tant que variable à expliquer et au niveau des variables explicatives on 
utilise la participation des étrangers et les indicateurs représentant la demande des institutions 
locales. La difficulté majeure de cette configuration est ancrée dans l´estimation jointe de la 
dette souveraine en monnaie locale et la partie de cette dette détenue par les étrangers. Pour 
cette raison-là on utilise la méthode de two-stage least squares (2SLS) avec les effets fixes et 
les instruments complexes et plausibles. 
Les résultats empiriques montrent que la demande des investisseurs étrangers est un facteur 
clé dans la croissance de la dette en monnaie locale dans les pays émergents tandis que la 
politique de taux bas de la Réserve fédérale des États-Unis qui reste la force derrière cette 
demande. Le second motif de la demande des étrangers est spéculatif, car les investisseurs 
étrangers achètent les obligations des pays où les banques centrales interviennent et la 
monnaie s´apprécie. Ce qui est surprenant c´est que les prévisions d´inflation et de croissance 
sont important pour la croissance de la dette locale et la demande des étrangers, mais le 
indicateurs institutionnels comme le risque politique, protection des investisseurs et 
l’Independence de la banque centrale jouent un rôle très limite. 
Les résultats empiriques présentés sont fondamentaux pour les investisseurs, les 
gouvernements et les régulateurs à l´égard de la normalisation de la politique monétaire et 
hausses des taux d´intérêt dans les pays avancés. 
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ARTICLE 1 
 
Drivers of foreign and domestic demand for sovereign bonds in developed 
and emerging economies: fundamentals vs. market sentiment1 
Abstract 
Using a new large dataset compiled from national sources this paper attempts to 
explain the determinants of demand for government debt from domestic institutions, foreign 
private holders and foreign central banks. On global scale, despite the recent increase in 
public debt the share of foreign holdings across countries increased significantly, indicating 
that spreading financial globalization might give ground to rising government indebtedness. 
However, this trend might not be persistent, as international private investors appear to update 
their assessment of credit risk over time.  
Prior to the global financial crisis, foreign private investors’ were purchasing bonds 
issued by developed countries with higher yields and growing public indebtedness 
irrespective of financial stress. After the 2008 crisis, during periods of high global risk 
aversion, foreign investors sold bonds of Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging Markets and 
purchase debt of Core Eurozone countries. Also, during post-crisis period foreign investors 
purchasing bonds significantly contributed to falling bond yields in some countries while 
outflows were associated with increasing yields in others. In turn, foreign central banks 
purchase bonds with low yields, higher growth and higher credit ratings, and sell under rising 
spreads or rating downgrades. Interestingly, bond purchases by foreign central banks are also 
driven by the global market sentiment. Finally, the relationship between bond yields and 
holdings differs from country to country in terms of coefficient sign and significance level. 
Author: Tomasz Orpiszewski 
Keywords: Sovereign risk, public domestic debt, credit ratings, emerging economies, 
Eurozone economies 
JEL Classification: F34, G15, H63  
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 I am extremely grateful for the comments to the participants of Conference on Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Management at Bank of Canada (2013), Euroframe 2013 conference, ZEW Summer Workshop 2013, UECE 
Conference in Lisbon 2013 and Bifec Conference 2013, as well as Orcun Kaya from (Goethe University / 
Deutsche Bank Research) and Alexandros Kontonikas (University of Glasgow), Manolis Davradakis (AXA IM) 
ARTICLE 1 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 47 
 
I. Introduction 
      This paper sheds new light on the dynamics of the government debt market from 
investors’ point of view. While the lion’s share of existing literature on government debt is 
dedicated to the mechanics of sovereign default and international capital flows, however to 
this day it remains is unclear what drives investors having different investment strategies, 
horizons and constraints to purchase government bonds at home and abroad. The objective of 
this paper is to identify common and country-specific determinants of demand for local 
currency debt: macroeconomic and fiscal indicators, yields, sovereign credit ratings, or simply 
market sentiment. To analyse the differences in investment decisions I introduce a new 
dataset on government bond holdings in 28 emerging and developed economies based on 
national sources. Within each country I am able to track between 3 and 20 years of history 
and distinguish between private and official non-resident holders and different categories of 
domestic banks, investment funds, pension funds and insurance companies and domestic 
central banks.  
Another novelty of this article consists in analysing the evolution and drivers of the 
investor base in countries characterized by different levels of development and stability, 
different currency regimes, and under different global market conditions. Thanks to 
significant representation of developing and developed economies, relatively long historical 
series and relatively high data frequency it is possible to capture medium-term dynamics in 
the investor base at different levels of financial stress.  
In a review of empirical literature on sovereign debt Tomz and Wright (2013) and 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) state that the relationship between sovereign 
default and composition and dynamics of the investors base remains widely unexplored. Since 
the beginning of the Eurozone crisis several researchers, Andritzky (2012a), (Merler and 
Pisani-Ferry 2012) and (Arslanalp and Takahiro 2012), presented new datasets on developed 
economies drawing attention to foreign bondholders. As for emerging economies, the lion’s 
part of existing reports and academic literature on emerging economies focuses on the impact 
of foreign purchases on yields or yields volatility, e.g. (Peiris 2010), or on foreign-currency 
debt, e.g. (Eichengreen and Mody 1998). The objective of this paper is to gain a broader 
perspective of the demand for government debt and explain the dynamics of investor 
behaviour through the prism of observable macroeconomic and fiscal factors, global factors, 
influence of rating agencies and market sentiment. 
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The key findings are the following. While the global amount of outstanding government 
debt more than tripled between 2001 and 2011, the share of foreign holdings across countries 
increased from 20% to 28% indicating that rising indebtedness might be coupled with 
spreading financial globalization. Interestingly, foreign central banks have been stocking 
government debt at a greater pace than international private investors and at the end of 2011 
central banks’ holdings were only slightly below private stocks. Investor structure varies 
strongly across countries. While foreign investors hold between 40% and 90% of government 
debt issued by Eurozone countries with Germany, France and Netherlands being most 
exposed to external demand, 90% of Japanese and 70% of US, UK and Danish debt is held 
domestically. Also, the share of foreign investors holding emerging market debt has been 
consistently rising over the last ten years reaching record levels in May 2013. 
Econometric findings indicate that prior to the crisis that international private investors, 
banks and investment funds were return seekers that purchase government bonds when bond 
prices increase. Not surprisingly, risk perception by international investors evolved over time. 
Prior to the crisis private international investors tend were purchasing debt of countries with 
higher growth, rising public indebtedness and higher yields. From 2007 onwards international 
private flows were directed to countries with lower yield levels and, perhaps more 
importantly, private inflows are significantly related to falling sovereign yields in some 
countries while outflows are associated with increasing yields in others. In turn, foreign 
central banks purchase bonds at low yields and better credit ratings, and sell under rising 
spreads or rating downgrades. 
As far as fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals are concerned, the results are also 
startling. Changes in domestic holdings are significantly associated with rising public 
indebtedness, but appear to be uncoupled from credit or business cycles. Before 2008, 
countries experiencing rising public indebtedness, in particular Greece and Spain, attracted 
inflows of international private investors, while official sector investors withdrew funds from 
those countries. After the crisis purchases by both types of investors appear to be associated 
with credit growth rather than public indebtedness. 
In terms of sensitivity of domestic investors to global risk aversion, I find that 
investment funds in Safe Haven countries tend to purchase domestic bonds when uncertainty 
rises, while rising risk pushes asset managers in Emerging Economies sell domestic bonds. As 
for private non-resident investors, results for the crisis period indicate that under high global 
risk aversion they sell bonds of Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging Markets and purchase debt 
of Core Eurozone countries. However, I find no evidence for flight-to-safety effects in Safe 
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Haven countries. What is surprising is that bond purchases by foreign central banks are 
significantly associated with waves of global risk sentiment. As financial crisis escalated 
foreign central banks suddenly sold bonds of Peripheral Eurozone countries and bought bonds 
of Safe Haven and Core Eurozone. As a result the share of debt held by foreign central banks 
reached over 40% in France and Germany. 
Given rising importance of sovereign risk and advancing financial integration, monitoring 
holdings of government debt becomes increasingly relevant for global financial stability. 
II. Holders of government debt: new dataset and classification 
II.1. The new dataset 
This new dataset has been created using data from national sources, mainly central banks, 
ministries of finance, statistical authorities and depositories. It includes historical series of 
holdings of debt instruments issued in local currency by governments in 28 countries located 
in Europe, North and Latin America, and Asia. Economies covered by this study differ in 
terms of size, currency of issuance, macroeconomic stability, currency regime, level of 
indebtedness and level of development of the financial sector. Presence of emerging 
economies together with non-euro developed countries provides a broader and more universal 
view on evolution of the investor base than the existing cross-country datasets constructed by 
(Andritzky 2012a), (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012) which focus on developed countries and 
comparable to the two datasets by (Arslanalp and Takahiro 2012) covering separately 
developed and emerging economies. Comparison in terms of geographic coverage is included 
in the Appendix Table 3. 
In this study I focus on the period 1996 to 2012, which covers several crises in emerging 
and developed markets, the creation of the Euro Zone and the gradual development of local 
currency debt markets in emerging economies. In terms of historical timespan it is in line with 
the studies by (Andritzky 2012a), (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012) which start between 1996 
and 2004, and has better historical coverage than (Arslanalp and Takahiro 2012) which starts 
in 2004. Moreover, data for all countries is available at monthly or even quarterly frequency, 
which makes it possible to capture the short-term changes more efficiently than with annual 
data as it is the case in (Andritzky 2012a). 
Another strength of this database is presence of the maturity structure of bond 
holdings. As presented in Table 1, data for 13 out of 16 is published with distinction for bills 
and bonds. Moreover, data for Poland, Iceland and Peru include holdings by bond issue, 
whereas data for Czech Republic and Denmark shed light on holdings by year of maturity. 
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The key advantage is that, viewed from the risk aversion angle, distribution by maturity 
allows to verify different behaviour and apply different strategies at the short and long end of 
the curve when monetary and liquidity conditions change.  
 
II.2. Debtholder Classification 
The objective of the classification is to distinguish clearly between non-residents and 
various types of domestic holders following broadly the guidelines set by the European 
Commission2 and the IMF. The rationale behind classification goes back to inherent 
differences in interests, knowledge of financial markets and risk aversion. In reality only a 
handful of 16 countries considered in this study apply similar categorization. Furthermore, 
very few countries are in position to distinguish between different types of foreign 
bondholders. Number of investor categories and subcategories varies strongly between 
countries ranging from two in Portugal to 26 in Czech Republic. To circumvent this lack of 
consistency3 between datasets it is essential to regroup original categories into standardized 
one according to investor characteristics. As can be seen in Table 1, I developed a proprietary 
bondholder classification that would ensure most consistent number of categories across 
countries and focus on key categories: non-residents, banks, general government, insurance 
and pension funds, mutual funds, households and non-financial companies. While the 
attribution is straightforward for banks, non-residents and domestic central banks, classifying 
other domestic actors requires certain assumptions on investor profiles in terms of risk, return 
and investment horizons. Following this approach, I assume that pension and insurance funds 
are long-term oriented and less liquidity-driven and I merge these two categories into one 
group. In contrast, investment and mutual funds, more return-oriented and liquidity-prone, are 
compatible with objectives of financial auxiliaries like securities brokers.  
As for holdings of non-resident central banks, I use the Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset to retrieve statistics on holdings of government debt held as 
reserved assets by foreign central banks4. I convert those series into local currency and split 
the aggregate series of non-resident holdings reported by national sources into foreign official 
holdings (CIPS) and remaining private official holdings. In turn, data on debt held by 
                                                          
2
 Further information on European system of national and regional accounts (ESA95) is available on the Eurostat webpage. IMF 
Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB) is available on the IMF website. 
3
 Several datasets include negative figures, i.e. Japan Bonds 1998-1999 for Investment Funds, UK Bonds several observations between 2002 
and 2008 for Banks, Denmark bills in 2005, 2011, 2012 for Pension and Insurance Funds, Germany Bills 2006, 2008 and 2009 for Banks. 
Negative values have been removed from the analysis. 
4
 I use linear interpolation to convert data from annual to quarterly frequency. Arslanalp and Takahiro (2012) calculate quarterly series using 
total reserve assets including cash from Cofer, but this approach requires several approximations. 
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domestic central banks is available only in selected countries under analysis. To account for 
the government bond purchases initiated by the ECB via Securities Market Programme (SMP) 
in 2010 and 2011, following the approach of(Arslanalp and Takahiro 2012), I assume that the 
composition of purchases corresponded to the share of county’s debt in the total debt of 
countries covered by the program at a given period. I also assume that the bond purchases of 
Greek, Irish and Portuguese bonds started in 2010Q2, while Italian and Spanish bond 
acquisitions were launched at the beginning of 2011Q3.  
Except for South Africa, all countries publish statistics foreign holdings, herein 
understood as investors with no legal residence in issuer’s country. At the time of writing only 
the United States tracks and publishes the geographic location of holders. Foreign institutional 
investors operating on national soil are considered as a part of the domestic investor base 
since their legal status and regulation are constrained by national laws. Series on insurance 
and pension funds are published by 15 countries, and 14 sources inform on holdings of 
investment and mutual funds as well as non-bank intermediaries like dealers and brokers. Last 
but not least, Statistics available for Indonesia, Italy and Mexico include a large share of 
unattributed holdings. To rectify this incoherence, I assume that each investor group holds an 
equal amount of residual government bonds and attribute those holdings accordingly. (Lynge 
Nielsen 2011) observes that the methodologies of country classification by the IMF, World 
Bank and the UN has undergone significant evolution in the last 50 years. What is important 
with regard to my database is that IMF upgraded Czech Republic to the status of an advanced 
economy in respectively 1997 and 2009; however financial markets, e.g. MSCI indices, 
classify Czech Republic as an emerging economy. As a result, for consistency reasons I 
categorize Israel as developed non-euro country and Czech Republic as emerging economy 
throughout the period of analysis. 
 
II.3. Data Issues 
What can potentially distort the picture of bond holdings are differences in data 
sourcing and compilation. Interviews with Ministries of Finance, Central Banks and statistical 
authorities showed that holding data can be obtained either from security depositories where 
all transactions are registered or through direct reporting of financial institutions to 
authorities. It is unclear to what extent these differences at data sourcing level may affect the 
robustness and comparability between countries. 
Methodological consistency over time is also an issue. Several countries altered the 
statistical coverage over time, for instance since 2007 Brazil has been publishing two 
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historically overlapping datasets with different holder categories that do not match each other. 
In several smaller economies like Latvia and Czech Republic data is plagued with significant 
jumps that may result from changes in ownership or legal status of large institutional investors 
and is not necessarily related to a massive purchases or selloffs of securities. In Bulgaria and 
Brazil data on foreign holdings seem to be categorized as institutional investors registered in 
the country as banks or mutual funds. In Peru securities sold to foreign institutional investors 
eventually remain on the domestic market via structured financial transactions. 
Other factors susceptible of blurring the statistical comparison are related to 
recognition and reporting. In their statistics most authorities refer to central government debt 
only, four countries compile data at the federal level, i.e. including the securities issued by the 
state, and four countries do not provide any information at all. Several countries, for instance 
Germany, publish two distinct series with a different time horizon and investor categories. 
Since debt instruments issued by the regional governments are usually less liquid and less 
accessible for foreign investors than central government debt, I use the central government 
data wherever possible. 
 
II.4. Comparison with other datasets 
Existing cross-country studies based on national sources (Andritzky 2012a) 
and(Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012) classify domestic investors into banks, public/government 
sector, and central banks, leaving other domestic institutional investors apart. For the common 
set of countries their results are consistent with my findings. In turn, Arslanalp and Takahiro 
(2012) combined several datasets provided by the World Bank, IMF and BIS to estimate the 
participation of foreign private banks, foreign official sector holders, foreign non-banks as 
well as domestic banks, domestic central banks and domestic non-banks. Nevertheless authors 
mention that their work is not free of measurement errors. It is noteworthy that this approach 
yields significantly different statistical results than using national sources. Comparing my 
dataset compiled from national sources to the dataset created using international databases 
indicates an average absolute difference of 11% for domestic banks and 7% for non-residents. 
More importantly, the maximum absolute difference for a given period reaches 26% for 
domestic banks and 33% for non-residents. These differences can be attributed to some extent 
to the usage of general government debt and market values by the IMF in contrast to central 
government debt at nominal value in my base. To sum up, although those two approaches to 
data classification are not perfectly compatible and cannot be used interchangeably, 
international sources shed some light on distribution of non-resident holders, which is not 
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negligible in several developed countries. Appendix Table 1 presents differences in coverage 
between these datasets. 
 
III. Motives for holding government debt 
III.1. Global Safe Assets 
It is needless to say that rationale for holding global “safe haven” bonds, i.e. bonds of US, 
UK, Germany, France and several other developed economies, is different than purchasing 
debt of other countries. (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012) identify three key 
motives for holding U.S. government debt: 
1) Safety. Government bonds represent safe return compared to private sector securities, 
i.e. equities or corporate debt, and do not require complex and subjective credit 
valuation models. They are also used as refuge assets in times of rising risk aversion. 
This motive is particularly valid for households, investment funds, pension funds and 
foreign central banks.  
2) Neutrality. Local and state governments as well as foreign central banks are de facto 
restrained in their choice of private sector assets and can only hold bonds of domestic 
or foreign governments. 
3) Liquidity. Government bonds are typically the most liquid instruments in the market 
which is crucial for investors facing short-term liquidity constraints, i.e. households, 
mutual funds and credit institutions as well as central banks that manage actively large 
reserve positions.  
Empirical research on aggregate demand confirms the above-mentioned criteria for the 
case of United States Treasuries. (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012) find evidence 
that the supply of US government securities is closely related to the aggregate demand for 
liquidity on one hand, measured as the spread between Insured Certificates of Deposit and a 
Treasury bill of comparable maturity, and on the other hand to the aggregate demand for 
safety measured as the spread between Baa and AAA-rated instruments of comparable 
liquidity. Beber et al. (2009) show that in the European Monetary Union, the second largest 
supplier of reserve currencies, the relationship between liquidity and safety appears to be 
more complex. Their findings indicate that although in tranquil times sovereign yield spreads 
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can be explained by differences in credit risk, in times of financial stress investors tend to 
chase liquidity and not necessarily quality5.  
Surprisingly, academic research on the composition of demand for government debt 
remains scarce. (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2007) argue that different groups of 
government bondholders likely have different motives for holding US Treasuries and, as a 
result, have different elasticities to changes in the spread between corporate bonds and 
government debt. Their findings show that foreign central banks are least reactive to changes 
in government bond prices, whereas state governments and private domestic banks are in the 
middle range. In turn, households, mutual funds, insurance and pension funds as well as 
foreign private investors adjust their holdings of Treasuries very swiftly rebalance their 
portfolio as bond credit risk changes. Authors argue that U.S. Treasuries carry certain 
“convenience value” that rises when the supply of debt is low and falls when it is high. The 
convenience value is also the missing puzzle explaining why the demand curve for Treasury 
securities is not perfectly elastic.  
(B.S. Bernanke 2011) points towards strong heterogeneity in investment objectives 
driving foreign demand  for U.S. assets.  He presents evidence that between 2003 and 2007 
European investors allocated less than one third of their funds into AAA-rated US securities 
and the two thirds in high-yielding stocks as well as corporate and mortgage debt, while over 
75% of capital flows from “saving glut” countries to the US was invested in government and 
agency debt. These findings open the discussion what factors drive investors to purchase 
government bonds issued by safe havens. 
 
Hypothesis 1: in Safe Haven and Core Eurozone countries, private investors are driven by 
returns in normal times and rebalance towards safety and liquidity under financial distress 
Hypothesis 2: foreign central banks are likely to seek safety, liquidity and exchange rate 
stability 
 
III.2. Global safe assets, international imbalances and asset shortages 
The dynamics of demand and supply of investable capital differs between developed 
countries and emerging markets. In certain emerging countries national savings exceed 
investment opportunities. In financially open economies excess savings are being channelled 
                                                          
5
 It is Ŷoteǁoƌthy that authoƌs’ aŶalysis tiŵefƌaŵe spaŶs fƌoŵ Apƌil Ϯ00ϯ to DeĐeŵďeƌ Ϯ00ϰ ǁheƌe the 
magnitude of the turbulence was lower than during the banking and sovereign crisis of 2008 and 2010. 
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to developed economies, while in less financially open economies excess savings are invested 
in domestic debt which lead to higher bond prices. 
In a memorable lecture (Ben S. Bernanke 2005) explained that, although primary 
motive of those purchases goes back to the objective of foreign currency stability, what drives 
demand for US debt are excess savings accumulated in emerging economies that are not 
invested at home. In consequence, interest payments on capital invested in “safe haven” result 
in improving current account balances in investor countries and deteriorating in recipient 
countries, in other words “savings glut” in emerging economies translates into global 
imbalances. (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2006) suggested that global imbalances, 
conundrum of low bond yields and speculative bubbles fall in the same basket as asset 
shortages in emerging economies. Through a theoretical analysis authors show that 
underdeveloped domestic financial sector leads to emergence of real estate bubbles financed 
by overexposed domestic institutions and international investors who undervalue the risk. 
Authors state that governments can tame the formation of domestic asset bubbles by opening 
the capital account or by issuing public debt that crowds out private investment. However, 
efficiency of such sterilization is guaranteed only if debt issuance is large, which can lead to 
excessive indebtedness in the long run. 
 Chen and Imam (2013) analyse a large set of emerging economies between 1996 and 
2008 and realize that, despite strong economic growth, the development of  equity and 
corporate bond markets has not been adequate to the rise in domestic savings. Asset 
shortages, defined as the difference between national savings and capital invested in assets at 
home and abroad, are more likely to occur in larger countries with lower credit rating and 
facing positive fiscal balances and lower trade openness. Global factors like higher world 
GDP growth and higher US interest rates tend to reduce asset shortages pushing domestic 
exporters to seek financing for new projects. Finally, domestic asset bubbles resulting from 
excess savings are significantly related to capital openness, lower government stability and 
higher corruption. 
Hypothesis 3: domestic investors are likely to hold more domestic bonds in countries 
prone to asset shortages, i.e. where level of development, market capitalization and financial 
openness is lower 
 
III.3. International investors and bond yields: chasing returns? 
Several empirical studies indicate that international investors are in general return 
chasers. Empirical findings of (Bohn and Tesar 1996) show that international equity investors 
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tend to move into markets with high expected future returns that are on average sub-optimal 
from the risk diversification point of view. In bond markets, however, the causation between 
yields and foreign participation remains more ambiguous.  
 Warnock and Warnock (2009) revisit Alan Greenspan’s statement that, compared to 
the impact of falling inflation expectations and yield volatility on the long end of the curve, 
foreign capital inflows contributed only marginally, by less than 50 basis points, to the long-
lasting reduction in yields in the United States. Their analysis of long-term yields between 
1984 and 2005 indicated that, controlling for other factors, without foreign demand Treasury 
yields at the end of 2005 would be almost 80 basis points higher, significantly higher than 
predicted by Alan Greenspan. In a recent cross-country study on bondholders (Andritzky 
2012a) shows that in developed countries, including large Eurozone members, lower 
government yields are usually associated with higher participation of foreign investors. 
 Looking at a set of ten emerging economies, (Peiris 2010) finds that one per cent 
increase in foreign participation lowers long-term bond yields by 6 bps on average6. However, 
contrarily to authors’ expectations, impact of foreign holdings on bond volatility differs 
between countries and remains widely unexplained7. 
Other studies prove the contrary. Tokuoka (2010) focuses on the relationship between 
low yields on Japanese bonds and participation of foreign investors, central bank and 
household and corporate sectors8. Contrarily to other studies, he finds that one percentage 
point increase of foreign ownership of JGBs pushes up the yield by ca. 11 basis points, which 
is non-negligible assuming that Japanese yields oscillated between 1.5% and 2.0% over the 
period 1998 – 2009. In turn, one percentage point rise in financial wealth of domestic 
institutions and households lowers bond yields by 2 basis points. Author suggests three Japan-
specific factors may be at origin at those findings: large pool of household assets accumulated 
through high saving rates, strong home bias and risk aversion of the household sector, and 
existence of large and stable institutional holders9. (Burger, Warnock, and Warnock 2010) 
find that that past bond returns or exchange rate volatility did not influence foreigners’ 
investment decision in emerging economies. 
                                                          
6
 Dataset from Asiabondonline and IMF Country Desk. Authors control for nominal short-term policy rates, 
inflation, fiscal deficit, current account deficit, US interest rate. They also verify the robustness towards cyclical 
factors, proxied by GDP growth, and global risk aversion, proxied by VIX 
7
 Results obtained from Garch model are significant only in four out of ten countries and show that, in reaction to 
increased foreign purchases, bond volatility tends to rise in Korea and fall in Malaysia, Mexico and Turkey. 
8
 Household and corporate sectors are proxied by net financial wealth held by household. Author control for 
gross debt and participation of Bank of Japan 
9
 Japan Post Bank and the Government Pension Investment Fund were holding over 30% of debt in 2006 
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In a comment on the interest rate conundrum (Wu 2005) states that what remains unclear 
is how domestic investors, who hold the lion’s share of domestic debt, would react if foreign 
investors started to withdraw funds from the US Treasury market and if the increase in 
domestic demand would not be sufficient to counter-balance the effect on yields. (Beltran et 
al. 2012) analyze government bond prices and foreign demand can be to some extent biased 
by autocorrelation, ambiguity of causation between yields and foreign demand and 
unobservable factors driving long-term yields. Last but not least, except for (Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen 2007) no study decomposes foreign flows into private and official 
capital. 
 
III.4. International investors: sensitivity to fundamentals and global factors 
Large discrepancies in the impact of foreign holdings on bond prices have three main 
implications. First, country-specific factors should be taken into consideration, second, 
influence of domestic investor groups plays a role, and third that foreign investors are not 
purely return-oriented and other factors need to be considered. Several studies show that it 
may indeed be the case. 
(Kee-Hong Bae, Young Sup Yun, and Warren Bailey 2006) examine bilateral bond 
holdings across 45 countries using point in time analysis for 2001 and 2002 and, after 
controlling for the level of development, find that stronger property rights are associated with 
higher foreign investment in country’s bond markets relative to GDP10. (Li L. Ong and Pipat 
Luengnaruemitchai 2005) argue that foreign investors play an important role in providing 
liquidity to the market and, due to enhanced monitoring, exert pressure on the authorities to 
improve governance and transparency. (Burger, Warnock, and Warnock 2010) analyse the 
allocation of US investment to local-currency emerging market bonds and find that US 
investors exhibit preference for countries with investor-friendly institutions, lower capital 
controls and taxation and better creditor rights. Other significant factors include a larger 
domestic investor base, represented as share of pension and investment funds, and lower share 
of foreign denominated debt. Last but not least, the (BIS 2011) and discussions with managers 
of bond funds show that investment criteria include also withholding taxes, issuance at longer 
maturities, breadth and liquidity of derivatives markets, and effective transaction cost in those 
markets. 
                                                          
10
 Authors construct a dataset based on Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF) that includes both local 
and foreign currency bonds issued by corporates and governments 
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In theory, capital markets should lend only to creditworthy borrowers and limit 
funding when debt overhang arises. In reality, investors’ risk perception and allocation is 
strongly associated with business and credit cycles in creditors’ countries. In the seminal work 
(Fernandez-Arias 1996) argues that although creditworthiness of financial institutions in a 
given country are associated with global interest rates. What matters most are the monetary 
conditions in the creditor country and not necessarily in the borrowing country. (Kodres, 
Hartelius, and Kashiwase 2008) show that compression of bond spreads in emerging markets 
between 2002 and 2008 was due not only to improvement in country-specific fundamentals, 
but also to global liquidity conditions, measured in terms of expectations and volatility of fed 
funds futures. (Gros 2011) states that during boom episodes countries receiving large capital 
inflows that boost their fundamentals and makes the country risk appear lower than it is in 
reality. When the bust finally arrives, the slowdown in incoming flows curbs investment and 
pushes investors to re-evaluate risk. (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2008) look at the 
intra-regional investments in bond securities in Europe, Asia and Latin America over 2001-
2003. Interestingly, the results show that investment is not always directed towards the 
countries with higher interest rates, but usually come from countries with lower rates. 
Investment rationale also seems to consider level of development, credit rating and financial 
openness. (Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi 1998) show that international bond flows react 
to global factors, proxied by the US interest rate and US industrial production, and are 
particularly sensitive to country-specific credit rating and debt price. 
Hypothesis 4: both local and global factors influence demand for government bonds 
hence investors with global exposure should react to changes in both local and international 
rates 
 
III.5. Market Sentiment and Mispricing 
Domestic investors tend to perceive government bonds at home as risk-free 
investment. However, international investors who can compare and trade debt of several 
countries could perceive same bonds as relatively risky. Should market pressure increase at 
some stage, also sophisticated domestic investors can re-evaluate the default probability of 
domestic government and domestic bonds can lose the risk-free status. 
In a theoretical setting with domestic and international interbank markets, (Freixas 
2005) shows that, due to information asymmetry and different valuation of investment risk, 
cost of foreign borrowing differ from domestic rates. Empirical studies conducted on different 
asset classes indicate that domestic and foreign investors are likely to value perceive risk and 
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return differently. Kang et al. (2010) assume that if domestic investors are subject to home 
bias and foreign investors are return-chasers on global scale, valuation criteria of each group 
should differ. By applying domestic and global benchmarks to stocks in Korea, authors find 
two interesting patterns. First, domestic or foreign valuations differ, and, second, non-
residents hold stocks for which their valuation is higher than that of domestic investors. 
(Andrade and Kohlscheen 2010) analyse the differences in exchange rate forecasts provided 
by domestic and foreign institutions around presidential elections of 2002 in Brazil and 
discover foreign predictions over one to three years were significantly more pessimistic than 
domestic investors. In a large cross-country study over 2001-2003, Bae et al. (2008) find that 
the local advantage gains importance in countries with lower quality of information, smoothed 
earnings, and most importantly, lower presence of foreign and institutional investors.  
It is widely assumed that if financial markets are not perfectly efficient, asset valuation is 
not consistent over time and corrections in valuation may result in sudden and strong price 
variations. However, empirical studies show also that these variations may at times be driven 
by market sentiment rather than sound analysis. 
(Eichengreen and Mody 2000) analyse a large set of emerging market corporate and 
government bonds issued in foreign currencies held between 1991 and 1997 and conclude that 
changes in spreads are driven mainly by shifts in market sentiment rather than shifts in 
fundamentals. Their findings indicate that in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis, around 1996 
and 1997, markets took a more benign view on fundamentals in emerging markets and, as 
consequence, secondary sovereign spreads fell significantly. Surprisingly, with the escalation 
of the East Asian crisis yields across emerging economies shot up again, even though macro 
fundamentals in economies outside Asia were almost unaffected. Authors describe this 
phenomenon as irrational exuberance11.  (Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler 2007) analyse 
phenomena of bond spread compression in ten new Central and Eastern European members of 
the European Union that occurred despite economists’ warning on rising vulnerabilities and 
ended in sudden upward revision of risk in 2007. Looking at residuals between fundamentals 
and bond prices authors hypothesize that the investors irrational exuberance was fuelled by 
expected improvements in fiscal discipline, implicit guarantee of a EU-initiated bailout in 
case of sovereign insolvency, and future membership in the Europrean Monetary.  
                                                          
11
 It is noteworthy that at the time liquidity in the emerging market bond sector was significantly lower and 
transparency and economic coverage weaker than in the subsequent decade, hence the jumps in yields are 
more remarkable. 
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Fratzscher (2012) looks at capital flows between 2005 and 2010 and observes that prior to 
the crisis and directly afterwards, capital flows were directed to countries with lower credit 
rating, while between 2007 and 2009 they shifted towards safe havens. Forbes and Warnock 
(2012) focus on episodes of sudden portfolio in- and outflows in developed and emerging 
economies in over 50 countries between 1980 and 2009. Their results indicate that that 
increases in global risk aversion cause both foreign and domestic investors to exit emerging 
markets and shift funds to safe havens12.  
De Grauwe and Ji (2012) find that between 2000 and 2008 yields of the Eurozone 
countries were broadly disconnected from underlying fiscal fundamentals and current account 
balances and that the escalation of the crisis brought a structural change in the market 
perception of sovereign risk, while in “stand-alone” countries, notably the UK, US, Denmark 
and Japan bond yields continuously reflected the underlying data. Authors conclude that 
government bond markets in a monetary union are structurally more fragile and more 
susceptible to switch from positive to negative equilibria that end with self-fulfilling crisis, as 
hypothesized in De Grauwe (2012). Analysing the determinants of bond yields in G7 
countries between 1993 and 2012 D’Agostino and Ehrmann (2012) find that, in case of 
French and Italian bond spreads, risk factors have been priced in the up-run of the monetary 
union and following the outbreak of the financial crisis, but not in the first years of the 
monetary union. Finally, looking at changes in foreign holdings of government bonds across 
Europe Andritzky (2012a) observed a significant short-term response to shocks in yield that 
was particularly visible in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Decomposition of yield 
volatility in those countries suggests that non-resident participation is driven to more extent 
by the residuals than by macroeconomic controls explaining the yields. 
Hypothesis 5: foreign investors are more likely to be driven by market sentiment than 
domestic institutions 
 
III.6. Sovereign risk and discrimination between domestic and foreign 
investors 
For over three decades researchers have been trying to answer the question why 
governments repay their debt. In the absence of legal punishment and enforcement 
mechanism, the choice between repayment and repudiation depends not only on actual 
capacity to service debt, but mainly on the discretionary choice between living with the debt 
                                                          
12
 Findings show also that increases in Global Interest Rate, here proxied by the US Treasury Rate, are 
associated retranchment episodes 
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burden or facing consequences of default. Following (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981) line of 
reasoning, in numerous countries where the share of foreign investors holding domestic debt 
is elevated and potential consequences of external default for domestic financial institutions 
are limited, government could prefer to default rather than to repay. As suggested by Bulow 
and Rogoff (1989), government’s political willingness to repay depends primarily on the size 
of debt, currency of denomination and residence of bondholders. However, in a recent review 
of empirical literature on sovereign debt Tomz and Wright (2013) conclude that the 
relationship between government’s default incentives and debt  composition has not been 
analysed empirically to this day. 
As far as external debt is concerned, in the seminal article on sovereign default Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981) initially suggested that governments repay foreign debt out of fear of 
being excluded from international trade or from lending abroad for a sustained period. Zymek 
(2012) finds evidence that between 1980 and 2007 in most developed and emerging countries 
an increase in default risk was followed by a contraction in the exports sectors that were 
dependent on foreign financing. As for the post-default cost of borrowing, empirical studies, 
Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011) among others, find evidence that even serial defaulters are 
able to return to the markets relatively swiftly and on acceptable conditions. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011) find evidence that domestic and external default are vaguely correlated with 
each other. Díaz-Cassou and Erce (2010) report that episodes of discrimination between 
domestic and foreign creditors indeed occurred in the past. Out of ten recent default episodes, 
four discriminated against foreign creditors, three adopted equal treatment, while particularly 
dramatic default episodes in Argentina, Russia and Ukraine resulted in preferential treatment 
to foreign creditors.  However in certain cases it may be difficult to identify the type of holder 
and default selectively on domestic or foreign bondholders, as suggested by Guembel and 
Sussman (2009) among others, due to high dispersion among investors or due to inability to 
track holdings. 
Hypothesis 1: Non-resident investors may be discriminated in case of an external 
default and are more likely to be driven by  credit risk than domestic investors 
 
IV. Empirical Methodology 
In this section I discuss the choice of explanatory variables and the estimation methodology 
for the battery of tests in different constellations and on different country sub-groups. 
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IV.1. Debt sustainability  
Unconstrained global investors typically analyse investment in government bonds 
through the prism of potential returns for a given level of risk, probability of deterioration in 
public finances, macroeconomic fundamentals, external vulnerabilities and institutional 
quality. 
In absence of the underlying collateral potential recovery value of sovereign debt in 
case of default is almost impossible to estimate. Therefore, the value of government debt 
depends mainly on the underlying probability of repayment which, in turn, depends on both 
current liquidity situation and long-term sustainability of public finances. Hence, in the short-
term, rational investors should monitor and react to changes in the debt burden and current 
fiscal balances, while investors with a long-term investment horizon are more likely to focus 
on structural indicators of the future fiscal situation.  
To render public debt sustainable in the long-term government focus should lie on 
structural  variables, such as the trend in economic growth, inflation, structural primary fiscal 
balances and low cost of borrowing13. To capture the change in these variables I follow the 
general sustainability equation as presented by Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Alessia (2010): 
Eq. 1                                    
Where, bt is the debt to GDP ratio, pbt is the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, gt is the 
trend in real GDP growth calculating with the Hodrick-Prescott recursive filter, πt represents 
inflation and rt stands for the synthetic interest rate calculated as follows. 
Giovannini and De Melo (1993) state that it is almost impossible to calculate the 
representative interest rate on domestic liabilities due to insufficient data availability. To 
calculate the cost of borrowing I follow the idea of Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) who 
calculated the historical weighted-average yield of all outstanding government bonds. Not 
being in possession of this dataset, I assume that the weighted average debt service cost would 
be equal to the bond yield for maturity at time t corresponding to the weighted-average 
maturity of total outstanding debt at time t. The final measure is                                 Eq. 2 
 
where r = effective cost of  debt, i = nominal interest rate on a government bond of maturity    , whereas    = debt-weighted average maturity of outstanding government debt at time t 
                                                          
13
 Further considerations include demographic projections, aging trends, dependency ratio, share of working-
age population, employment, etc. 
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for the entire maturity range. For the debt-weighted maturity I use the data provided by the 
BIS or OECD, or if the yield on 5 Year government bond not available. Due to limited data 
availability for all missing maturities I use linear interpolation between 1 or 2 years, 
whichever is available, and 10 years. I also assume that the non-marketable debt bears the 
same cost as the marketable debt. In result, for each period of analysis, the cost of borrowing 
in the sustainability equation corresponds to the observed yield on government bond of 
maturity which is equal to the weighted average maturity of the entire outstanding 
government debt. Obviously, it would be precise to calculate the debt-weighted average 
effective cost, but the composition of debt necessary for this calculation is not available for 
set of countries.  
 Sustainability exercise is more complex for developing countries where the 
share of foreign currency denominated debt oscillates on average between 10% and 30%, and 
in case of Bulgaria, Hungary, Indonesia and Peru exceeds 40%. Since historical data on the 
cost of foreign currency borrowing is not available for the countries in the dataset I assume 
that the covered interest rate parity holds in the long term and that governments hedge their 
currency exposures, which is a suitable basis to approximate the cost of foreign currency debt 
to be comparable with cost of local currency debt. In consequence, I apply domestic interest 
rate on the total central government debt, in both local and foreign currencies.  
While economic growth and primary balance have been adjusted for the cyclical 
elements, interest rate is taken at the observed market value which makes it more credible 
knowing that investors apply the world rate in their valuation models. Also, in reality to 
calculate fiscal sustainability professional financial analysts use multi-period models, but 
unfortunately past forecasts of economic growth and fiscal indicators are not available for the 
period of analysis14.  
While professional investors can forecast the future path of growth and budget 
balances, projecting the cost of borrowing remains a difficult task. By accounting identity, 
investment spending financed by budget deficits may must be financed either from national 
savings or net foreign borrowing. Since borrowing from domestic institutions may result in 
crowding out of private investment, it is in country’s interest to maintain steady access to 
international borrowing. Analysing the sustainability of the U.S. debt Labonte (2012) states 
that investors are likely to demand low interest rates as long as they remain convinced by 
government’s fiscal policy. In fact, external financing can be extremely burdensome even at 
                                                          
14
 Publicly accessible past forecasts of GDP growth and fiscal balances provided in the historical editions IMF 
World Economic Outlook for the entire set of countries start de facto around 2009.  
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seemingly low levels. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 82003) find evidence that serial 
sovereign defaulters frequently were unable to refinance themselves at debt to GDP ratios that 
were well below the euro area’s “Maastricht Treaty” bound of 60 per cent. A rating 
downgrade or inconclusive behaviour of the government may change the sentiment among 
investors which would automatically result in higher yields. This goes back to the debt 
sustainability equation, since effective future cost of borrowing depend on the rates demanded 
by the market.  
IV.2. Macroeconomic indicators 
Macroeconomic conditions are a key input for both domestic and foreign actors when 
taking investment decisions and changes in these conditions affect valuation of their holdings. 
In turn, domestic investors are directly exposed to changes in growth, inflation as well as 
interest and exchange rates.  
Growth in Credit Growth -  growth in credit has been at the source of numerous 
banking crisis and asset bubbles, as indicated by  Borio and Drehmann (2009) among others 
Current account balance – current account encompasses the balance of trade, i.e. net 
exports or imports, and factor income, i.e. interest or dividend paid or received from abroad. It 
measures net foreign assets or liabilities incurred over a given period, hence negative current 
account deficit means that an economy is absorbing more than it is producing and its long-
term liability is rising, which may lead to higher default probability for foreign currency debt. 
Strongly positive current account balances may be a sign of asset shortages, as explained by 
Caballero (2006) among others. 
Financial openness. It appears that financial openness acts as a double-edge sword. On 
one hand, Mehl and Reynaud (2010) found that the removal of capital controls helps lower 
domestic ‘original sin’, and decrease the shape of foreign-currency debt. On the other hand, in 
a seminal paper Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) explain that financial liberalization together 
with opening of financial account elevate the frequency and the severity of currency and 
banking crisis. However, in a later study Edwards (2004) shows that financial openness does 
not necessarily amplify the effects of  capital account reversals. Last but not least, Kaminsky 
(2008) argues that capital controls protect inefficient domestic financial institutions leading to 
financial vulnerabilities. To measure the determinants of demand for bonds with regard to the 
last two factors I use synthetic indices provided by Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2008) which 
are well adapted for this dataset for two reasons. First, they reflect the path of exchange rate 
stability and capital account openness pursued in the developing countries, in particularly in 
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the Eurozone, at the cost of reduced monetary independence. Second, trilemma indices reflect 
the development towards intermediate levels of the index observable in emerging markets in 
the recent years. 
Sovereign Credit Ratings – following the linear approach to rating conversion 
presented by Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) I attribute each sovereign credit rating provided by 
S&P, Fitch and Moody’s a numeric value ranging from 5 for Caa, i.e. lowest rating above 
default, to 100 for AAA, i.e. safest assets. This approach does not reflect the idea that 
differences between low-grade ratings may have different importance for investors than at 
high-grades, or that ratings on the verge of investment or non-investment grade, however 
inconsistencies  remain relatively limited. 
Institutional quality. I use the Worldwide Governance Indicators based on surveys 
conducted by the World Bank among citizens and companies in numerous developing and 
industrialized countries. I look at the political stability and absence of violence, which reflects 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, and government effectiveness, which Reflects perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the degree of its independence from political pressures and credibility of the 
government's commitment to implement announced policies. 
 Risk  Aversion. To gauge market sentiment I use the Citigroup Macro Risk Aversion 
Index. To measure political uncertainty I use the European Uncertainty Index developed by 
Baker, Bloom and Davis which is based on non-market data, i.e. newspaper coverage, future 
changes in the tax code, and disagreement among economic forecasters. 
IV.3. Methodology: Core specification 
Since my objective is to analyse the drivers of demand for government bonds I apply 
panel specification similar to Mehl and Reynaud (2010) and Emanuele Baldacci and Kumar 
(2010) to analyse the macroeconomic, fiscal and market determinants of holdings of different 
investor groups. Panel data approach is not only efficient with dealing with relatively short 
time series of quarterly data, but also allows to  analyse the impact of country-specific 
variables across a group of countries with macroeconomic fundamentals, institutional setting 
and size of domestic capital market. It is noteworthy that my objective and methodological 
approach differ those chosen by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) and Andritzky 
ARTICLE 1 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 66 
 
(2012b), who use holding data as independent variables to explain respectively new debt 
issuance15 and bond yields. 
Specifically, I intend to explain the new demand, i.e. change in holdings of 
government debt, by specific investor types, namely (i=1) for private non-residents, (i=2) for 
official non-residents, (i=3) for banks, (i=4) for pension and insurance funds, (i=5) for 
investment and mutual funds.  
Eq. 3                                         
Where      is the log of investor-specific holdings in local currency. While the use of log 
values is necessary due to the obvious difference in size between countries, I focus on the 
actual holdings rather than the share in total debt in order to account for the abrupt rise in 
outstanding debt that occurred between 2008 and 2012. This argument is valid not only in 
Japan where debt to GDP has been consistently growing over the entire time horizon, but also 
for Ireland and Spain where public indebtedness more than doubled between 2007 and 2010. 
Basic reduced-form model, estimated for a panel of 16 economies denominated j and time 
span t between Q1 1999 and Q3 2011, consist of the following: 
    Eq. 4                                  
Where j and t are the country and time dimensions respectively,     measures the change in 
investor holdings Eq. 3,        is the vector of explanatory variables and   a vector of 
estimated parameters, z is the number of explanatory variables. Residuals are split into 
unobserved country effects; noted     and panel level effects     that are independent of    .  
In the baseline regression the equation takes the following form for all investor types and 
regions: 
Eq. 5                                                                                                                                                     
                                                          
15
 Supply is defined as the spread between AAA-rated securities, which includes agency debt and high grade 
corporates, and Treasuries. It follows (Longstaff 2004) finding that government debt supply is correlated with 
the spread between Treasuries and the bonds issued by Refcorp. 
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IV.4. Methodology: Robustness and Coefficients Stability  
Construction and heterogeneity of the dataset, choice of a turbulent time period and 
several data issues necessitate commensurate test and estimation. Each of the following tests 
is conducted separately for each investor class without distinction for country groups. 
i. Structural Breaks and Stationarity 
To verify the presence of unit root in the investor holding under analysis I conduct 
Fisher unit root tests for using both Philips Perron Estimation and Advanced Dickey Fuller. 
Results presented in Appendix Table 7 show that series in level contain unit roots, but first 
difference renders them stationary.  
The dataset is not free of structural breaks that are related to two factors. First, as 
described in the section on data issues, the panel is not entirely free of statistical 
inconsistencies, changes in classification by the national sources and subjective attribution to 
investment categories and which is also the reason why structural breaks occur at different 
time periods for different panels. Second, financial crisis has brought a true structural change 
in behaviour of several investors. In consequence, the dataset contains structural breaks that 
are individual for each panel, à priori unknown and can occur at several instances in each 
panel which has important implications for the of unit root tests. Last but not least, Cavaliere 
(2005) and Xu and Cavaliere (forthcoming) show that the regular unit root tests applied to 
bounded variables may also fail to reject the unit root and cointegration hypothesis even if the 
series are actually stationary. For each I implement the test described in Clemente, Montañés,  
and Reyes (1998) which takes into account presence of one or two unknown structural breaks. 
Applying the test on 15 years of quarterly data  of long-term interest rates in the US and UK 
authors have shown that the test performs well with relatively short datasets and even if there 
are less than 30 observations between structural breaks. I run the test for additive (AO) and 
innovational outlier (IO) unit root for one, or if necessary two, unknown breaks for each 
country individually and, with few exceptions, state that the dataset is not stationary at 
intercept or individual trends, but differencing results in stationary series for both share and 
log of the series. Results are presented in Appendix Tables 8 to 18. 
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ii. Panel Homogenity, Serial Correlation, Cross-section Dependence, 
Co-integration, Heteroskedasticity,  
For each type of investor I test the homogeneity of my panel, as described Hsiao 
(2003), and find that panel intercepts and coefficients are homogenous and that random 
effects are preferred to fixed effects. Results of Hausman test presented in Appendix Table 7 
additionally confirm these findings. However Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for 
difference variances across entities between the models with or without random effects 
indicate that random effects do not significantly improve the estimation precision. 
To verify the presence of serial correlation I use standard procedure described in 
Drukker (2003). Although serial correlation does not affect unbiasedness or consistency of the 
estimators, it can have a significant impact on efficiency and in consequence affect the 
estimated standard errors. Results in Appendix Table 7 show that errors are serially correlated 
for non-resident official investors and banks.  
To verify cross-section dependence under  fixed country effect for each investor type I 
run a Pesaran (2004) test on the dependent variable alone, and subsequently for the baseline 
regression. Test results in Appendix Table 8 show that the cross-section dependence is present 
for all investor types except investment funds where the limited sample size does not allow 
for a definite conclusion. I assume that all holding series are cross-section dependent by 
nature and correct this issue. If the cross-section dependence is not corrected, the coefficient 
estimates from standard panel estimators are likely to be consistent, but their efficiency may 
be very low. 
I also detect groupwise heteroskedasticity using standard Wald test for fixed effects 
models, results are presented in Appendix Table 7. 
iii. Method of Estimation  
I apply pooled estimation for the full sample and country groups while controlling for 
cross-section dependence, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The technique of 
estimation of the variance covariance matrix that is most likely to provide consistent results 
has been developed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998).  Hoechle (2006) extends the model for 
unbalanced panels and shows that calculated standard errors are smaller than under more 
efficient than standard OLS, Rogers and Newey-West. Author shows that the estimator 
becomes less efficient when the time dimension is drastically reduced below T=15. In my 
case the method is well adapted, as the panels range between 2 and 27 countries and 16 to 40 
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time observations within each country. Since the results vary strongly across time for most 
investors and settings I distinguish between the pre-crisis period between 2001Q1 and 
2007Q4 and post-crisis period 2008Q1 to 2011Q4. 
 
IV.5. Modelling the relationship between Yields and Bondholdings 
in cross-country and country-specific settings 
To provide a complete picture of the price-demand mechanism for government bonds, I 
follow the empirical approach of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) and Andritzky 
(2012b) where holdings data is used to determine bond yields. While the first article is 
concentrated on US Treasuries and considers holdings of all investor types relative to GDP, 
the second one analyses sovereign bond yields of several developed economies through the 
prism of foreign holdings and banks’ holdings. This article extends this approach in several 
ways. First, I look at a panel of developed and emerging economies. Second, I consider 
countries on individual basis to determine whether demand for government debt has a 
different impact on bond yields in different countries. Third, I consider the presence of 
endogenity between bond yields, fiscal and macro variables and bond holdings by using 
dynamic panel estimation, as described below. 
 
To measure the impact on bond yields I select countries with sufficient historical 
coverage of holdings data on one hand and relatively high bond liquidity on the other hand. 
Among developed non-euro countries I retain Japan, UK, US, in Core Eurozone I focus on 
France, Germany, Netherlands and for the Eurozone Periphery I use Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain. Among Emerging Economies I use Brazil, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Poland, 
Turkey and Thailand. As far as bond holdings data is concerned, I use foreign public and 
private holdings and banks’ holdings for the panel estimation and use all available series for 
the individual country estimations. 
In terms of estimation method, in each panel setting I first run an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression with country fixed effects and robust standard errors and 
subsequently conduct a dynamic Arellano-Bond (AB) panel estimation method proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). While the first approach is a simple and common estimation 
method, AB estimator sets up a generalized method of moments (GMM) setting in which the 
model is specified as a system of equations and where different instruments apply to each 
equation. The key advantage of the AB regression lies in the possibility to input exogenous 
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variables as well as pre-determined endogenous variables. Another advantage lies in the 
treatment of fixed effects which, in a regular OLS regression, could be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. The choice of the AB method is also dictated by weakness of available 
instruments that materialized during the prior 2-Stage Least Squares estimations.  The 
resulting reduced-form model takes the following form 
Eq. 6                                                 
Where j and t are the country and time dimensions respectively,        measures the 
change in bond yields,       is the share of government debt held by the investor i, zjt is the 
vector of endogenous variables, ct is the vector of control variables and   a vector of 
estimated parameters. Residuals are split into unobserved country effects labelled     and 
panel level effects     in case of the OLS regression.  
As endogenous variables I use both government debt to GDP and change in debt to 
GDP as factors of supply and stock of debt, as well as inflation and GDP growth trend which 
determine sustainability of public debt. As exogenous control variables I consider Fed Funds 
3-month Futures, VIX to control for risk aversion and Oil prices to account for energy shocks. 
To verify the relationship between holdings and yields for individual countries I 
undertake two additional tests. First I run a panel OLS regression similar to the one specified 
in Equation 6, but in each regression I limit the estimation exclusively to the holdings of one 
country by multiplying the holdings variable with a country dummy. The resulting model 
looks as follows: 
Eq. 7                                                      
Finally for each country j I run a simple non-panel OLS regression, as presented in Equation 
8. To verify whether adding holdings variables improves the model I conduct one additional 
analysis without presence of holdings series. 
Eq. 8                               
Last but not least, I run an alternative version on first difference of yields and holdings to see 
whether change in demand is related to the change in bond yields.  
V. Results 
V.1. Outstanding Debt and Cross-country Capital Flows 
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Capitalizing on the broad scope of the dataset that covers ca. 70% of the outstanding 
global government debt, I first examine the aggregate investor structure across countries and 
the underlying dynamics over the last ten years16.  
Figure 1 reveals three patterns with regard to the global sovereign bond market. First, 
the dollar amount of outstanding debt has more than tripled over the last decade with greatest 
increase occurring not surprisingly between 2008 and 2010. Second, although the amount of 
debt held by foreign official sector and international investors increased considerably, the 
bulk of government debt is financed from domestic savings. Third, share of foreign holdings 
increased from 20% to 28% between 2001 and 2011 indicating that rising indebtedness might 
be coupled with spreading financial globalization. Interestingly, foreign central banks have 
been stocking government debt at a greater pace than private investors, the respective growth 
rates being 18% vs. 12%, and at the end of 2011 central banks’ holdings were only slightly 
below foreign private holdings. 
In the following steps I focus on the dynamics of holdings over time. Figure 2 
indicates that bond investment of international private investors appears to be more volatile 
than flows from central banks, although we should not forget that the latter series are 
interpolated linearly from annual data.  
Figure 3 shows that private investors’ allocation to government bonds appears to be 
associated with the changes in global risk aversion. It is striking that each sudden increase and 
decrease in risk aversion between 2007 and 2010 was associated with dramatic in- or outflows 
into government debt ranging between USD 400 bn and 800 bn QoQ. In turn, calm periods 
between tension episodes are characterized by flow intensity between USD 10bn and 150 bn. 
As for the foreign official sector, Figure 4 shows that between 2007 and 2009 the 
magnitude of purchases by foreign central banks across Eurozone and Safe Haven markets 
varied in line with global risk aversion. Subsequently, as the Eurozone crisis began to unwind, 
foreign central banks withdrew their funds from Peripheral Eurozone countries and in 2011 
limited their investment into Core Eurozone countries. 
Until late 2011 foreign investors continued to purchase government bonds of Core and 
Peripheral Eurozone countries despite overwhelmingly rising risk of sovereign default. 
Finally, heavy outflows from Peripheral Eurozone debt markets of almost USD -400bn in the 
                                                          
16
 To obtain unbiased bond capital flows starting from the data provided in local currencies across countries I 
first calculate the difference in stocks of foreign holdings within each country and subsequently converting the 
resulting value into USD. It is noteworthy  that if the data was first converted into USD and than differenced, a 
mere change in currency exchange over the period of analysis would imply a change in holdings even if the 
actual holdings did not vary. 
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second half of 2011 correspond to record inflows into Japanese, UK and US debt of over USD 
+740bn. Interestingly, in the aftermath of summer turbulences, in Q4 2011 Last but not least, 
flows into emerging market debt merely slowed down during this period. 
 
V.2. Stylized Facts 
Table 2 shows that the composition of the investor structure for the given sample as of end Q4 
2011. The global investor structure can be summarized as follows. 
First, most recent data indicates that private non-residents hold on average around one 
fifth of government debt in non-euro developed countries, almost 30% in Core Eurozone 
countries and Emerging Economies and over 50% in Peripheral Eurozone. The latter 
observation is consistent with the findings by Schoeneker (2008) and de Santis and Gerard 
(2006) who state that high shares of foreign investors among Eurozone countries resulted 
from the increase in inter-regional investments that followed the creation of the monetary 
union.  Foreign central banks hold 5% to 10% of bonds issued by Safe Havens and Peripheral 
Europe and over 40% of French and German debt. Domestic banks and Pension and Insurance 
funds hold respectively around 20% of debt in Emerging nations and Non-Euro developed 
countries, in the Eurozone it is significantly less. Finally, as a result of recent Quantitative 
Easing and SMP Programs, central banks hold between 2% and 11% in Europe and over 23% 
in the US. 
Second, disparities are strong within each country group and within the entire sample. 
Table 3 indicates that private foreign participation in Emerging Economies ranges between 
14% in Bulgaria and 35% in Hungary, in peripheral Eurozone it is between 33% in Ireland 
and 60% in Greece. Banks hold between 2% and 57% and pension and insurance between 1% 
and 40%. Finally, general government holdings comprising social security funds and public 
companies hold almost 40% of debt in the US and around 10% in Czech Republic, Greece, 
Spain and Denmark. 
Summing up, Safe Haven countries have on average most diversified investor base 
where no investor type has more than 20% of debt, debt of Core Eurozone countries is held 
mainly by non-residents, whereas Emerging Markets rely mainly on domestic banks and 
pension and insurance funds. It is noteworthy that opening of the financial account, 
stabilization of inflation rates and improved governance resulted in diversification of the 
investor base in emerging economies and convergence towards the model of developed 
economies, as indicated by Figures 9, 16 and 20. Findings on emerging markets partly 
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contradict the results obtained by Hausmann and Panizza (2011) who find low participation of 
foreign investors in local currency debt, though the sample considered here is significantly 
smaller. 
 
V.3. Determinants of Demand by Investor Type 
I this section I attempt to identify the fiscal, macroeconomic and market-related 
determinants of demand for government bonds are identified using simple graphical analysis 
as well as econometric analysis. Econometric analysis is conducted using all countries in the 
sample full sample and for specific country groups, and for the pre- and post-crisis periods to 
capture the change in investors’ behavior. In Tables 3 to 8 I report only the findings that are 
statistically significant. Due to limited data availability of certain independent variables some 
extended models contain fewer observations than the baseline model. 
i. Overview of Demand Drivers for the full sample 
The results for all countries under analysis presented in Tables 3.A and 3.B reveal an 
interesting picture with regard to foreign and domestic demand.  
Table 3.A shows that while the change in demand from both private and official 
investors is significantly and positively associated with GDP growth trend, being a sign of 
pro-cyclical behavior, differences appear with regard to risk indicators. In general, when the 
risk aversion rises international private investors tend to sell bonds, while foreign central 
banks significantly stock up debt held as reserves assets, at least from 2007 onwards.  
Private non-resident investors increased exposure to countries with growing public 
indebtedness and higher yields prior to the financial crisis and higher credit growth. From 
2007 international private flows were directed to countries with lower yield levels and, 
perhaps more importantly, private inflows are significantly related with depressing sovereign 
yields in some countries while outflows are associated with increasing yields in other 
economies. As for the official sector, foreign central banks holdings are significantly 
associated with low-yield countries and purchases significantly contributed to lowering yields 
in selected countries prior to the crisis. 
On the domestic side, Table 3.B indicates that purchases by domestic investors are 
significantly associated with rising public indebtedness and appear to be uncoupled with the 
credit or business cycles. In terms of prices, both domestic banks and investment funds tend to 
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increase holdings when yields fall and sell under increasing yields which can be interpreted as 
return-seeking behavior.  
Last but not least, low overall R-squared values indicate that, with exception of 
foreign central banks where the sample is limited, investor demand for government debt 
remains widely unexplained across countries and needs to be examined for each country 
individually, using more granular data, or considering country- and investor-specific 
constraints such as the amount of investable assets for domestic actors and country of origin 
for foreign investors. 
ii. Private Non-resident Investors 
Graphical Analysis. Holdings of private non-resident investors exhibit strong 
disparities between countries and country groups.  Starting with the Eurozone, Figures 6 to 7 
show that between 1999 and 2008 foreign demand was consistently rising in Italy, France, 
Germany and Greece; in the last two countries foreign participation reached ca. 80% when the 
time the 2007 crisis escalated. In France non-resident private investors receded slightly after 
2008 foreign central banks. Interestingly, in Spain and Ireland private non-residents began to 
increase their exposure in 2008 when the bond yields became more appealing and few doubts 
were raised concerning its’ stability.  
What is striking is that foreign holdings of safe haven assets remained stable 
throughout the crisis period and actually increased in the United States. In Denmark private 
foreign investors sold almost half of their holdings when financial turmoil began, as indicated 
by Figure 8. Last but not least, over time private international investors gained confidence in 
emerging market local currency debt and foreign participation reached peaked shortly before 
the subprime crisis. Once the dust settled and central banks in developed economies switched 
to the zero interest rate policy the demand for emerging country debt picked up again. In all 
countries except Czech Republic. 
 
Econometric Analysis. Significant determinants of demand by foreign private investors varies 
are indicated in Tables 4.A and 4.B. Rising public indebtedness is significantly associated 
with greater purchases by foreign investors in Safe Haven countries prior to the crisis and in 
the Eurozone throughout time. Investors exposed to emerging local currency debt do not seem 
to react to changes in public finances, although it is worth mentioning that in general public 
finances in EMs have been in relatively better shape than in DMs.  
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As for the effects of global risk aversion on demand for bonds, from 2007 onwards 
investors tend to sell bonds of Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging Markets and purchase debt 
of Core Eurozone countries. Surprisingly, I find no significant “flight to safety” effects for 
Safe Haven countries which is consistent with results graphed in Figure 7. 
From the beginning of the crisis foreign private demand tends to face out in countries 
with rising political risk, in particular in emerging economies, but not necessarily in 
developed countries. Finally, the relationship between demand for debt and sovereign credit 
ratings has been significant over the crisis period. Since 2007 foreign demand for EM debt is 
significantly higher in emerging economies with low credit ratings, while positive coefficient 
for Peripheral Eurozone indicates that post-crisis rating downgrades were significantly 
associated with outflows of private foreign capital. 
iii. Official Non-resident Investors 
Graphical Analysis. Foreign reserves of central banks have been traditionally allocated 
to Safe Haven assets. Participation of foreign central banks ranges between 3% in Japan and 
16% in the US, as presented in Figure 11. In Europe, demand from foreign official institutions 
started to rise significantly after the establishment of the monetary union reaching 40% in 
France and Germany at the end of 2011. What is quite striking is that while in France and 
Germany foreign participation kept increasing throughout the crisis, official demand for 
Spanish and Irish bonds increased under the rise in global risk aversion around 2007 and then, 
as the fiscal situation began to deteriorate in those countries, foreign central banks drastically 
reduced their exposure to Greece, Ireland and Spain. 
 
Econometric Analysis. Econometric findings in Table 5.A indicate that allocation patterns of 
reserves by foreign central banks changed over time. Before the crisis demand by foreign 
central banks was detached from fundamentals and market conditions, while since 2008 
foreign central banks invest more in bonds issued by countries with lower level of public debt, 
higher GDP growth, and lower yields. Allocation of reserve asset portfolio is greater to 
countries with higher credit ratings and lower political risk. Furthermore, foreign central 
banks tend to invest more when risk aversion rises, in particular in debt Safe Haven and 
Peripheral as indicated in Table 5.B. Purchases of foreign investors were associated with 
negative current account deficit in Safe Haven countries during the 2001-2007 period, which 
confirms Bernanke’s (2005) hypothesis, and are significantly related with lower current 
account balance in Core Eurozone countries. 
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iv. Domestic Banks 
Graphical Analysis. Banks represent a large fraction of demand for bonds, their 
holdings range from 3% in the US to 35% in Japan. Two patterns deserve particular attention. 
First, starting from the creation of the Euro monetary zone, domestic banks in Europe reduced 
their exposure to domestic government debt, but this trend suddenly reversed when the 
financial crisis began to spread. Second, in most emerging economies reliance on banks 
financing decreased to the level comparable to that of developed countries. 
Econometric Analysis. Regression results in Tables 6.A indicate that domestic banks 
tend to invest in domestic government bonds under rising public debt, lower credit rating, 
higher political risk and lower financial openness. Prior to the crisis, banks increased 
purchases of domestic government deb when yields were higher, while from 2007 banks 
increase their holdings in low-yield countries and their purchases (withdrawals) are 
significantly related to lowering (rising) bond yields. The letter results are particularly valid 
for countries of Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging Economies, which indicates that banks in 
those countries could be classified as return seekers. 
v. Domestic Insurance and Pension Funds 
Graphical Analysis. Figures 17 to 20 shows that participation of insurance and 
pension funds in other developed countries has been broadly stable. However, in France and 
the UK the weight of insurance and pension funds in debt financing diminished significantly 
over the last decade. Interestingly, in emerging economies participation of pension and 
insurance funds has approached the levels observed in developed economies. 
Econometric Analysis. Results in Table 7 show that in general holdings of pension 
funds and insurance companies are associated with rising public debt. In Emerging 
Economies higher participation of pension and insurance funds was associated with weaker 
credit growth and lower credit ratings prior to 2007, while during the crisis these investors 
withdrew from domestic bond markets under higher risk aversion. 
vi. Domestic Investment Funds 
Graphical Analysis. Figures 20 to 23 show that domestic investment funds represent 
the smallest fraction of demand for government debt, usually below 10%. In Core and 
Peripheral Eurozone countries investment funds significantly reduced their exposure to 
domestic government which is consistent with findings of Santis and Gerard (2006) who 
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argued that since the creation of the monetary zone European investment funds diversified 
their assets across the region. 
Econometric Analysis. Regression results in Table 8 show that in general investment 
funds’ demand for domestic bonds increases in countries with rising public debt and falling 
bond yields. Also, during the crisis era in Safe Haven countries domestic investment funds 
purchased domestic sovereign bonds under high risk aversion which confirms the status of 
refuge asset. In turn, investment vehicles in emerging economies sell bonds under rising risk 
aversion, presumably in fear of falling prices of EM assets. These findings confirm that 
investment funds are return seekers that react to waves of global risk aversion. 
V.4. Relation between Yields and Holdings 
i. Relation between sovereign yields and bond holdings in 
cross-country setting 
The relation between government bond yields and debtholdings is investigated 
empirically according to the specification presented in Equation 6. I consider several 
constellations concerning foreign holdings, split by country groups and method of estimation. 
As far as foreign holdings are concerned, I conduct econometric tests first using data on 
aggregate foreign holdings and subsequently using distinct series for foreign private and 
foreign official holders. Moreover, I conduct separate tests for developed markets (DM) and 
emerging markets (EM) assuming that demand for respectively ‘risk-free’ debt may differ 
from the demand for ‘risky’ debt. Finally, as explained earlier, each estimation is conducted 
twice, once with regular OLS fixed-effects estimation and once with Arellano-Bond (AB) 
method. Pre-estimation tests show that bond yields data is stationary, but heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation are present which requires a correction of standard errors in case of the 
OLS estimation. Results are presented in Tables 9 and 10 
Regression results for the full sample in regressions (1) to (4) show that the choice of 
the estimation method alters the significance of results. OLS estimation shows that greater 
share of non-resident holdings significantly increases bond yields, while greater share of debt 
held by domestic banks is associated with lower yields. In turn, results from AB estimation 
are non-significant for all types of holdings. 
Split into developed and emerging economies presented in Regressions (5) to (12) 
reveals diverging mechanisms between yields and holdings. In advanced economies, non-
resident holdings are associated with significantly higher yields according according to OLS 
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estimates. In case of Emerging Economies both OLS and AB regression estimates are 
statistically significant and point towards a negative relation between bond yields and foreign 
holdings. Coefficients estimates for all other indicators have similar signs. 
Regression results included in Table 10 suggest that using first difference, i.e. change 
in yields, is not significantly related to the change in demand for government debt.  
 
ii. Relation between sovereign yields and bond holdings for 
individual countries 
 
Tables 11 and 12 present regression results based on Equation 7 where countries 
dummies are combined with holdings data to estimate the relation between bonds and 
holdings for individual countries while keeping the broadest possible setting. Although 
relatively few results are statistically significant, several interesting patterns emerge with 
regard to different country types.  
Results shows that in Greece and Ireland higher share of foreign private investors is 
significantly associated with higher yields, which indicates that the outflow of foreign capital 
from those bond markets was associated with the rise in bond yields. In case of Spain similar 
pattern appears with regard to foreign official investors. Econometric results in Table 12 
present a mixed and blurred picture for Emerging Economies; only in Hungary and Brazil 
demand factors appear to be related significantly related to bond yields.  
Despite the general lack of statistical significance, it is noteworthy that in the US the 
higher share of foreign private and official holders is associated with lower Treasury yields, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis of Bernanke (2005) and Caballero, Farhi, and 
Gourinchas (2008). It is also surprising that in most developed and emerging countries bond 
yields are lower in countries with a higher share of debt held by domestic investment funds.  
Country-specific OLS regressions based on Equation 8 presented in Tables 13 to 16 
reveal several interesting relations. Although these results need to be considered with caution 
as the number of observations is relatively low. In the developed markets demand from 
domestic banks appears to significantly influence bond yields in the UK, US, France and 
Spain. Foreign holdings are statistically associated with yields only in the case of Spain. As 
for Emerging Economies, link between yields and holdings of foreign investors and domestic 
pension funds are statistically significant for Mexico, Brazil, Hungary and Poland. Last but 
not least, it is noteworthy that in the UK, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Spain Mexico, 
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Hungary and Poland the inclusion of holdings data considerably improved the model fit, 
expressed as R2, although further research and higher frequency data is necessary to establish 
whether bondholdings factors improve comprehension of bond yield mechanics.  
To conclude, at this level of data granularity it is difficult to pin down a universal 
relation between yields and bondholdings and this link appears to differ from country to 
country. 
VI. Conclusions  
Building on a new broad dataset, this study aims to explain what factors drive demand for 
government bonds among different investor groups, namely private and official non-residents, 
domestic banks, domestic pension funds and insurance companies and domestic investment 
and mutual funds. Econometric results show that in most countries demand from foreign 
private investors, non-domestic central banks and domestic banks is relatively disconnected 
from macroeconomic variables and driven mainly by yields, fiscal situation, global market 
sentiment and policy uncertainty. The reverse relationship between yields and demand for 
government debt is difficult to establish and appears to differ from country to country. 
While the global amount of outstanding government debt more than tripled between 2001 
and 2011, the share of foreign holdings across countries increased from 20% to 28% 
indicating that rising indebtedness might be coupled with spreading financial globalization. 
Interestingly, foreign central banks have been purchasing government bonds at a greater pace 
than foreign private investors and at the end of 2011 central banks’ holdings were only 
slightly below the stocks of foreign private investors.  
Investor structure varies strongly across countries. While foreign investors hold between 
40% and 90% of government debt issued by Eurozone countries with Germany, France and 
Netherlands being most exposed to external demand, 90% of Japanese and 70% of US, UK 
and Danish debt is held domestically. Also, the share of foreign investors holding emerging 
market debt has been consistently rising and reached record levels in May 2013. 
Econometric findings indicate that prior to the crisis that international private investors, 
banks and investment funds behaved as return seekers that purchase government bonds when 
bond prices increase. Not surprisingly, perception of credit risk by international investors 
evolved over time. Prior to the crisis private international investors were purchasing bonds of 
countries with higher growth, rising public indebtedness and higher yields. However, from 
2007 onwards international private flows were directed to countries with lower yields. As a 
result, private inflows are significantly associated to depressing sovereign yields in some 
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countries while outflows are associated with increasing yields in others. As for foreign central 
banks, they tend to purchase bonds with low yields and better credit ratings, and sell when 
under rising spreads or rating downgrades. 
As for fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals, demand from domestic investors are 
significantly associated with rising public indebtedness and appears to be decoupled from the 
credit or business cycles. Before 2008, countries experiencing rising public indebtedness, in 
particular Greece and Spain, attracted inflows of international private investors while official 
sector investors withdrew funds from those countries. After the crisis purchases by both types 
of investors appear to be associated with credit growth rather than public indebtedness. 
In terms of sensitivity to global risk aversion, I find that results differ strongly between 
country groups. Among domestic investors, investment funds in Safe Haven countries tend to 
purchase domestic bonds when uncertainty rises, while rising risk pushes asset managers in 
Emerging Economies tend to sell domestic bonds. As for private non-resident investors, 
results for the crisis period indicate that under high global risk aversion they sell bonds of 
Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging Markets and purchase debt of Core Eurozone countries. 
However, I find no evidence for flight-to-safety effects in Safe Haven countries. What is 
surprising is that bond purchases by foreign central banks have also been associated with 
global risk sentiment. As financial crisis escalated foreign central banks sold bonds of 
peripheral countries and began to buy Safe Haven and Core Eurozone. In the result, in 2011 
foreign central banks were holding over 40% of government debt of France and Germany.  
Last but not least, this article analyses demand for government debt by different 
investor types as potential determinants of government bond yields. Econometric findings 
indicate that greater foreign demand for local currency government debt tends to significantly 
lower sovereign bond yields in Emerging Economies. Empirical investigation for individual 
countries reveals that demand by foreign investors is significantly associated with government 
yields in Greece, Ireland and Spain as well as Brazil, Mexico, Hungary and Poland. 
Academic research encompassing domestic and foreign demand for government debt 
has been very limited until now leaving broad scope for further research. Potential research 
direction could focus on cross-country linkages on different investor groups in countries with 
different degree of financial integration, for instance impact of the Eurozone crisis on 
holdings in emerging market economies. Further unexplored fields include the short-term 
causality between credit risk, yields and investor classes seen at different levels of maturity.  
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Tables 
 
Region Country Frequency Data Availability Distinction for Maturity orm and ValuatioCoverage Source
France Monthly 10/1999 - 06/2013
Only government and 
central bank bonds Stocks, N/A N/A Agence France Tresor. Monthly Bulletin.
Germany Quarterly 12/1999 - 03/2013 Bills and bonds Stocks, nomina
Central 
Government
I. Courtesy of Bundesbank. Department of "Bankenstatistik und andere Finanzstatistiken"
II. Alternative, less detailed dataset with longer history of general government debt: 
Bundesbank. Statistics. Time series. Public finances. Sovereign debt developments. 
Creditors.
III. Bundesbank Depot Statistik - Verschuldung des Bundes  for data starting before 2005
Netherlands Quarterly 12/1999 - 03/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, nomina
Central 
Government Courtesy of Balance of Payments Department of the Dutch National Bank
Greece Quarterly 12/1997 - 03/2013 Bills and bonds Stocks, nomina
Central 
Government Bank of Greece. Statistics.  Financial Accounts. Central Government. Quarterly Data
Ireland Monthly 09/2001 - 12/2012
Only government and 
central bank bonds Stocks, nomina
Central 
Government Central Bank of Ireland. Securities Statistics
Italy Monthly 01/1997 - 02/2013
1. Bills, 
2. Bonds, 
3. Zero Coupon 
Bonds,
4. Variable rate 
treasury credit 
certificates Stocks, market 
Central 
Government
Base informative pubblica. Supplements to the statistical bulletin.
I. The Public Finances. Borrowing Requirement and Debt. General Government Debt. By 
residual maturity
II. The Financial Market. Securities: stocks by groups of investors. Table TDEE0060.
Portugal Quarterly 12/2007 - 04/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, market 
Central 
Government
Bank of Portugal. Statistical Bulletin. Statistics. Statistical publications. Statistical 
Bulletin. Publications Document List. Chapter K
Spain Monthly 12/1996 - 12/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominaN/A
1) Banco de Espana Statistics. Boletín Estadístico. Chapter 22: Mercados secundarios de 
valores
2) Tesoro Publico. Boletín de Estadisticas. 
Japan Quarterly 12/1997 - 12/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, market 
Central 
Government
Bank of Japan.  Time Series Data Search. Flow of Funds.  Data Selection By List of 
Series. Flow of Funds. Financial Assets and Liabilities
UK Quarterly 03/1987 - 03/2013 Bills and bonds No information p
 Tradable 
Government 
Securities
1) UK Debt Management Office. Gilt Market Data.
Data on average maturity and duration available as "gross" debt and "net" debt from 2004 
and 2005 respectively.
2) Office for National Statistics. Courtesy.
US Quarterly 03/2001 - 12/2012 Total marketable debt
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government
I. The Bureau of the United States Department of Treasury. Treasury Bulletin. Ownership of 
Federal Securities
II.  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Fred Economic Data.  Money, Banking, & Finance. 
Monetary Data. Securities, Loans, & Other Assets & Liabilities Held by Fed . U.S. 
Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve: All Maturities 
Denmark Monthly 12/1999 - 06/2013 Bills and bonds
Stocks, 
nominal value
Federal 
Government
Central Bank. Securities Statistics. DNVPDKS: VP-registered securities by issuer and 
investors sector. 
Iceland Monthly 02/2009 - 06/2012
1. Bills and bonds
2. By instrument, i.e. 
year of maturity Stocks, N/A N/A Government Debt Management. Market Information. Monthly Reports
Israel Monthly 01/2006 - 12/2012 Bills and bonds
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government Bank of Israel. Publications. Annual Reports. Bank of Israel Annual Report - by year
Table 1.A Data Availability and Sources
Eurozone 
Core
Eurozone 
Periphery
Safe 
Havens
Developed 
Economies
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Region Country Frequency Data Availability Distinction for Maturity orm and ValuatioCoverage Source
India Quarterly 03/2007 - 12/2012 Total marketable debt
Stocks, 
nominal value
Federal 
Government
Reserve Bank of India. Database on Indian Economy. Statistics. Financial Market. 
Government Securities Market. Ownership Pattern of Government of India Dated Securities
Indonesia Monthly 05/1999 - 03/2013 Total marketable debt
Stocks, 
market value
Central 
Government
1. Bank of Indonesia. Statistics. Indonesian Financial Statistics. Government Finance 
Sector. Outstanding of Government Securities
2. Directorate General of Debt Management. Statistics. Ownership of Tradeable 
Government Securities  
Malaysia Quarterly 03/1996 - 03/2013 Bills and bonds N/A N/A
Central Bank of Malaysia. Publications & Research Paper. Periodicals. Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin. Table 3.1.5 Federal Government Domestic Debt: Classification by Holder
Thailand Monthly 01/2003 - 04/2013 Bills and bonds
Stocks, 
nominal value
Federal 
Government
I. Bank of Thailand. Statistics. Financial Markets. Debt Securities - series from 2009 
onwards
II. Datastream based on Bank of Thailand
Bulgaria Quarterly 06/2002 - 03/2012 Total marketable debt
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government
Bulgarian National Bank. Research and Publications. BNB Periodical Publications. 
Government Securities Market
Czech 
Republic Monthly 12/1996 - 03/2013
1. Bills and bonds 
2. By maturity: T-bills 
to 50y bonds
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government Ministry of Finance. State Debt. Debt Statistics. Treasury Securities by Type of Holder.
Hungary Quarterly 12/1997 - 12/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, N/A
Federal 
Government
I. Government Debt Management Agency. Publication, Statistics. Statistics. Ownership 
structure of government securities
II. Hungarian Central Bank. Statistics. Statistical Data and Information. Statistical Time 
Series. Table XIII: Securities Data on securities issued by Hungarian residents with 
breakdown by issuer and holding sectors
Latvia Monthly 07/1996 - 12/2009 Bills and bonds
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government Courtesy of the Monetary Policy Department of the Bank of Latvia
Poland Monthly 01/1996 - 06/2013
1. Bills and bonds
2. By instrument, i.e. 
year of maturity
Stocks, 
market value
Central 
Government
Ministry of Finance. Public Debt. Publications. 
1) Investors. Secondary Market.  Nominal T-bonds and T-bills outstanding  
2) State Treasury Debt
Turkey Monthly 01/2006 - 05/2013 Total marketable debt
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government
Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury. Statistics. Public Finance. 
Central Government Domestic Debt Statistics. Composition of Domestic Debt Stock by 
Holders.
Brazil Monthly 01/2007 - 05/2013 Total marketable debt
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government I. Tesouro Nacional. Public Debt. Federal Public Debt Monthly Report. 
Mexico Monthly 01/1999 - 06/2013 Bills and bonds
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government
Banco de Mexico. Statistics.
1) Financial system. Financial markets. Debt outstanding.
2) Public Finances. Average Maturity of Government Securities.
Peru Monthly 11/2003 - 11/2011
By instrument, i.e. 
year of maturity
Stocks, 
nominal value
Central 
Government
Courtesy of Dirección General de Endeudamiento y Tesoro Público de la República del 
Perú 
South Africa Monthly 01/2006 - 06/2011
Bills, short-term 
bonds, long-term 
bonds
Stocks, 
market value
Central 
Government
Reserve Bank of South Africa. Publications. Publications and Noties. Statistical Tables. 
Ownership distribution of domestic marketable debt.
Table 1.B Data Availability and Sources
Emerging 
Europe
Emerging 
Latin 
America
Emerging 
Asia
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Table 2: Investor Structure per country as of December 2011 
    
  
Private Non-
residents 
Official Non-
residents 
Banks Pension and Insurance Funds Investment 
Funds 
General 
Government 
Domestic 
Central Bank 
Emerging Economies             
Brazil 12% 0% 33% 20% 26% 9% 0% 
Bulgaria 1% 0% 55% 22% 22% 0% 0% 
Czech Republic 14% 0% 42% 26% 3% 8% 2% 
Hungary 35% 0% 32% 16% 5% 1% 2% 
Iceland 24% 0% 35% 21% 13% 0% 0% 
India 1% 0% 42% 24% 11% 8% 14% 
Indonesia 33% 0% 40% 19% 7% 0% 1% 
Israel 10% 0% 22% 46% 16% 0% 5% 
Latvia 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Malaysia 38% 0% 15% 42% 0% 4% 1% 
Mexico 36% 0% 13% 34% 17% 0% 0% 
Peru 46% 0% 11% 39% 2% 3% 0% 
Poland 31% 0% 23% 37% 7% 0% 0% 
South Africa 0% 0% 54% 44% 0% 0% 2% 
Thailand 15% 0% 20% 34% 0% 17% 10% 
Turkey 17% 0% 57% 0% 4% 0% 2% 
Eurozone Core             
France 28% 30% 14% 22% 2% 0% 0% 
Germany 59% 31% 2% 1% 5% 0% 0% 
Netherlands 35% 30% 9% 22% 3% 0% 0% 
Eurozone Periphery             
Greece 62% 0% 24% 0% 0% 10% 0% 
Ireland 34% 7% 18% 1% 1% 1% 33% 
Italy 53% 3% 22% 0% 5% 0% 16% 
Portugal 54% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 
Spain 40% 5% 12% 10% 6% 12% 10% 
Safe Havens               
Denmark 36% 0% 12% 40% 0% 11% 0% 
Japan 7% 2% 45% 24% 4% 3% 11% 
UK 21% 11% 10% 24% 9% 0% 21% 
US 12% 23% 2% 7% 6% 38% 12% 
Note: Data as of 2011 for all countries except of France and Latvia where it is reported as of 2010.  Data has been collected from national sources except for official non-resident holdings that have been 
extracted from the IMF CPIS database. Central Bank for Eurozone countries stand for ECB holdings following the SMP programme. 
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Table 3.A Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Different Foreign Investors Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Dependent Variable   Foreign Private   Foreign Official 
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post    
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)    
Change in Public Debt/GDP   1.88*** -0.03      1.91***  0.21      -2.61*   -0.05      -2.70*   -0.17    
    (0.66)    (0.39)      (0.67)    (0.39)      (1.41)    (0.21)      (1.35)    (0.19)    
Change in Private Debt/GDP   -0.19     0.18***   -0.25     0.16**    -0.04    -0.42***    0.01    -0.41*** 
    (0.36)    (0.06)      (0.35)    (0.06)      (0.66)    (0.09)      (0.67)    (0.10)    
Growth Trend    1.14*    0.76**     1.09*    0.71**    -0.81     0.54**    -0.70     0.51**  
    (0.60)    (0.27)      (0.62)    (0.26)      (0.48)    (0.21)      (0.42)    (0.23)    
Risk Aversion Index   -0.04**  -0.06***   -0.04*   -0.06***   -0.06     0.03***   -0.06     0.03*** 
    (0.02)    (0.02)      (0.02)    (0.02)      (0.06)    (0.01)      (0.06)    (0.01)    
Level of Sovereign Yield    0.01**  -0.01**                        -0.01    -0.01*                       
    (0.00)    (0.00)                          (0.01)    (0.00)                        
Change in Sovereign Yield                        0.02    -0.02**                        -0.09*    0.01    
                        (0.06)    (0.01)                          (0.05)    (0.02)    
R-squared    0.03     0.10       0.03     0.10       0.04     0.37       0.05     0.33    
Nb of Observations    482      417        479      417        319      228        319      228     
Nb of Countries    25      27        25      27        15      15        15      15     
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using 
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Table 3.B Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Different Domestic Investors Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Dependent Variable   Banks   Pension & Insurance   Investment Funds 
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post    
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)        (9)     (10)       (11)     (12)    
Change in Public 
Debt / GDP 
   2.31***  2.27***    2.24***  2.46***    0.77***  0.86*      0.79***  0.92**     1.42**   2.28       1.42**   2.48*   
  (0.54)    (0.65)      (0.51)    (0.67)      (0.20)    (0.45)      (0.20)    (0.42)      (0.61)    (1.33)      (0.61)    (1.26)    
Change in Private 
Debt / GDP 
   0.11     0.18       0.08     0.16      -0.07     0.11      -0.09     0.10      -0.22     0.03      -0.20    -0.01    
  (0.16)    (0.15)      (0.16)    (0.15)      (0.06)    (0.09)      (0.07)    (0.09)      (0.23)    (0.14)      (0.23)    (0.15)    
Growth Trend    0.28     0.02       0.25    -0.02       0.49**  -0.41       0.47*   -0.36       0.18     0.13       0.17     0.31    
  (0.23)    (0.32)      (0.24)    (0.32)      (0.24)    (0.24)      (0.24)    (0.25)      (0.31)    (0.42)      (0.26)    (0.39)    
Risk Aversion Index   -0.00     0.02      -0.00     0.02       0.00     0.01       0.00     0.01       0.02    -0.01       0.02    -0.00    
  (0.01)    (0.02)      (0.01)    (0.02)      (0.01)    (0.01)      (0.01)    (0.01)      (0.01)    (0.01)      (0.02)    (0.02)    
Level of Sovereign 
Yield 
   0.00    -0.00*                          0.00***  0.00                           0.00     0.00                        
  (0.00)    (0.00)                          (0.00)    (0.00)                          (0.00)    (0.00)                        
Change in Sovereign 
Yield 
                       0.00    -0.02***                        0.00    -0.01                          -0.04*** -0.05*** 
                      (0.01)    (0.01)                          (0.01)    (0.01)                          (0.01)    (0.01)    
R-squared    0.05     0.08       0.04     0.09       0.06     0.05       0.04     0.05       0.03     0.05       0.05     0.08    
Nb of Observations    484      401        481      401        378      342        376      342        325      326        323      326     
Nb of Countries    25      26        25      26        20      22        20      22        19      21        19      21     
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk 
Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets, 4. For US, Japan and Germany I use 10-year bond yields, for the Eurozone I calculate spread over German Bunds, and in EMs I 
use the yield differential between local yield and average yield on UST, Bunds and JGBs  
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Table 4.A Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Private Non-resident Investors Types Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Scope of Analysis   All Countries   Safe Havens   Emerging Economies 
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post    
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)        (9)     (10)       (11)     (12)       (13)     (14)    
Change in Public Debt / 
GDP 
      1.88*** -0.03       1.91***  0.21       1.92*** -0.08       1.81**   0.23       1.70**   1.08                                            
     (0.66)    (0.39)      (0.67)    (0.39)      (0.66)    (0.40)      (0.76)    (0.39)      (0.70)    (0.76)                                            
Change in Private Debt / 
GDP 
     -0.19     0.18***   -0.25     0.16**    -0.12     0.18***   -0.28     0.22***                                                             
     (0.36)    (0.06)      (0.35)    (0.06)      (0.35)    (0.06)      (0.36)    (0.07)                                                                
Growth Trend 
      1.14*    0.76**     1.09*    0.71**     0.43     0.78**     1.15*    0.53*      3.00**   0.98                                            
     (0.60)    (0.27)      (0.62)    (0.26)      (0.58)    (0.27)      (0.58)    (0.29)      (1.15)    (0.61)                                            
Risk Aversion Index 
     -0.04**  -0.06*** -0.04*   -0.06*** -0.04**  -0.06*** -0.05**  -0.06***                     -0.01    -0.10*** -0.01    -0.12**  
     (0.02)    (0.02)      (0.02)    (0.02)      (0.02)    (0.02)      (0.02)    (0.02)                          (0.05)    (0.03)      (0.05)    (0.04)    
Level of Sovereign Yield 
      0.01**  -0.01**                                                                                                                          
     (0.00)    (0.00)                                                                                                                            
Change in Sovereign 
Yield 
                          0.02    -0.02**                                                                                                      
                         (0.06)    (0.01)                                                                                                        
Credit Rating 
                                             -0.22*    0.06                                                                                    
                                             (0.12)    (0.07)                                                                                    
Change in Political Risk 
                                                                 -0.00    -0.01**                        -0.01    -0.03**                      
                                                                 (0.00)    (0.01)                          (0.01)    (0.01)                        
Financial Openness 
                                                                                                                              0.02    -0.23*** 
                                                                                                                             (0.12)    (0.06)    
R-squared       0.03     0.10       0.03     0.10       0.04     0.09       0.02     0.11       0.05     0.07       0.00     0.19       0.00     0.20    
Nb of Observations      482    417    479    417    493    417    469    390    111    64      240    200    240    104    
Nb of Countries      25    27      25    27      25    27      24    25       4     4      13    13      13    13    
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk 
Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets, 4. For US, Japan and Germany I use 10-year bond yields, for the Eurozone I calculate spread over German Bunds, and in EMs I 
use the yield differential between local yield and average yield on UST, Bunds and JGBs 
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Table 4.B Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Private Non-resident Investors Types Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Scope of Analysis   Core Eurozone   Peripheral Eurozone 
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)        (9)     (10)        
Change in Public Debt / 
GDP        1.30     1.98*    1.84     2.22*    1.82     2.19*    1.73*    1.20**   1.58     1.05**    
        (1.75)    (1.12)    (1.37)    (1.19)    (1.32)    (1.16)    (0.98)    (0.43)    (1.03)    (0.43)      
Private Debt        0.18     0.26***  0.04     0.23**   0.08     0.23**                                            
        (0.46)    (0.09)    (0.40)    (0.09)    (0.40)    (0.09)                                              
Risk Aversion Index       -0.08     0.02*                                            0.02    -0.02*    0.01    -0.03**    
        (0.08)    (0.01)                                            (0.04)    (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.01)      
Level of Sovereign Yield                           -0.00     0.01*                       -0.09    -0.02***                       
                            (0.01)    (0.01)                        (0.11)    (0.00)                          
Credit Rating                                                0.03    -0.03*                       -0.07     0.44***   
                                                (0.03)    (0.01)                        (0.14)    (0.06)      
R-squared        0.07     0.40     0.01     0.41     0.01     0.38     0.07     0.42     0.06     0.48      
Nb of Observations       63    48    63    48    63    48    109    80    109    80      
Nb of Countries        3     3     3     3     3     3     4     5     4     5      
 Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk 
Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets, 4. For US, Japan and Germany I use 10-year bond yields, for the Eurozone I calculate spread over German Bunds, and in EMs I 
use the yield differential between local yield and average yield on UST, Bunds and JGBs 
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Table 5.A Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Foreign Central Banks Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Scope of Analysis   All Countries 
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post    
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)    
Level of Public Debt / 
GDP 
  
-0.03    -0.04***   -0.06    -0.01      -0.03    -0.02*     -0.02    -0.04*** 
  
(0.03)    (0.01)      (0.06)    (0.01)      (0.04)    (0.01)      (0.03)    (0.01)    
Credit Growth 
  
 0.08    -0.42***    0.08    -0.42***    0.05    -0.39***    0.07    -0.40*** 
  
(0.75)    (0.09)      (0.76)    (0.08)      (0.68)    (0.08)      (0.76)    (0.10)    
Growth Trend 
  
-0.23     0.49*     -0.33     0.33      -0.31     0.19      -0.28     0.51    
  
(0.38)    (0.27)      (0.50)    (0.32)      (0.65)    (0.28)      (0.35)    (0.33)    
Risk Aversion Index 
  
-0.05     0.02***   -0.05     0.03***   -0.05     0.02***   -0.05     0.03*** 
  
(0.07)    (0.01)      (0.07)    (0.01)      (0.06)    (0.01)      (0.07)    (0.01)    
Level of Sovereign Yield 
  
-0.00    -0.01**                                                              
  
(0.01)    (0.01)                                                                
Credit Rating(-1) 
  
                    -0.25     0.35**                                          
  
                    (0.46)    (0.14)                                            
Political Risk 
  
                                         0.00    -0.00**                      
  
                                        (0.00)    (0.00)                        
Current Acc Bal  
  
                                                            -0.24*    0.24    
  
                                                            (0.13)    (0.14)    
R-squared    0.01     0.44          0.01     0.46          0.02     0.43          0.01     0.39    
Nb of Observations 291    188         291    188         270    176         291    188    
Nb of Countries   12    12         12    12         11    11         12    12    
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 
2011Q4.  Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk 
Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets 
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Table 5.B Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Foreign Central Banks Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Scope of   Safe Havens   Core Eurozone   Peripheral 
Time period      Post         Post        Pre     Post                   Post        Pre     Post    
Regression     (1)     (2)        (3)     (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)     (8)       (9)        (12)       (13)     (14)    
Public Debt / GDP 
     
                                                            -2.62     0.84*** -2.50     0.82*** -2.75     0.70*** -4.89    -0.93**  
     
                                                            (2.12 (0.24   (2.22 (0.16   (2.30 (0.23)      (2.95)    (0.38)    
Credit Growth 
     
-0.12    -0.39*** -0.12    -0.40*** -0.15    -0.39*** -0.19    -0.51*** -0.12    - -0.19    -0.52***          -0.33**  
     
(0.27 (0.06)      (0.30 (0.07)      (0.28)    (0.07)      (0.81 (0.05   (0.82 (0.03   (0.82 (0.05)               (0.15)    
Growth Trend 
     
                                                            -1.02        1.33     0.28      -1.06       -1.33*            
     
                                                            (3.15 (0.36   (4.54 (0.37   (3.11 (0.37)      (0.77)             
Risk Aversion Index 
     
-0.02       -0.02       -0.02                                                                             0.06*** 
     
(0.03 (0.01)      (0.03 (0.01)      (0.03)    (0.01)                                                                           (0.01)    
Level of Sovereign 
Yield 
     
                    -0.03                                               -7.92     2.30***                                       
     
                    (0.60 (0.58)                                              (8.30 (0.63                                         
Current Acc Bal  
     
                                        -  0.01                                              -0.16    -0.44***                   
     
                                        (0.20)    (0.24)                                              (0.43 (0.13)                        
R-squared        0.39           0.47          0.03     0.39                         0.69          0.07     0.37    
Nb of      95    64         95    64         95    64         75    48         75    48         75    48         125    76    
Nb of Countries       4     4          4     4          4     4          3     3          3     3          3     3          5     5    
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk 
Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets, 4. For US, Japan and Germany I use 10-year bond yields, for the Eurozone I calculate spread over German Bunds, and in EMs I 
use the yield differential between local yield and average yield on UST, Bunds and JGBs 
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Table 6.A Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Domestic Banks Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Scope of Analysis   All Countries   
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post    
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)        (9)     (10)       (11)     (12)    
Change in Public 
Debt / GDP      
 
1.84*** 
 
2.37***   
 
2.13*** 
 
2.42***   
 
2.04***  2.63***   
 
2.08*** 
 
2.26***   
 
2.16*** 
 
2.75***    1.91*** 
 
3.12**  
     (0.45)    (0.65)      (0.48)    (0.66)      (0.46)    (0.66)      (0.46)    (0.67)      (0.48)    (0.79)      (0.44)    (1.01)    
Level of Sovereign 
Yield 
                          0.00*   -0.00*                                                                                   
                         (0.00)    (0.00)                                                                                    
Change in Sovereign 
Yield 
                                              0.00    -0.02***                                                             
                                             (0.01)    (0.01)                                                                
Credit Rating                                                                  -0.11**   0.06                                            
                                                                 (0.04)    (0.05)                                            
Political Risk                                                                                       0.00**   0.00                        
                                                                                     (0.00)    (0.00)                        
Financial Openness                                                                                                          -0.06***  0.01    
                                                                                                         (0.02)    (0.06)    
R-squared    0.03     0.07       0.05     0.07       0.04     0.08       0.05     0.07       0.05     0.09       0.04     0.10    
Nb of Observations   545    419      514    403      509    403      545    419      517    392      518    203    
Nb of Countries   26    27      25    26      25    26      26    27      25    25      25    26    
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk 
Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets, 4. For US, Japan and Germany I use 10-year bond yields, for the Eurozone I calculate spread over German Bunds, and in EMs I 
use the yield differential between local yield and average yield on UST, Bunds and JGBs 
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Table 6.B Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Domestic Banks Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Scope of Analysis   Safe Havens   Core Eurozone   Peripheral Eurozone   Emerging Econ 
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post    
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)        (9)     (10)       (11)     (12)        (13)      (14)    
Change in Public 
Debt / GDP 
   2.05**   3.14***    2.38***  3.02       2.30**   4.06**     2.28**   2.01       2.23**   2.34       2.09**   1.88       1.78***  2.37*   
  (0.85)    (0.77)      (0.85)    (1.82)      (0.92)    (1.72)      (1.07)    (1.42)      (0.97)    (1.46)      (0.93)    (1.26)      (0.45)    (1.18)    
Risk Aversion Index 
                                                                                                      -0.05*    0.08       0.01     0.03*   
                                                                                                      (0.03)    (0.06)      (0.01)    (0.02)    
Credit Rating 
  -0.06     1.12*                                                                 -0.02     0.42*                            
  (0.49)    (0.53)                                                                  (0.21)    (0.21)                             
Change in Sovereign 
Yield 
                       0.05     0.19*                         -0.11    -0.03**                                           -0.00    -0.01**  
                      (0.08)    (0.10)                          (0.17)    (0.01)                                             (0.01)    (0.01)    
R-squared       0.05     0.10       0.03     0.19       0.02     0.25       0.05     0.06       0.05     0.12       0.06     0.09          0.04     0.11    
Nb of Observations      111    64      63    48      63    48      109    64      109    64      109    64         221    200    
Nb of Countries       4     4       3     3       3     3       4     4       4     4       4     4         13    13    
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk 
Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets, 4. For US, Japan and Germany I use 10-year bond yields, for the Eurozone I calculate spread over German Bunds, and in EMs I 
use the yield differential between local yield and average yield on UST, Bunds and JGBs 
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Table 7 Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Domestic Pension and Insurance Funds Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Scope of Analysis   All Countries   Core Eurozone   Emerging Economies 
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post    
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)        (9)     (10)    
Change in Public Debt / 
GDP 
     
 0.58**   1.07**     1.23*    0.57       1.28*    0.52                                            
     (0.27)    (0.40)      (0.63)    (0.54)      (0.68)    (0.62)                                            
Credit Growth      
-0.04***  0.00       0.00     0.06*     -0.01    -0.03      -0.04**  -0.01      -0.03*   -0.01    
     (0.01)    (0.01)      (0.02)    (0.03)      (0.03)    (0.05)      (0.02)    (0.02)      (0.01)    (0.02)    
Growth Trend      
 1.54**  -0.33                                                                                    
     (0.60)    (0.74)                                                                                    
Credit Rating      
                    -0.02    -0.06                                              -0.17*    0.04    
     
                    (0.04)    (0.05)                                              (0.09)    (0.07)    
Political Risk      
                                         0.00     0.02**     0.00***  0.00                        
     
                                        (0.00)    (0.01)      (0.00)    (0.00)                        
Risk Aversion      
                                                            -0.00    -0.02*     -0.00    -0.02**  
     
                                                            (0.01)    (0.01)      (0.01)    (0.01)    
R-squared    0.09     0.04       0.02     0.06       0.03     0.17       0.11     0.03       0.07     0.02    
Nb of Observations   405    358      63    48      63    48      171    173      171    173    
Nb of Countries   21    23       3     3       3     3      10    11      10    11    
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk 
Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets, 4. For US, Japan and Germany I use 10-year bond yields, for the Eurozone I calculate spread over German Bunds, and in EMs I 
use the yield differential between local yield and average yield on UST, Bunds and JGBs 
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Table 8 Determinants of Demand for Government Bonds by Domestic Investment Funds Pre- and Post-Crisis 
Scope of Analysis   All Countries   Safe Havens   Core Eurozone   Emerging Economies 
Time period     Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post        Pre     Post    
Regression Number     (1)      (2)        (3)      (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)        (9)     (10)       (11)     (12)          (13)     (14)    
Change in Public 
Debt / GDP 
      1.24*    2.26*      0.86    -0.37       0.84    -0.05       2.84    10.61*      2.34*    0.57       0.96     0.13       1.31     0.40    
     (0.62)    (1.20)      (0.83)    (1.05)      (0.81)    (0.91)      (1.83)    (5.46)      (1.20)    (0.92)      (0.96)    (0.97)      (1.12)    (0.96)    
Change in Sovereign 
Yield 
     -0.04*** -0.05***                       -0.08*** -0.17***   -0.00    -0.20**                                            -0.05**  -0.03*   
     (0.01)    (0.02)                          (0.03)    (0.03)      (0.06)    (0.07)                                              (0.02)    (0.02)    
Risk Aversion Index 
                          0.02     0.06***                                            0.02    -0.04**                                          
                         (0.02)    (0.02)                                              (0.02)    (0.02)                                            
Level of Sovereign 
Yield 
                                                                                                         -0.01*   -0.00                        
                                                                                                         (0.00)    (0.00)                           
R-squared    0.03     0.07       0.03     0.16       0.07     0.33          0.06     0.37       0.04     0.03       0.04     0.00          0.08     0.02    
Nb of Observations   332    328         83    48         83    48         61    48      118    157         104    157         102    157    
Nb of Countries   19    21          3     3          3     3          3     3       9    10          9    10          9    10    
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * p<.10,** p<.05,*** p<.01, Panel OLS Regression with Driscoll Kraay SE, Pre-crisis 2001Q1 to 2006Q4, Post-crisis 2007Q1 to 2011Q4 
Note: 1. Dependent variable, i.e. bond holdings, as well as public and private debt to GDP are used in first difference, 2. GDP Growth is detrended using HP Filter, 3. Risk Aversion is proxied using Citi Global Risk 
Aversion Macro Index where rising index values indicate higher aversion to risky assets, 4. For US, Japan and Germany I use 10-year bond yields, for the Eurozone I calculate spread over German Bunds, and in EMs I 
use the yield differential between local yield and average yield on UST, Bunds and JGBs 
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Table 9: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Developed and Emerging Markets. Dependent variable: 10-y gov bond yield. Panel OLS Regressions. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  All All All All DM DM DM DM EM EM EM EM 
Non-resident Total  0.03*** -0.01   0.07*** -0.00   -0.09*** -0.03**   
  (3.37) (-0.25)   (6.99) (-0.12)   (-5.15) (-2.71)   
Non-resident Private    0.02* -0.04   0.07*** -0.02   -0.09*** -0.03** 
    (1.74) (-1.43)   (5.33) (-1.15)   (-5.12) (-3.17) 
Non-resident Official    0.04*** -0.00   0.07*** 0.01   -0.03 -0.23** 
    (3.91) (-0.14)   (6.76) (0.34)   (-0.13) (-2.86) 
Banks’ Holdings  -0.03** 0.03 -0.04** 0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.04* 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (-2.23) (1.28) (-2.53) (0.83) (-1.59) (0.62) (-1.67) (0.79) (0.84) (0.82) (0.84) (0.73) 
Change in Public Debt  0.05*** 0.03 0.05*** 0.05* 0.04* 0.05* 0.04* 0.06** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
  (3.07) (1.47) (2.97) (1.85) (1.79) (2.07) (1.79) (2.34) (0.62) (0.26) (0.59) (0.33) 
Debt to GDP  -0.04*** 0.03 -0.04*** 0.02 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.05*** 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  (-5.85) (1.29) (-5.61) (1.26) (-7.22) (1.51) (-7.11) (0.69) (0.37) (1.52) (0.40) (1.21) 
Inflation  0.10*** 0.04 0.09** 0.08* -0.07 0.08 -0.07 0.11 0.08** 0.04 0.08** 0.04 
  (2.73) (1.16) (2.43) (1.94) (-1.30) (1.25) (-1.39) (1.61) (2.33) (1.60) (2.34) (1.34) 
Growth Trend  -0.06*** 0.09* -0.06*** 0.03 -0.05** 0.05 -0.05** -0.01 0.10*** 0.04 0.10*** 0.05* 
  (-2.92) (1.83) (-2.72) (1.38) (-2.32) (1.15) (-2.29) (-0.56) (2.61) (1.83) (2.62) (1.90) 
Fed Funds Rate  0.00**  0.00*  0.00  0.00  -0.00*  -0.00*  
  (2.37)  (1.89)  (0.57)  (0.46)  (-1.85)  (-1.86)  
Credit Rating  -0.30***  -0.30***  -0.34***  -0.34***  -0.05**  -0.05**  
  (-31.02)  (-31.13)  (-35.22)  (-35.15)  (-2.36)  (-2.32)  
VIX  0.00  0.00  -0.00*  -0.00*  0.00  0.00  
  (1.12)  (0.92)  (-1.67)  (-1.71)  (0.84)  (0.84)  
Oil  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00**  -0.00**  0.00  0.00  
  (-2.93)  (-2.79)  (-2.44)  (-2.39)  (1.36)  (1.38)  
Govt Yield 10Y (Lag)   0.69***  0.84***  0.81***  0.92***  0.48***  0.48*** 
   (5.04)  (9.40)  (8.47)  (15.39)  (8.41)  (8.38) 
R-squared  0.72  0.72  0.85  0.85  0.30  0.30  
Nb of Observations  542 523 542 523 323 313 323 313 219 210 219 210 
Nb of Countries  18 18 18 18 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 
Country Fixed Effects  YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Note: Robust Standard Errors. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 10: Determinants of Changes in Government Bond Yields in Developed and Emerging Markets. Dependent variable: first difference of 10-y gov bond 
yield. Panel OLS Regressions. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  All All All All DM DM DM DM EM EM EM EM 
Non-resident Total (1st D)  -0.01 0.02   -0.00 0.00   -0.02 -0.01   
  (-0.65) (0.51)   (-0.20) (0.00)   (-0.46) (-0.12)   
Non-resident Private (1st D)    -0.02 0.00   -0.01 -0.02   -0.01 -0.00 
    (-0.92) (0.10)   (-0.45) (-0.51)   (-0.29) (-0.01) 
Non-resident Official (1st D)    0.00 0.01   0.01 0.01   -0.36 -0.35*** 
    (0.01) (0.61)   (0.25) (0.21)   (-1.50) (-7.79) 
Banks’ Holdings (1st D)  0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (1.18) (1.05) (1.17) (1.04) (0.25) (0.32) (0.23) (0.19) (0.40) (0.55) (0.36) (0.52) 
Change in Public Debt  0.05*** 0.03 0.05*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.07* 0.11*** 0.07* 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
  (4.34) (1.68) (4.35) (1.52) (5.55) (2.13) (5.58) (1.99) (0.45) (-0.17) (0.48) (-0.13) 
Debt to GDP  -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (-0.97) (1.61) (-0.89) (1.63) (-0.47) (1.24) (-0.44) (1.28) (0.56) (1.78) (0.58) (1.81) 
Inflation  0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
  (0.72) (-0.24) (0.58) (-0.33) (1.51) (0.22) (1.34) (0.71) (-0.96) (-1.01) (-0.97) (-0.96) 
Growth Trend  -0.00 0.07* 0.00 0.07* -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.07* 0.07** 0.07* 0.07** 
  (-0.09) (2.02) (0.01) (2.08) (-0.95) (1.14) (-0.83) (1.15) (1.84) (3.28) (1.91) (3.29) 
Fed Funds Rate  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
  (0.37)  (0.30)  (0.77)  (0.73)  (-0.42)  (-0.42)  
Credit Rating  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.01  -0.01  
  (-4.79)  (-4.76)  (-4.56)  (-4.55)  (-0.46)  (-0.47)  
VIX  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00**  -0.00**  0.00  0.00  
  (-1.55)  (-1.54)  (-2.26)  (-2.22)  (0.14)  (0.22)  
Oil  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  
  (-0.07)  (-0.02)  (-1.02)  (-0.95)  (0.61)  (0.63)  
Govt Yield 10Y (Lag) 
  -0.16*  -0.17**  -0.11  -0.07  -0.23***  -0.23*** 
   (-2.06)  (-2.15)  (-0.62)  (-0.41)  (-4.29)  (-4.17) 
R-squared  0.10  0.10  0.20  0.20  0.03  0.04  
Nb of Observations  537 518 537 518 322 312 322 312 215 206 215 206 
Nb of Countries  18 18 18 18 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 8 
Country Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses. Note: Robust Standard Errors. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 11: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Developed Markets. Dependent variable: 10-y gov bond yield. Panel OLS Regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 JAP UK US FR GER NL GR IR IT PT SP 
Non-resident Private -0.06 0.09 -0.07 0.06 0.14 -0 0.41*** 0.11** 0 0 0.14 
(x Country Dummy) (-0.30) (0.65) (-0.26) (0.35) (0.48) (-0.01) (9.06) (2.50) (.) (.) (1.57) 
Non-resident Official 0.41 0.12 -0.03 0.06 0.18 -0 -0.99*** 0.06 0 0 0.20** 
(x Country Dummy) (0.97) (0.80) (-0.19) (0.36) (0.62) (-0.01) (-3.42) (1.61) (.) (.) (2.09) 
Banks -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.08 0.34 -0.03 0.93*** 0.09 0 0 -0.07 
(x Country Dummy) (-0.19) (-0.45) (-0.06) (0.41) (0.94) (-0.07) (9.06) (0.73) (.) (.) (-0.56) 
Pension and Insurance 0.31 0.02 0.27 0.08 0.25 -0.07 0 0.53 0 0 -0.23 
(x Country Dummy) (0.92) (0.32) (0.43) (0.41) (0.25) (-0.18) (.) (1.47) (.) (.) (-1.14) 
Investment Funds -0.10 -0.19 -0.16 -0.03 0.07 -0.14 0 -0.58** 0 0 0.15 
(x Country Dummy) (-0.26) (-1.57) (-0.52) (-0.16) (0.16) (-0.32) (.) (-2.35) (.) (.) (0.77) 
Change in Public Debt 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.02* 0.04** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 (3.61) (3.17) (3.18) (3.17) (3.17) (3.13) (1.66) (2.55) (3.54) (3.19) (3.68) 
Debt to GDP -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (-8.10) (-7.14) (-7.46) (-7.81) (-7.81) (-7.66) (-6.75) (-5.40) (-8.90) (-7.83) (-8.33) 
Inflation 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.06** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.08** 
 (2.78) (2.80) (2.64) (2.79) (2.67) (2.83) (2.03) (4.10) (3.50) (2.77) (2.42) 
Growth Trend -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.03* -0.05** -0.17*** -0.07*** -0.06*** 
 (-3.17) (-3.26) (-3.14) (-3.27) (-3.10) (-3.30) (-1.78) (-2.36) (-5.15) (-3.24) (-2.93) 
Fed Funds Rate 0* 0** 0** 0** 0** 0** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0** 0* 
 (1.90) (2.38) (2.22) (2.38) (2.16) (2.17) (2.80) (2.70) (3.44) (2.31) (1.85) 
Credit Rating -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.21*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29*** 
 (-30.64) (-29.44) (-30.13) (-30.70) (-30.80) (-30.43) (-20.62) (-32.94) (-29.99) (-30.91) (-32.05) 
VIX 0* 0** 0** 0** 0** 0* 0*** 0** 0** 0** 0** 
 (1.71) (2.39) (2.28) (2.12) (2.16) (1.89) (2.72) (2.02) (2.37) (2.13) (1.99) 
Oil -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 
 (-0.87) (-0.77) (-0.74) (-0.81) (-0.70) (-0.63) (-0.68) (-1.55) (-0.18) (-0.79) (-0.64) 
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.72 
Nb of Observations 561 561 561 561 561 554 561 560 528 561 561 
Nb of Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 18 18 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  
Note: Robust Standard Errors. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 12: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Emerging Markets. Dependent variable: 10-y gov bond yield. Panel OLS Regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Mex Bra Czech Hun Poland Turk Ind Mal Thai 
Non-resident Private -0.46 0.41** 0.01 -0.48*** 0.02 0 0.64 0 0 
(x Country Dummy) (-1.54) (2.26) (0.12) (-5.44) (0.14) (.) (1) (.) (.) 
Non-resident Official 0 0 0 -0.15 -1.21 0 0 0 0 
(x Country Dummy) (.) (.) (.) (-0.32) (-1.52) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Banks -0.47 0.11 0.03 -0.46*** -0.01 0 -0.05 0 0 
(x Country Dummy) (-1.47) (0.90) (0.67) (-6.01) (-0.05) (.) (-0.34) (.) (.) 
Pension and Insurance -0.30 0.53 0.18 -0.41*** 0.05 0 0.10 0 0 
(x Country Dummy) (-1.04) (1.41) (1.14) (-4.20) (0.50) (.) (0.70) (.) (.) 
Investment Funds -0.40 -0.09 -0.48 -0.20 -0.19 0 0.10 0 0 
(x Country Dummy) (-1.31) (-0.48) (-1.64) (-0.70) (-0.61) (.) (0.62) (.) (.) 
Change in Public Debt 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (2.50) (3.22) (3.28) (3.25) (3.25) (3.21) (3.01) (3.19) (2.97) 
Debt to GDP -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (-8.61) (-7.71) (-7.83) (-8.84) (-7.87) (-8.11) (-7.38) (-7.83) (-7.80) 
Inflation 0.07* 0.09** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.10*** 0.08** 
 (1.87) (2.51) (2.84) (2.74) (2.45) (2.69) (2.37) (2.77) (1.98) 
Growth Trend -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (-2.92) (-3.53) (-2.78) (-4) (-3.47) (-3.18) (-3.20) (-3.24) (-3.09) 
Fed Funds Rate 0 0*** 0** 0** 0*** 0** 0** 0** 0* 
 (1.54) (3.18) (2.34) (2.47) (2.68) (2.10) (2.36) (2.31) (1.92) 
Credit Rating -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 
 (-31.41) (-31.57) (-31.37) (-32.91) (-31.09) (-30.88) (-30.54) (-30.91) (-30.20) 
VIX 0** 0** 0* 0** 0* 0** 0** 0** 0** 
 (2.10) (2.24) (1.90) (2.39) (1.93) (2.03) (2.05) (2.13) (2.31) 
Oil 0 -0 -0 0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 
 (0.31) (-0.87) (-1.32) (0.55) (-0.93) (-0.61) (-1) (-0.79) (-0.62) 
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
Nb of Observations 561 557 561 561 561 551 553 561 528 
Nb of Countries 18 18 18 18 18 17 18 18 17 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Note: Robust Standard Errors. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 13: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Developed Markets. Dependent variable: 10-y gov bond yield. Individual OLS Regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 JAP JAP UK UK US US FR FR GER GER NL NL 
Fed Funds Rate 0*** 0** 0*** -0** 0*** 0 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0 
 (4.26) (2.78) (3.24) (-2.56) (5.52) (1.26) (2.93) (2.94) (3.86) (4.04) (4.01) (1.24) 
Credit Rating 0 -0 0 0 0.71*** 0.64*** 0.38** 0.49 0 0 0 0 
 (0.05) (-0.04) (.) (.) (5) (4.07) (2.63) (1.59) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
VIX -0 -0 -0 -0** -0 -0** 0* 0** 0 0 0** 0 
 (-0.36) (-0.06) (-0.59) (-2.72) (-1.14) (-2.35) (1.75) (2.26) (0.98) (0.48) (2.30) (0.22) 
Oil -0 0 -0*** -0* -0* -0** -0 0 -0** -0 -0* 0 
 (-0.44) (0.02) (-2.79) (-1.72) (-1.91) (-2.07) (-0.03) (1.02) (-2.20) (-0.95) (-1.78) (1.65) 
Non-resident Private  0.01  0.04  -0.07  0.12  0.02  -0.02 
  (0.12)  (0.51)  (-1.39)  (1.64)  (0.16)  (-0.12) 
Non-resident Official  -0.05  0.13  -0.07  0.09  0.08  -0.02 
  (-0.26)  (1.48)  (-1.23)  (1.14)  (0.51)  (-0.13) 
Banks Holders  0.10  -0.14*  -0.46*  0.22**  0.28  -0.11 
  (1.14)  (-1.72)  (-1.93)  (2.51)  (1.25)  (-0.67) 
Pension and Insurance  -0.07  0.03  0.20  0.15*  1.59***  -0.17 
  (-0.67)  (0.71)  (0.97)  (1.77)  (2.96)  (-1) 
Investment Funds  0.03  0.06  0.23  0.05  -0.36  -0.05 
  (0.18)  (0.66)  (1.36)  (0.44)  (-1.54)  (-0.16) 
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.80 0.87 0.90 0.49 0.67 0.54 0.79 0.51 0.86 
Nb of Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 28 
Nb of Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: Robust Standard Errors. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 14: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Developed Markets. Dependent variable: 10-y gov bond yield. Individual OLS 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
 GR GR IR IR IT IT PT PT SP SP 
Fed Funds Rate 0 0.01 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 
 (0.80) (1.03) (-0.68) (-1.16) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.68) (-1.56) 
Credit Rating -0.32*** -0.29*** -0.08*** -0.20*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.03*** -0.04 
 (-10.48) (-6.34) (-2.91) (-4.85) (-1.30) (-1.30) (-6.31) (-6.31) (-2.78) (-1.69) 
VIX 0 0 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 -0** 
 (1.21) (1.15) (0.82) (-1.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0) (-2.14) 
Oil -0 0 0 -0* 0** 0** 0 0 0*** 0 
 (-0.11) (0.02) (0.72) (-1.84) (2.64) (2.64) (1.67) (1.67) (3.72) (0.93) 
Non-resident Private  0.07  0.04      -0.11** 
  (0.40)  (0.73)      (-2.71) 
Non-resident Official  -0.57  0.05      0.01 
  (-0.54)  (1.59)      (0.14) 
Banks Holders  0.18  -0.10      -0.15** 
  (0.54)  (-0.74)      (-2.68) 
Pension and Insurance    -0.09      0.09 
    (-0.27)      (0.83) 
Investment Funds    -0.35      -0.28** 
    (-1.39)      (-2.46) 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.66 0.88 0.44 0.44 0.85 0.85 0.68 0.81 
Nb of Observations 35 35 35 32 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Nb of Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: Robust Standard Errors. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 15: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Emerging Markets. Dependent variable: 10-y gov bond yield. Individual OLS 
Regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 MEX MEX BRA BRA CZECH CZECH HUN HUN PL PL 
Fed Funds Rate 0 0 -0.01*** -0 0 0 -0 0 -0 -0 
 (1.25) (0.91) (-3.27) (-0.77) (0.15) (0.55) (-1.02) (1.60) (-0.86) (-1.10) 
Credit Rating -0.08 0.18 -0.59*** -0.63*** -0.28** -0.26** 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.12 
 (-0.57) (1.62) (-7.47) (-5.92) (-2.35) (-2.32) (0.46) (0.71) (-0.73) (-1.07) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.49) (0.78) (4.78) (4.96) (3.30) (1.07) (3.74) (1.16) (1.06) (-0.24) 
Oil -0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00** 
 (-2.50) (1.47) (5.50) (5.75) (1.05) (-0.62) (-0.36) (0.03) (-0.51) (2.22) 
Non-resident Private  -0.30*  0.42**  0.07  -0.27  -0.26*** 
  (-2.03)  (2.59)  (0.89)  (-1.68)  (-3.31) 
Non-resident Official  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.26  -1.18*** 
  (.)  (.)  (.)  (-0.71)  (-3.97) 
Banks Holders  -0.20  0.05  0.01  0.08  -0.18* 
  (-1.25)  (0.63)  (0.18)  (0.44)  (-2.03) 
Pension and Insurance  -0.15  0.40*  0.11  -0.38***  -0.19* 
  (-1.06)  (1.96)  (0.96)  (-3.02)  (-2.04) 
Investment Funds  -0.29*  0.02  -0.36  0.01  -0.14 
  (-1.92)  (0.16)  (-1.61)  (0.04)  (-0.91) 
R-squared 0.49 0.87 0.79 0.87 0.39 0.55 0.50 0.70 0.15 0.67 
Nb of Observations 35 35 28 24 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Nb of Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: Robust Standard Errors. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 16: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Emerging Markets. Dependent variable: 10-y gov bond yield. Individual OLS Regressions. 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 TURK TURK INDIA INDIA MAL MAL THAI THAI 
Fed Funds Rate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (1.69) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.71) (0.71) 
Credit Rating -1.26*** -1.26*** 0.29*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 
 (-3.43) (-3.43) (4.22) (.) (.) (.) (0.39) (0.39) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.17) (0.17) (-2.40) (-2.52) (-2.52) (-2.52) (-1.42) (-1.42) 
Oil -0.00 -0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.38) (-0.38) (2.74) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (-0.64) (-0.64) 
Non-resident Private    0.23  0.23   
    (0.74)  (0.74)   
Non-resident Official    0.00  0.00   
    (.)  (.)   
Banks Holders    -0.01  -0.01   
    (-0.24)  (-0.24)   
Pension and Insurance    0.02  0.02   
    (0.18)  (0.18)   
Investment Funds    -0.02  -0.02   
    (-0.21)  (-0.21)   
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.76 0.70 0.57 0.70 0.42 0.42 
Nb of Observations 12 12 35 24 24 24 35 35 
Nb of Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: Robust Standard Errors. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Figures 
Figure 1         Figure 2 
                        
Note : Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) between 2001Q1 and 2011Q4    Note : Non-resident Official Holdings are interpolated from annual data 
Figure 3         Figure 4 
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Figure 5          Figure 6 
                     
Figure 7          Figure 8 
                                     
Note: Holdings of private non-resident are determined are calculated as the difference between total non-resident holdings extracted from the naional sources and official non-resident holdings based on survey estimates 
of the IMF CPIS. In consequence presented statistics may lack precision to some extent. Ireland: data from the IMF (2013) “Tracking Global Demand” dataset. 
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Figure 9        Figure 10 
  
Figure 11 
 Note: Holdings of private non-resident are determined are calculated as the difference between total non-resident holdings extracted from 
the naional sources and official non-resident holdings based on survey estimates of the the US Treasury for the US and IMF CPIS for all other countries. In consequence presented statistics may lack precision to some 
extent. In the Eurozone official non-resident holdings exclude holdings of the ECB.
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Figure 12          Figure 13 
               
Figure 14        Figure 15 
           
 
ARTICLE 1 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 112 
 
Figure 16        Figure 17
 
Figure 18        Figure 19 
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Figure 20        Figure 21 
 
Figure 22        Figure 23 
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Figure 24        Figure 25       
  
Figure 26 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1 : List of explanatory variables 
Indicator Underlying Data Unit Source 
GDP Growth Trend 
Real GDP in Local 
Currency detrended 
with HP-filter YoY% IMF 
Change in Public Debt 
Public Debt from 
national sources 
Nomina GDP from 
IMF WEO 
% of 
GDP 
National Sources 
and IMF 
Change in Private Debt 
Private Debt from 
national sources 
Nomina GDP from 
IMF WEO 
% of 
GDP 
National Sources 
and IMF 
Sovereign Yield 
Government Yield 
corresponding to 
average maturity in % Bloomberg 
Risk Aversion Index 
Citigroup Risk 
Aversion Index 
Score 0 
to 100 Bloomberg 
Credit Rating 
S&P Rating - Linear 
conversion 
Score 0 
to 100 S&P Ratings 
Change in Political Risk 
Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
Political Risk 
Score 0 
to 100 Bloomberg 
Financial Openness 
Chin Ito Financial 
Openness Datset 
(2011) 
Score 0 
to 100 
Chin Ito Datset 
(2011) 
Current Account Balance IMF WEO Data 
% of 
GDP IMF 
VIX 
Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange Volatility 
Index Score Bloomberg 
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Appendix Table 2a : Classification of Investor Holdings based on Original Sources 
 
Region Country Debtholder categories provided by the authorities Non-residents Banks State Central Bank Insurance and 
Pension Funds
Investment/Mu
tual Funds
Households Non-financial 
corporations
Other
France
I. Credit Institutions (établissement de crédit)
II. Insurance (assurances)
III. Mututal Funds (OPCVM)
IV. Others
V. Non-residents
V. Non-
residents
I. Credit 
Institutions N/A N/A II. Insurance 
III. Mututal 
Funds N/A N/A IV. Others
Germany
I. Non-financial companies
II. Financial Institutions
III. Banks
IV. Other Financial Institutions
V. Insurance Companies
VI. Households
VII. Other
VIII. Non-resident investors
VIII. Non-
resident 
investors III. Banks N/A N/A
V. Insurance 
Companies
IV. Other 
Financial 
Institutions VI. Households
I. Non-financial 
companies VII. Other
Greece
I. Nonfinancial corporations
II. Financial corporations
1) National Central Bank
2) Other Monetary Financial Institutions (OMFIs)
3) Other financial intermediaries
4) Insurance and pension funds
III. General government
IV. Households and Non-Profit Institutions Serving 
Households
V. Rest of the world
V. Rest of the 
world
II. 2) of which 
Other Monetary 
Financial 
Institutions 
(OMFIs)
III. General 
government
II. Financial 
corporations
1) National 
Central Bank
II. Financial 
corporations
4) Insurance 
and pension 
funds
II. Financial 
corporations
3) Other 
financial 
intermediaries
IV. Households 
and Non-Profit 
Institutions 
Serving 
Households
I. Nonfinancial 
corporations #N/A
Ireland
I. MFIs and Central Bank
II. General Government
III. Financial Intermediaries
IV. Financial Auxillaries
V. Insurance Companies and Pension Funds
VI. Other financial Intermediaries
VII. Non-Financial Corporations
VIII. Households
IX. Non-Resident
IX. Non-
Resident
I. MFIs and 
Central Bank
II. General 
Government N/A
V. Insurance 
Companies and 
Pension Funds
VI. Other 
financial 
Intermediaries
IV. Financial 
Auxillaries VIII. Households
VII. Non-
Financial 
Corporations
Italy I. Central BankII. Other Investors. Includes insurance and social security 
institutions 
III. Investment Funds
IV. Banks
V. Foreign Sector
V. Foreign 
Sector IV. Banks N/A I. Central Bank N/A
III. Investment 
Funds N/A N/A
II. Other 
Investors. 
Includes 
insurance and 
social security 
institutions 
Netherlands
I. Investment funds
II. Households
III. Pension funds
IV. Insurance companies
V. Banks
VI. Non-residents
VI. Non-
residents V. Banks N/A N/A
IV. Insurance 
companies
I. Investment 
funds II. Households N/A N/A
Portugal I. Residents
II. Non-residents II. Non-residents N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A I. Residents
Spain
I. Monetary Financial Institutions excl. Money Market 
Funds: 1) Central Bank 2) MFIs
II. Funds: 1) Mutual Funds, 2) Insurance and Pension 
Funds, 3) Other funds
III. Non-financial companies 
IV. Households
V. Public Administration
VI. Non-residents
VI. Non-
residents I. 2) MFIs
V. Public 
Administration
I. 1) Central 
Bank
II. 2) Insurance 
and Pension 
Funds
II. 1) Mutual 
Funds IV. Households
II. Non-financial 
companies 
II. 3) Other 
funds
Eurozone
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Appendix Table 2b : Classification of Investor Holdings based on Original Sources 
 
Region Country Debtholder categories provided by the authorities Non-residents Banks State Central Bank Insurance and 
Pension Funds
Investment/Mu
tual Funds
Households Non-financial 
corporations
Other
Japan
I. Financial institutions
1. Central bank
2. Depository corporations
i. Foreign banks in Japan
3. Insurance
4. Pension funds
5. Other financial intermediaries
i. Financial dealers and brokers
ii. Public financial institutions
iii. Securities investment trusts
iv. Nonbanks
II. General government
III. Private nonfinancial corporations
IV. Public nonfinancial corporations 
V. Households
VI. Private non-profit institutions serving households
VII. Overseas
VII. Overseas
I. 2. Depository 
corporations
II. General 
government
IV. Public 
nonfinancial 
corporations 
5. ii. Public 
financial 
institutions
I.  1. Central 
bank
I. 3. Insurance
I. 4. Pension 
funds
I. 5. i. Financial 
dealers and 
brokers
I. 5. iii. 
Securities 
investment 
trusts
I. 5. iv. 
Nonbanks
V. Households
VI. Private non-
profit institutions 
serving 
households
III. Private 
nonfinancial 
corporations N/A
Swityerland
1. Foreign depositors
2. Domestic depositors:
3a. Dom Financial institutions (without investment funds)
3b. Dom Collective investment institutions pursuant to 
CISA 
4. Dom Insurance companies 
5. Dom Pension funds only
6. Dom Financial auxiliaries 
7. Dom Social security institutions 
1. Foreign 
depositors
3a. Dom 
Financial 
institutions 
(without 
investment 
funds)
7. Dom Social 
security 
institutions 
4. Dom 
Insurance 
companies 
5. Dom Pension 
funds only
6. Dom 
Financial 
auxiliaries 
3b. Dom 
Collective 
investment 
institutions 
pursuant to 
CISA 
UK
I. Non-financial Corporations: (1) Public, (2) Private
II. Monetary Financial Institutions
III. Insurance Companies and Pension funds
IV. Other Financial Institutions
V. Bank of England
VI. Private Non-Financial companies
VII. Households
VIII. Overseas Holdings (Rest of World); for bonds 
(1) Foreign Central Banks, (2) Other
IX. Central Government
VIII. Overseas 
Holdings 
II. Monetary 
Financial 
Institutions N/A
V. Bank of 
England
III. Insurance 
Companies and 
Pension funds N/A VII. Households
VI. Private Non-
Financial 
companies N/A
US
I. Fed Reserve and intra-governmental
II. Depository institutions
III. U.S. savings bonds 
IV. Pension Funds
a. Private 
b. State
V. Insurance companies
VI. Mutual funds 
VII. State and local governments
VIII. Foreign and international
IX. Other investors 
VIII. Foreign and 
international
II. Depository 
institutions
I. Fed Reserve 
and intra-
governmental  
after deducting 
"Federal 
Reserve: FED  
Holdings"
IV. Pension 
Funds
b. State
VII. State and 
local 
governments
Federal 
Reserve: FED  
Holdings
IV. Pension 
Funds
a. Private 
V. Insurance 
companies VI. Mutual funds 
III. U.S. savings 
bonds N/A
IX. Other 
investors 
Safe 
Havens
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Appendix Table 2c : Classification of Investor Holdings based on Original Sources 
 
  
Region Country Debtholder categories provided by the authorities Non-residents Banks State Central Bank Insurance and 
Pension Funds
Investment/Mu
tual Funds
Households Non-financial 
corporations
Other
Australia
I. Non-resident holdings
II. Other banks
III. Government financial institutions
IV. Reserve Bank
V. Life assurance offices
VI. Other private financial institutions
VII. Other public authorities
Non-resident 
holdings Other banks
Government 
financial 
institutions Reserve Bank
Life 
assurance 
offices
Other private 
financial 
institutions
Other public 
authorities
Canada
I. Nonresident bond and bills holdings
II. Treasury bonds and bills held by Bank 
of Canada     
III. Treasury bonds and bills held by Bank 
of Canada     
Nonresident 
bond and bills 
holdings
Treasury 
bonds and 
bills held by 
Bank 
of Canada     
Denmark
I. Non-financial corporations
II. Monetary financial institutions and other financial 
intermediaries
III. Insurance corporations and pension funds
IV. General government 
V. Households
VI. Other domestic
VII. Abroad VII. Abroad
II. Monetary 
financial 
institutions 
and other 
financial 
intermediaries
IV. General 
government N/A
III. Insurance 
corporations 
and pension 
funds N/A N/A
I. Non-financial 
corporations
VI. Other 
domestic
Iceland
I. Banks & Saving Banks
II. Miscellaneous credit undertakings
III. Mutual and inv funds
IV. Pension Funds
V. Firms
VI. Households
VII. Others
VIII. Foreign investors
VIII. Foreign 
investors
I. Banks & 
Saving Banks
II. 
Miscellaneous 
credit 
undertakings N/A N/A
IV. Pension 
Funds
III. Mutual and 
inv funds
VI. 
Households V. Firms VII. Others
Israel
I. Public
II. Mutual Funds
III. Provident and advanced study funds
IV. Pension funds
V. Commercial banks
VI. Insurance companies
VII. Non-residents
VIII. Bank of Israel
VII. Non-
residents
V. 
Commercial 
banks N/A
VIII. Bank of 
Israel
III. Provident 
and advanced 
study funds
IV. Pension 
funds
VI. Insurance 
companies
II. Mutual 
Funds N/A N/A I. Public
Developed 
Economies
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Appendix Table 2d : Classification of Investor Holdings based on Original Sources 
 
Region Country Debtholder categories provided by the authorities Non-residents Banks State Central Bank Insurance and 
Pension Funds
Investment/Mu
tual Funds
Households Non-financial 
corporations
Other
Emerging 
Economies 
- Asia
India
I. Commercial Banks
II. Insurance Companies
III. Primary Dealers
IV. Mutual Funds
V. Co-Operative Banks
VI. Financial Institutions
VII. Corporates
VIII. Foreign Institutional Investors
IX. Provident Funds - social security funds managed by 
the Government of India
X. Reserve Bank of India
XI. Others
VIII. Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors
I. Commercial 
Banks
V. Co-Operative 
Banks
IX. Provident 
Funds - social 
security funds 
managed by the 
Government of 
India X. Reserve Bank of India
II. Insurance 
Companies
IV. Mutual 
Funds N/A VII. Corporates
III. Primary 
Dealers
VI. Financial 
Institutions
XI. Others
Indonesia
I. Banks:
1) State Banks – Recap
2) Private Banks – Recap
3) Non Recap Banks
4) Regional Banks
5) Bank Syariah
II. Bank Indonesia*) 
III. Mutual Fund
IV. Insurance Company
V. Foreign Holder
VI. Pension Fund
VII. Securities Company
VIII. Others V. Foreign Holder
I. Banks
2) Private Banks 
– Recap
3) Non Recap 
Banks
4) Regional 
Banks
5) Bank Syariah
I. Banks:
1) State Banks 
– Recap II. Bank Indonesia*) 
IV. Insurance 
Company
VI. Pension 
Fund
III. Mutual Fund
VII. Securities 
Company N/A N/A VIII. Others
Malaysia Categories for bills:I. Central Bank of Malaysia
II. Banking institutions
III. Other
Categories for bonds
I. Public Sector: 1. General government, 2. Other 
II. Social security institutions: 1. Employees Provident 
Fund, 2. SOCSO(Social Security), 3. Other
III. Insurance companies
IV. Financial Sector: 1. Central Bank of  Malaysia, 2. 
Banking institutions, 3. National Savings Bank, 4. Other
V. Foreign holders V. Foreign holders
IV. 2. Banking 
Institutions
IV. 3. National 
Savings Bank
I. Public Sector 
(1) + (2)
IV. 1. Central Bank of  
Malaysia
III. Insurance 
companies
II. Social 
security 
institutions: (1) 
+ (2) + (3) N/A N/A N/A
For Bills: III. 
Other 
Thailand
I. Central Bank
II. Other depository corporations
III. Financial corporations not elsewhere classified
IV. Other Non-financial Corporations
V. Central Government
VI. Local Government
VII. Public Non-financial Corporations
VIII. Households and non-profit institutions serving 
households
IX. Non-residents V. Non-residents
II. Other 
depository 
corporations
IV. Local 
Governments
I. Central 
Government
VIII. Public non-
financial 
corporations N/A N/A
II. Financial 
Corporations III. Households
VII. Other non-
financial 
corporations N/A
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Appendix Table 2e: Classification of Investor Holdings based on Original Sources 
 
Region Country Debtholder categories provided by the authorities Non-residents Banks State Central Bank Insurance and 
Pension Funds
Investment/Mu
tual Funds
Households Non-financial 
corporations
Other
Non-euro 
EMEA Bulgaria
I. Government banks
II. Private Banks
III. Local nonbank financial institutions, companies and 
individuals 
a. Insurance companies and pension funds (from 2002 
onwards)
IV. Foreign Investors IV. Foreign Investors II. Private Banks
I. Government 
banks N/A
II. a. Insurance 
companies and 
pension funds 
(from 2002 
onwards) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Czech Republic
I. Non-fina cial corporations
1) Public 
2) National private
3) Foreign controlled 
II. The central bank
III. Other monetary financial institutions
1) Public
2) National private
3) Foreign controlled
IV. Credit corporations
1) Public
2) National private
3) Foreign controlled
V. Financial auxiliaries
1) Public
2) National private
3) Foreign controlled
VI. Pension funds
1) Private
2) Foreign controlled
VII. Investment corporation 
1) National private
2) Foreign controlled
VIII. Insurance corporations
1) Public
2) National private
3) Foreign controlled
IX. Government
1) Central government
2) Local government
3) Social security funds
X. Households
XI. Nonprofit institutions serving households XII. Rest of the world
III. Other 
monetary 
financial 
institutions: 2) 
National private, 
3) Foreign 
controlled 
IV. Credit 
corporations: 2) 
National private, 
3) Foreign 
controlled
I. Non-financial 
corporations: 1) 
Public 
III. Other 
monetary 
financial 
institutions: 1) 
Public
IV. Credit 
corporations: 1) 
Public
V. Financial 
auxiliaries: 1) 
Public
IX. Government: 
1) Central 
government, 2) 
Local 
government, 3) 
Social security 
funds
VIII. Insurance 
corporations: 1) 
Public II. The central bank
VI. Pension 
funds: 1) 
Private, 2) 
Foreign 
controlled: 
VIII. Insurance 
corporations: 1) 
Public, 2) 
National private, 
3) Foreign 
controlled
V. Financial 
auxiliaries: 2) 
National private, 
3) Foreign 
controlled
VII. Investment 
corporation: 1) 
National private, 
2) Foreign 
controlled
X. Households
XI. Nonprofit 
institutions 
serving 
households
I. Non-financial 
corporations: 2) 
National private, 
3) Foreign 
controlled N/A
Hungary
I. Nonfinancial corporations 
II. Financial corporations 
1) Central Bank 
2) Other monetary financial institutions 
3) Other financial intermediaries 
4) Financial auxiliaries 
5) Insurance corporations and pension funds
III. General government
1) Central government 
2) Local government 
3) Social security funds 
IV. Households
V. Nonprofit institutions serving households
VI. Rest of the world VI. Rest of the world
II. 2) Other 
monetary 
financial 
institutions
III. General 
government 
(1+2+3) II. 1) Central Bank 
III. 5) Insurance 
corporations 
and pension 
funds 
3) Other 
financial 
intermediaries 
4) Financial 
auxiliaries
IV. Households
V. Nonprofit 
institutions 
serving 
households 
I. Nonfinancial 
corporations
VI. Rest of the 
world 
Iceland
I. Banks & Saving Banks
II. Miscellaneous credit undertakings
III. Mutual and inv funds
IV. Pension Funds
V. Firms
VI. Households
VII. Others
VIII. Foreign investors
VIII. Foreign 
investors
I. Banks & 
Saving Banks
II. 
Miscellaneous 
credit 
undertakings N/A N/A
IV. Pension 
Funds
III. Mutual and 
inv funds VI. Households V. Firms VII. Others
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Appendix Table 2f : Classification of Investor Holdings based on Original Sources 
 
  
Region Country Debtholder categories provided by the authorities Non-residents Banks State Central Bank Insurance and 
Pension Funds
Investment/Mu
tual Funds
Households Non-financial 
corporations
Other
Non-euro 
EMEA Israel
I. Public
II. Mutual Funds
III. Provident and advanced study funds
IV. Pension funds
V. Commercial banks
VI. Insurance companies
VII. Non-residents
VIII. Bank of Israel VII. Non-residents
V. Commercial 
banks N/A VIII. Bank of Israel
III. Provident and 
advanced study 
funds
IV. Pension 
funds
VI. Insurance 
companies II. Mutual Funds N/A N/A I. Public
Latvia
I. Residents
1. Latvian banks
2. Public enterprises
3. Private enterprises
4. Private persons
5. Other residents
6. State Treasury
7. Bank of Latvia
8. Public funds
II. Non-residents
1. Banks in the OECD countries
2. Banks in other countries
3. Public enterprises
4. Private enterprises
5. Private persons
6. Other non-residents
II. Non-residents - all 
subcategories 1. Latvian banks
2. Public 
enterprises
6. State 
Treasury
8. Public funds 7. Bank of Latvia N/A N/A
4. Private 
persons
3. Private 
enterprises
5. Other 
residents
Poland
I.  Banks: (1) Total, (2) Deposited by the Ministry of 
Finance
II.  Foreign investors
III.  Insurance funds
IV.  Pension funds
V.  Investment funds
VI.  Individuals
VII.  Non-financial sector
VIII.  Others   II.  Foreign investors
I.  Banks - net 
of holdings by 
MoF N/A N/A
III.  Insurance 
funds
IV.  Pension 
funds
V.  Investment 
funds VI.  Individuals
VII.  Non-
financial sector
I.  Banks - 
holdings by 
MoF
Turkey
I. Banking Sector: 1) Public Banks, 2) Private 
Banks, 3) Foreign Banks, 4) Development and 
Investment Banks
III. Retail Investors
IV. Corporate Investors
V. Securities Mutual Funds
VI. Non Residents
VII. CBRT  (Central Bank) VI. Non Residents
I. Banking 
Sector: 1) 
Public Banks, 
2) Private 
Banks, 3) 
Foreign Banks, 
4) Development 
and Investment 
Banks N/A VII. CBRT  (Central Bank) N/A
V. Securities 
Mutual Funds
III. Retail 
Investors
IV. Corporate 
Investors N/A
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Appendix Table 2g : Classification of Investor Holdings based on Original Sources 
Region Country Debtholder categories provided by the authorities Non-residents Banks State Central Bank Insurance and 
Pension Funds
Investment/Mu
tual Funds
Households Non-financial 
corporations
Other
Emerging 
Economies 
- Latin 
America
Brazil
I. Proprietary Holdings
1. Domestic Commercial Bank
2. Foreign Commercial Bank
3. Domestic Investment Bank
4. Foreign Investment Banks 
5. Domestic Broker / Inter-broker
6. Foreign Broker / Inter-broker
7. Others
II. Bound Securities – “securities bound to reserve 
requirements on savings deposits and time deposits”
III. Clients
1. Individuals
2. Non-financial corporates
3. Financial corporates 
4. Mutual Funds
5. Other funds
I. Proprietary 
Holdings:
2. Foreign 
Commercial Bank
4. Foreign 
Investment Banks 
6. Foreign Broker / 
Inter-broker
I. Proprietary 
Holdings:
1. Domestic 
Commercial 
Bank
3. Domestic 
Investment 
Bank N/A N/A
III. Clients
3. Financial 
corporates 
III. Clients: 4. 
Mutual Funds
I. Proprietary 
Holdings: 5. 
Domestic 
Broker / Inter-
broker
III. Clients
1. Individuals
III. Clients
2. Non-financial 
corporates
I. Proprietary 
Holdings: 7. 
Others
II. Bound 
Securities 
III. Clients: 5. 
Other funds
Mexico
I. Repos with Banxico
II. Banking Sector
III. Guarantees Received by Banxico
IV. Siefores
V. Mutual Funds
VI. Insurance and Surety Companies 
VII. Other Domestic Residents
VIII. Foreign Residents
VIII. Foreign 
Residents
I. Repos with 
Banxico
II. Banking 
Sector
III. Guarantees 
Received by 
Banxico N/A N/A
IV. Siefores
VI. Insurance 
and Surety 
Companies 
V. Mutual 
Funds N/A N/A
VII. Other 
Domestic 
Residents
Peru
I. No Residentes
II. Bancos
III. Fondos publicos
IV. Fondos privados
V. Personas naturales
VI. Otros
VII. Administradoras de Fondo de Pensiones
VIII. Seguros I. No Residentes II. Bancos
III. Fondos 
publicos N/A
VII. 
Administradoras 
de Fondo de 
Pensiones
VIII. Seguros
IV. Fondos 
privados
V. Personas 
naturales N/A VI. Otros
Emerging EcSouth Africa
I. Public Investment Corporation
II. Monetary authority
III. Banks
IV. Non-monetary private sector N/A III. Banks N/A II. Monetary authority
I. Public 
Investment 
Corporation N/A N/A N/A
IV. Non-
monetary private 
sector 
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Appendix Table 3 Classification of Investor Categories for different datasets 
Tomasz Orpiszewski (2012) Brugel (2012) IMF (2012) 
Non-residents Non-Residents Non-resident investors 
Banks Resident Banks Banks 
General Government Other Public Institutions Public sector 
Central Bank Central Bank  
Insurance and Pension Funds  Private non-bank financial institutions 
Investment/Mutual Funds   
Households   
Non-financial corporations   
Other Other Residents  
Note: At several instances the dataset compiled by Brugel includes further country-specific 
distinctions for insurance and pension funds, households and related non-profit institutions, investment 
institutions, monetary financial institutions, etc. 
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Appendix Table 4: Classification differences in datasets  
Country Tomasz Orpiszewski Brugel IMF 
Italy 
Bank of Italy BOP Statistics mention only central 
government  General Government General Government 
Italy Bank of Italy BOP Statistics mention nominal valuation   Market Rate 
Germany Series starting from 2005 
Series starting from 
1992  
Portugal Central Government Debt General Government General Government 
Spain 
Notes attached to the dataset provided by the Bank of 
Spain indicate nominal valuation   
Spain  
Inconsistencies found in 
reporting of the debt stock 
held by the central bank  
US General Government  
Federal Government Debt reported as Central 
Government Debt 
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Appendix Table 5: Comparaison of dataset coverage 
Country Orpiszewski 
(2013) 
Merler and Pisani-
Ferry, Bruegel 
(2012) 
Andritzky, 
IMF (2012) 
Arslanalp and 
Takahiro, IMF 
(2012) Australia - - Quarterly Quarterly 
Austria - - - Quarterly 
Belgium - Annual - Quarterly 
Brazil Monthly - - Quarterly 
Canada - - Quarterly Quarterly 
Czech Republic Monthly - - Quarterly 
Denmark Monthly - - Quarterly 
Finland - Annual - Quarterly 
France Monthly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
Germany Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
Greece Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
Ireland Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
Italy Monthly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
Japan Quarterly - Quarterly Quarterly 
Korea - - Quarterly Quarterly 
Netherlands Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
New Zealand - - - Quarterly 
Norway - - - Quarterly 
Portugal Quarterly Annual Quarterly Quarterly 
Slovenia - - - Quarterly 
Switzerland -     Quarterly 
UK Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
US Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
Spain Monthly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 
Hungary Quarterly - - - 
Iceland Monthly - - - 
India Quarterly - - - 
Indonesia Monthly - - - 
Israel Monthly - - - 
Latvia Monthly - - - 
Malaysia Quarterly - - - 
Mexico Monthly - - - 
Peru Monthly - - - 
Poland Monthly - - - 
South Africa Monthly - - - 
Thailand Monthly - - - 
Turkey Monthly - - - 
Bulgaria Quarterly - -   
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Appendix Table 6: Sovereign Ratings conversion Table   
Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score 
AAA 100 
 
BBB+ 67 B- 29 
AA+ 95 BBB 62 CCC+ 24 
AA 90 BBB- 57 CCC 19 
AA- 86 BB+ 52 CCC- 14 
A+ 81 BB 48 CC 10 
A 76 BB- 43 C 5 
A- 71 B+ 38 DDD and below 0 
  B 33     
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Appendix Table 7 : Econometric Tests 
Official Non-
residents
Private Non-
residents Banks
Insurance and 
Pension Funds
Investment/M
utual Funds
General 
Government
AUTOCORRELATION
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel 
data F-statistic 76.75 113.87 29.19 99.34 60.39 20.46
H0: no first-order autocorrelation Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Presence of Autocorrelation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TIME TREND
Time Trend on Least Squares Dummy 
Variable Chi2 51.76 95.05 33.75 67.53 135.82 133.77
H0: All years coefficients are equal zero
Prob > Chi2 0.737 0 0.99 0.21 0 0
Time fixed effects needed No Yes No No Yes Yes
UNIT ROOT
A. Test in Level
Fisher-type unit-root test  based on 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests under 
consideration of panel means Chi2 42 17 91 126 75 50
Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: At least one panel is stationary P-value with time trend 0.86 1 0 0 0 0.03
P-value without time trend 0.51 0.95 0.09 0.05 0 0.33
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test  under 
consideration of panel means
 Z-t-tilde-bar -1.52 4.83 -3.9 -3.8 -2.66 -3.75
Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: Some panels are stationary P-value with time trend 0.06 1 0 0 0 0
P-value without time trend 0.52 1 0.11 0.75 0.58 0.9
Presence of Unit Root Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
B. Test in First Difference
Fisher-type unit-root test  based on 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests under 
consideration of panel means 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: At least one panel is stationary P-value with time trend 0 0 0 0 0 0
P-value without time trend 0 0 0 0 0 0
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test  under 
consideration of panel means P-value with time trend 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: Some panels are stationary P-value without time trend 0 0 0 0 0 0
Presence of Unit Root No No No No No No
CROSS-SECTION
Cross-section dependence Average 
correlation coefficients & Pesaran (2004) CD 
test
H0: cross-section independence CD ~ N(0,1)
Dependent variable (xtcd) P-value 0 n/a 0 n/a n/a n/a
All variables (xtcsd) under fixed effects P-value 0.01 0 n/a 0.12 0.18 0.02
All variables (xtcsd) under LSDV P-value 0.43 0 0.43 0.45 0.39 n/a
All variables (xtcsd) under LSDV and time 
effects P-value 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.12
Cross-section independence present Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
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Appendix Table 8 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test under unidentified breaks for Non-resident Private Investors 
    AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Country   Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root Czech Republic   -     4.35    N    -     4.31    N    -     2.32    Yes   -     5.03    Yes 
Denmark   -     2.55    Yes   -     3.54    Yes   -     0.44    Yes   -     5.27    Yes 
France   -     2.38    Yes   -     2.86    Yes   -     3.17    Yes   -     2.60    Yes 
Germany   -     2.99    Yes   -     2.63    Yes   -     1.85    Yes   -     2.84    Yes 
Greece   -     3.33    Yes   -     4.10    Yes   -     2.79    Yes   -     5.54    No 
Hungary   -     2.75    Yes   -     1.79    Yes   -     3.57    Yes   -     2.99    Yes 
Indonesia   -     1.70    Yes   -     1.60    Yes   -     4.75    Yes   -     5.37    Yes 
Ireland   -     1.97    Yes   -     2.94    Yes   -     2.69    Yes   -     5.68    No 
Italy   -     3.26    Yes   -     2.23    Yes   -     3.72    Yes   -     2.23    Yes 
Japan   -     3.03    Yes   -     1.57    Yes   -     3.01    Yes   -     2.98    Yes 
Mexico   -     1.97    Yes   -     0.19    Yes   -     3.90    Yes   -     5.24    Yes 
Malaysia   -     2.16    Yes   -     1.52    Yes   -     2.60    Yes   -     3.18    Yes 
Poland   -     3.58    No   -     3.72    Yes   -     3.57    Yes   -     4.92    Yes 
Spain   -     3.78    No   -     2.32    Yes   -     3.94    Yes   -     2.21    Yes 
UK   -     2.34    Yes   -     2.42    Yes   -     3.67    Yes   -     3.40    Yes 
US   -     3.71    No   -     3.43    Yes   -     4.22    Yes   -     3.25    Yes 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative 
Outlier tests (IO). Critical value at 5% level. H0: series contain a unit root, H0: no unit root 
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Appendix Table 9 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test under unidentified breaks for Non-resident Official Investors 
    AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Country   Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root Czech Republic   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Denmark   N/A N/A   -     2.62    Yes   -     2.10    Yes   -     2.62    Yes 
France   -     2.63    Yes   -     2.61    Yes   -     4.05    Yes   -     2.94    Yes 
Germany   -     2.81    Yes   -     2.02    Yes   -     2.88    Yes   -     1.40    Yes 
Greece   -     2.22    Yes   -     2.46    Yes   -     3.22    Yes   -     6.92    No 
Hungary   -     2.03    Yes   -     2.31    Yes   -     2.06    Yes   -   12.67    No 
Indonesia   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Ireland   -     1.49    Yes   -     1.43    Yes   -     2.71    Yes   -     3.72    Yes 
Italy   -     2.73    Yes   -     3.80    Yes   -     1.83    Yes   -     4.46    Yes 
Japan   -     1.49    Yes   -     4.84    No   -     5.04    Yes   -     5.14    Yes 
Mexico   -     1.46    Yes   -     3.13    Yes   -     2.97    Yes   -     5.77    No 
Malaysia   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Poland   -     3.06    Yes   -     5.04    No    .      -   19.19    No 
Spain   -     1.84    Yes   -     2.79    Yes   -     1.82    Yes   -     2.10    Yes 
UK   -     2.22    Yes   -     3.40    Yes   -     3.13    Yes   -     4.15    Yes 
US   -     1.72    Yes   -     1.92    Yes   -     2.79    Yes   -     2.81    Yes 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative 
Outlier tests (IO). Critical value at 5% level. H0: series contain a unit root, H0: no unit root 
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Appendix Table 10 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test under unidentified breaks for Domestic Banks 
    AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Country   Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root Czech Republic   -     2.98    Yes   -     4.23    Yes   -     2.44    Yes   -     4.49    Yes 
Denmark   -     2.10    Yes   -     5.03    No   -     3.17    Yes   -     5.27    Yes 
France   -     2.13    Yes   -     2.51    Yes   -     3.37    Yes   -     5.62    No 
Germany   -     3.42    Yes   -     3.61    Yes   -     3.59    Yes   -     4.15    Yes 
Greece   -     1.74    Yes   -     2.94    Yes   -     1.70    Yes   -     2.75    Yes 
Hungary   -     4.35    No   -     4.38    No   -     0.17    Yes   -     5.61    No 
Indonesia   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Ireland   -     1.94    Yes   -     1.90    Yes   -     3.74    Yes   -     2.60    Yes 
Italy   -     1.73    Yes   -     1.75    Yes   -     3.52    Yes   -     3.08    Yes 
Japan   -     0.68    Yes   -     2.54    Yes   -     4.97    Yes   -     4.84    Yes 
Mexico   -     3.74    No   -     3.46    Yes   -     3.87    Yes   -     3.95    Yes 
Malaysia   -     2.27    Yes   -     2.99    Yes   -     2.33    Yes   -     4.67    Yes 
Poland   -     3.50    Yes   -     3.92    Yes   -     2.34    Yes   -     4.85    Yes 
Spain   -     1.25    Yes   -     1.66    Yes   -     2.67    Yes   -     1.01    Yes 
UK   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
US   -     1.31    Yes   -     4.05    Yes   -     2.53    Yes   -     3.18    Yes 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative 
Outlier tests (IO). Critical value at 5% level. H0: series contain a unit root, H0: no unit root 
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Appendix Table 11 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test under unidentified breaks for Dom. Pensions and Insurance Funds 
    AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Country   Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root Czech Republic   -     2.73    Yes   -     3.68    Yes   -     3.25    Yes   -     5.26    Yes 
Denmark   -     1.40    Yes   -     4.77    No   -     1.62    Yes   -     7.16    No 
France   -     2.78    Yes   -     4.48    No   -     3.77    Yes   -     4.54    Yes 
Germany   -     4.02    No   -     8.67    No   -     2.95    Yes   -     9.40    No 
Greece   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Hungary   -     1.25    Yes   -     3.15    Yes   -     3.29    Yes   -     4.52    Yes 
Indonesia   -     4.78    No   -     3.64    Yes   -     5.95    No   -     4.69    Yes 
Ireland   -     4.69    No   -     6.10    No   -     3.34    Yes   -     3.04    Yes 
Italy   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Japan   -     3.01    Yes   -     3.46    Yes   -     3.18    Yes   -     4.24    Yes 
Mexico   -     1.36    Yes   -     4.57    No   -     4.28    Yes   -     4.69    Yes 
Malaysia   -     2.57    Yes   -     2.06    Yes   -     1.48    Yes   -     2.63    Yes 
Poland   -     1.59    Yes   -     4.00    Yes   -     2.06    Yes   -     4.87    Yes 
Spain   -     3.14    Yes   -     5.78    No   -     3.95    Yes   -     6.89    No 
UK   -     3.17    Yes   -     3.06    Yes   -     1.52    Yes   -     4.14    Yes 
US   -     4.02    No   -     4.52    No   -     3.11    Yes   -     5.48    Yes 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative 
Outlier tests (IO). Critical value at 5% level. H0: series contain a unit root, H0: no unit root 
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Appendix Table 12 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test under unidentified breaks for Domestic Investment Funds 
    AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Country   Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root 
 
Min T-
Stat 
Unit 
Root Czech Republic   -     3.21    Yes   -     4.31    N    -     4.31    Yes   -     4.31    Yes 
Denmark   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
France   -     3.19    Yes   -     3.13    Yes   -     4.37    Yes   -     3.88    Yes 
Germany   -     2.62    Yes   -     8.35    No   -     4.33    Yes   -     9.36    No 
Greece   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Hungary   -     3.90    No   -     2.49    Yes   -     3.67    Yes   -     5.03    Yes 
Indonesia   -     2.06    Yes   -     1.88    Yes   -     4.89    Yes   -     3.96    Yes 
Ireland   -     0.44    Yes   -     6.23    No   -     1.50    Yes   -     9.00    No 
Italy   -     3.48    Yes   -     3.23    Yes   -     1.91    Yes   -     3.12    Yes 
Japan   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Mexico   -     1.50    Yes   -     7.69    No   -     6.57    No   -   11.50    No 
Malaysia   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Poland   -     0.90    Yes   -     0.46    Yes   -     1.11    Yes   -     5.88    No 
Spain         0.01    Yes   -     2.37    Yes         0.25    Yes   -     4.27    Yes 
UK   -     2.51    Yes   -     2.16    Yes   -     2.81    Yes   -     3.86    Yes 
US   -     3.18    Yes   -     3.10    Yes   -     4.12    Yes   -     4.07    Yes 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative 
Outlier tests (IO). Critical value at 5% level. H0: series contain a unit root, H0: no unit root 
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Appendix Table 13 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test: Identified Breaks with corresponding p-values with for Non-resident Private Investors 
    P-value   Structural Break Date 
Country   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Czech Republic 0.00    0.00    0.02  0.00    0.02  0.02    2004q2   2003q3   2003q2 2004q2   2003q3 2004q2 
Denmark   0.72    0.74    0.01  0.00    0.00  0.00    2011q2   2008q1   2006q4 2009q1   2006q3 2008q2 
France   0.00    0.04    0.00  0.00    #N/A #N/A   2004q3   2003q3   2005q1 2009q2   2000q2 2004q3 
Germany   0.00    0.01    0.00  0.79    0.30  0.30    2005q1   2005q2   2005q1 2008q2   2001q4 2005q2 
Greece   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2004q2   2003q2   2004q2 2006q3   2003q2 2011q1 
Hungary   0.00    0.37    0.00  0.00    #N/A #N/A   2011q4   1999q2   2001q3 2011q4   1999q2 2010q4 
Indonesia   0.00    0.19    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2007q3   2009q3   2006q2 2010q3   2005q2 2009q3 
Ireland   0.00    0.08    0.00  0.00    0.01  0.01    2005q4   2005q3   2005q4 2011q1   2004q3 2009q4 
Italy   0.00    0.04    0.00  0.00    #N/A #N/A   2003q4   2004q3   1999q4 2005q2   1999q3 2004q3 
Japan   0.01    0.94    0.00  0.00    0.02  0.02    2011q2   1998q3   2001q1 2006q1   2001q2 2005q4 
Mexico   0.00    0.44    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2011q2   2003q3   2004q2 2010q2   2003q3 2010q2 
Malaysia   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2008q3   2008q4   2006q4 2010q2   2005q4 2009q3 
Poland   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.01  0.01    2010q4   2010q1   2002q4 2010q4   2003q2 2010q1 
Spain   0.00    #N/A   0.00  0.00    #N/A #N/A   1999q4   1998q3   1999q2 2010q1   1998q3 2009q1 
UK   0.00    0.01    0.00  0.00    0.02  0.02    2005q4   2005q1   1999q4 2005q4   1997q1 2005q1 
US   0.01    0.19    0.01  0.00    0.03  0.03    2009q3   2007q1   2006q3 2008q2   2005q4 2008q1 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative Outlier tests (IO). H0: 
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Appendix Table 14 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test: Identified Breaks with corresponding p-values with for Non-resident Private Investors 
    P-value   Structural Break Date 
Country   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Czech Republic #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Denmark   #N/A   0.01    0.14  0.00    #N/A #N/A   #N/A   2008q3   2006q3 2008q4   2001q3 2008q3 
France   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.16  0.16    2010q3   2008q1   2004q1 2010q3   2001q3 2008q1 
Germany   0.00    0.17    0.03  0.00    0.21  0.21    2006q3   2006q3   2004q3 2007q3   2006q2 2008q1 
Greece   0.01    0.22    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2011q2   2003q3   2003q4 2010q2   2003q3 2010q1 
Hungary   0.00    0.17    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2004q1   2004q2   2004q1 2010q2   2004q2 2009q3 
Indonesia   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Ireland   0.92    0.03    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2008q1   2008q2   2005q3 2009q2   2004q3 2008q2 
Italy   0.00    0.01    0.00  0.02    0.00  0.00    2000q2   1998q2   2000q2 2009q2   1998q2 2007q3 
Japan   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2001q1   2001q2   2001q1 2008q2   2001q2 2008q3 
Mexico   0.00    0.52    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2007q1   2007q3   2007q1 2009q3   2007q2 2009q2 
Malaysia   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Poland   0.00    0.16    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2005q1   2005q3   2005q3 2007q1   2005q2 2007q1 
Spain   0.05    0.04    0.00  0.00    0.02  0.02    2011q4   2005q3   2008q1 2011q3   2005q3 2010q1 
UK   0.00    0.01    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2002q2   1997q2   1999q4 2006q2   1997q2 2004q4 
US   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.02  0.02    2007q4   2003q1   2004q3 2008q4   2003q1 2009q2 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative Outlier tests (IO) 
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Appendix Table 15 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test: Identified Breaks with corresponding p-values with for Domestic Banks 
    P-value   Structural Break Date 
Country   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Czech Republic 0.00    0.00    0.68  0.00    0.00  0.00    2003q4   2003q3   1999q4 2004q1   1999q2 2003q3 
Denmark   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.26  0.26    2004q4   2005q1   2004q4 2006q2   2000q3 2005q1 
France   0.00    0.34    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2004q2   2000q2   2005q3 2008q1   2004q4 2007q4 
Germany   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.12  0.12    2006q2   2005q2   2005q1 2006q4   2001q4 2005q2 
Greece   0.00    0.05    0.00  0.00    . .   2002q1   1999q2   2000q4 2003q3   1999q2 2001q1 
Hungary   0.00    0.00    0.05  0.00    0.14  0.14    2008q1   2007q3   2005q1 2008q1   1998q3 2007q3 
Indonesia   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Ireland   0.08    0.05    0.00  0.00    0.03  0.03    2011q2   2011q2   2004q3 2009q3   2006q3 2008q2 
Italy   0.10    .   0.00  0.00    0.08  0.08    2010q3   1999q1   2002q1 2009q2   2002q1 2008q3 
Japan   0.00    .   0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2001q1   1999q1   2002q2 2009q1   1999q1 2002q3 
Mexico   0.00    0.00    0.42  0.00    0.16  0.16    2005q4   2004q3   2004q2 2005q4   2000q3 2004q3 
Malaysia   0.00    0.02    0.00  0.04    0.00  0.00    2000q1   1999q1   2000q1 2007q4   2000q1 2008q1 
Poland   0.00    0.05    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2003q1   2003q4   2004q3 2008q1   2003q4 2007q2 
Spain   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.28    0.00  0.00    2008q3   2008q3   2008q3 2010q3   2008q4 2010q2 
UK   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
US   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    . .   2003q3   2002q3   2003q3 2009q4   2002q3 2009q1 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative Outlier tests (IO) 
 
  
ARTICLE 1 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 136 
 
 
Appendix Table 16 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test: Identified Breaks with corresponding p-values with for Domestic Pensions and Insurance Funds 
    P-value   Structural Break Date 
Country   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Czech Republic 0.00    0.01    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2006q4   1997q3   1997q2 2006q2   1997q3 2005q3 
Denmark   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2008q1   2008q2   2003q1 2009q1   2003q1 2008q2 
France   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    #N/A #N/A   2005q4   2006q1   2003q1 2007q3   2002q1 2006q1 
Germany   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    #N/A #N/A   2005q1   2005q2   2005q1 2006q1   2001q4 2005q2 
Greece   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Hungary   0.04    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2011q4   2010q4   2004q1 2011q3   2004q1 2010q4 
Indonesia   0.02    0.90    0.00  0.19    0.04  0.04    2009q3   2011q4   2009q2 2011q3   2009q1 2011q4 
Ireland   0.00    0.01    0.01  0.10    0.80  0.80    2010q1   2009q4   2003q4 2010q3   2008q4 2010q1 
Italy   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Japan   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.01  0.01    2008q2   2007q4   2007q2 2009q3   2006q1 2008q3 
Mexico   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2004q4   2004q2   2004q1 2010q1   2004q2 2009q4 
Malaysia   0.00    0.01    0.00  0.00    0.02  0.02    2009q1   2008q2   2007q4 2010q4   2004q1 2008q2 
Poland   0.00    0.21    0.00  0.04    0.01  0.01    2003q4   2005q1   2006q3 2009q4   2005q1 2009q2 
Spain   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2007q2   2007q3   2008q3 2010q4   2003q4 2007q3 
UK   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2007q4   2008q1   2006q3 2008q4   2006q2 2008q1 
US   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.01    0.00  0.00    2009q4   2009q1   2009q3 2010q4   2009q1 2009q4 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative Outlier tests (IO) 
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Table 17 Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test: Identified Breaks with corresponding p-values with for Domestic Investment Funds 
    P-value   Structural Break Date 
Country   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double   AO Single   IO Single   AO Double   IO Double 
Czech Republic 0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    #N/A #N/A   2008q1   2007q1   1998q2 2007q2   1997q3 2007q1 
Denmark   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
France   0.00    0.01    0.00  0.00    0.03  0.03    2008q2   2008q1   2003q1 2008q2   2001q4 2008q1 
Germany   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.09  0.09    2006q1   2005q2   2005q1 2007q2   2001q4 2005q2 
Greece   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Hungary   0.00    0.07    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2004q2   2003q1   2004q1 2008q1   2003q1 2008q2 
Indonesia   0.05    0.19    0.00  0.00    0.01  0.01    2011q3   2011q2   2009q2 2011q2   2009q3 2011q1 
Ireland   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2004q4   2005q2   2004q4 2006q1   2003q4 2005q2 
Italy   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.03  0.03    2006q3   2004q2   2000q2 2006q2   1999q1 2004q3 
Japan   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Mexico   0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2005q4   2005q1   2005q4 2010q1   2005q1 2010q2 
Malaysia   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A   #N/A   #N/A #N/A   #N/A #N/A 
Poland   0.26    0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2006q3   2007q2   2005q4 2008q2   2005q1 2007q2 
Spain   0.00    .   0.00  0.00    . .   1999q4   1998q2   1999q4 2008q2   1998q3 2007q4 
UK   0.00    0.15    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    2001q2   1999q4   2006q2 2010q2   2005q3 2008q3 
US   0.00    0.01    0.00  0.00    0.02  0.02    2008q2   2007q1   2004q3 2008q2   2003q4 2007q3 
Note: Tests are conducted under single and double unidentified breaks for presence of Additive Outliers (AO) and Innovative Outlier tests (IO) 
 
ARTICLE 1 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 138 
 
Appendix Table 18 Fisher-type Unit- root Test based on Phillips-Perron Tests 
    Inverse chi-squared   Inverse normal   Inverse logit   Modified inv. chi-squared   
Presumable Unit Root 
Variable   Intercept Only Time Trend   Intercept Only Time Trend   Intercept Only Time Trend   Intercept Only Time Trend   
Non-resident Private   0.98 (16.33) 1.00 (7.57)   0.96 (-1.76) 1.00 (-2.90)   0.99 (2.59) 1.00 (4.13)   0.99 (2.44) 1.00 (4.01)   Yes 
Non-resident Official   1.00 (10.86) 1.00 (11.87)   0.99 (-2.47) 0.99 (-2.34)   0.99 (2.36) 1.00 (3.61)   0.99 (2.31) 1.00 (3.38)   Yes 
Banks   0.76 (24.37) 0.91 (20.39)   0.77 (-0.73) 0.89 (-1.24)   0.66 (0.42) 0.95 (1.69)   0.65 (0.38) 0.96 (1.72)   Yes 
Pension and Insurance Funds 0.89 (19.11) 0.69 (23.76)   0.88 (-1.19) 0.71 (-0.57)   0.99 (2.37) 0.91 (1.33)   0.99 (2.21) 0.89 (1.23)   Yes 
Investment Funds   1.00 (11.12) 0.75 (20.93)   0.98 (-2.06) 0.76 (-0.70)   0.96 (1.81) 0.85 (1.04)   0.97 (1.84) 0.85 (1.06)   Yes 
                              
Structural Primary Fiscal Balance 0.98 (19.07) 1.00 (3.01)   0.96 (-1.81) 1.00 (-3.76)   0.99 (2.56) 1.00 (6.13)   1.00 (2.59) 1.00 (6.02)   Yes 
Debt / GDP   0.00 (94.24) 1.00 (5.05)   0.00 (7.31) 1.00 (-3.51)   0.00 (-3.75) 1.00 (6.13)   0.00 (-2.93) 1.00 (5.70)   Yes 
Wght-Av. Debt Maturity   0.16 (39.83) 1.00 (12.10)   0.16 (0.98) 0.99 (-2.49)   0.67 (0.44) 1.00 (5.10)   0.70 (0.53) 1.00 (4.73)   Yes 
GDP Growth Trend   0.79 (27.26) 1.00 (6.34)   0.79 (-0.82) 1.00 (-3.35)   0.91 (1.37) 1.00 (6.01)   0.97 (1.93) 1.00 (5.99)   Yes 
Current Account Balance / GDP 0.00 (88.24) 0.00 (87.34)   0.00 (6.58) 0.00 (6.47)   0.00 (-4.77) 0.00 (-4.36)   0.00 (-4.03) 0.00 (-3.55)   No 
S&P Rating   0.97 (20.62) 1.00 (15.49)   0.95 (-1.62) 0.99 (-2.24)   0.60 (0.25) 1.00 (2.71)   0.61 (0.29) 1.00 (2.58)   Yes 
Risk Aversion Index   0.70 (29.32) 0.16 (42.13)   0.71 (-0.57) 0.16 (0.99)   0.24 (-0.72) 0.02 (-2.05)   0.21 (-0.81) 0.01 (-2.29)   Yes 
Average Bid-Ask Spread   0.00 (89.35) 0.00 (74.35)   0.00 (6.71) 0.00 (4.89)   0.00 (-4.06) 0.02 (-2.00)   0.00 (-3.03) 0.07 (-1.46)   No 
                              
Inflation (CPI)   0.05 (48.95) 0.78 (27.52)   0.03 (1.81) 0.78 (-0.79)   0.01 (-2.35) 0.52 (0.06)   0.01 (-2.52) 0.51 (0.03)   Yes 
Credit to Private Sector / GDP 0.49 (33.62) 0.00 (60.44)   0.52 (-0.05) 0.00 (3.21)   0.28 (-0.58) 0.04 (-1.76)   0.30 (-0.53) 0.03 (-1.82)   Yes 
European Policy Uncertainty 0.00 (83.02) 0.00 (116.13)   0.00 (5.94) 0.00 (9.96)   0.00 (-5.37) 0.00 (-7.73)   0.00 (-5.60) 0.00 (-7.59)   No 
Government Effectiveness 0.34 (36.85) 0.98 (19.50)   0.37 (0.35) 0.96 (-1.76)   0.87 (1.11) 1.00 (3.83)   0.92 (1.43) 1.00 (3.64)   Yes 
Sovereign Spread 
 
0.02 (54.16) 0.06 (47.27)   0.01 (2.45) 0.05 (1.61)   0.61 (0.29) 0.21 (-0.82)   0.75 (0.67) 0.35 (-0.40)   Yes 
Currency Appreciation  0.00 (511.05) 0.00 (449.65)   0.00 (57.85) 0.00 (50.40)   0.00 (-35.43) 0.00 (-31.18)   0.00 (-20.49) 0.00 (-18.92)   No 
Note: Ho: All panels contain unit roots. Ha: At least one panel is stationary. Results contain p-values followed by corresponding statistic values in brackets. 
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Impact of sovereign credit downgrades on investor holdings of 
government debt in developed and emerging economies17 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a new broad dataset compiled from national sources, this paper analyzes the impact of 
changes in sovereign credit ratings on investor holdings of sovereign debt and on sovereign 
bond yields. Findings for the broad country sample indicate that upgrades exert no consistent 
and significant impact on bond holdings nor on bond yields, whereas rating downgrades 
induce volatility in sovereign yields and bondholdings of domestic banks, pension funds and 
investment funds. In case of Eurozone Periphery and Emerging Economies, upgrades that 
occurred before and after the sovereign crisis influenced the holdings of domestic investors, 
but not the bond prices. In Peripheral Eurozone, holdings of non-resident investors and non-
resident central banks as well as sovereign yields were impacted by the rating downgrades, in 
particular those issued by S&P and Moody’s together with serial downgrades that took place 
over a short time period.  
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I. Introduction 
Credit rating agencies have played a crucial role in shaping global financial markets over the 
last two decades, as sovereign ratings provide objective and valuable information of riskiness 
and repayment probability of sovereigns. This is why financial press, policymakers and 
investors pay close attention to the actions and inactions of rating agencies in turbulent times, 
when political risk and uncertainty of debt repayment move into alarming levels. Occasionally 
public opinion and policymakers criticize rating agencies for issuing excessively negative 
ratings that supposedly cause panic in financial markets, push investors to sell downgraded 
sovereign bonds and rise governments’ refinancing costs. 
To date empirical research focused on measuring the reaction of asset prices to 
changes in credit ratings. The objective of this study is to analyse the impact of rating changes 
on both bond yield and the actual holdings of government for different investor types. For the 
purpose of this paper a new dataset has been compiled to gauge the holdings of non-resident 
private investors, non-resident central banks as well as domestic banks, domestic pension and 
insurance funds, and domestic investment funds. The data has been compiled from national 
sources for a set of 24 countries from Core and Peripheral Eurozone, so-called Safe Haven 
developed countries, and emerging economies of different size and level of development.  
Econometric analysis is conducted under consideration for different country types and rating 
agencies, anticipative effects related to rating outlooks, and general vs. serial rating changes 
vs. multi-notch rating changes. The main results are as follows. 
Findings for the full sample indicate that upgrades exert no consistent and significant impact 
either neither on investor holdings nor on bond yields, no matter whether they are preceded by 
an outlook warning or not. However, in case of Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging 
Economies rating upgrades pushed domestic asset managers and pension funds to change 
their allocation to domestic government bonds. 
In line with existing literature results for the full sample indicate that sovereign yields and all 
types of domestic investors are affected by rating downgrades, in particular those preceded by 
negative outlooks. In case of Eurozone Periphery and Emerging Economies, foreign private 
investors and sovereign yields were influenced in particular by the second and third 
downgrades over two-year horizon. 
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Downgrades by S&P and Moody's in Peripheral Eurozone were associated not only with 
significant changes in holdings among non-resident private investors and non-resident central 
banks, but also with changes in bond yields. In Emerging Economies, downgrades by Fitch 
affected the holdings of foreign investors, domestic banks and pension funds, and sovereign 
bonds. Last but not least, investors in Emerging Economies reacted differently to 1st and 3rd 
downgrades over a two year horizon and to multi-notch downgrades. 
From a policy-making and investment point of view, to safeguard the stability of the 
international financial system, the key priorities are to reduce the sovereign solvency risk and 
to tackle contagion, as pointed out by Santis (2012) among others. Presented analysis 
indicates that rating changes not only affect the bond yields, but more importantly they affect 
the structure of investor holdings. Although at this stage of research the holdings-yields 
relationship has not been entirely identified, it is conceivable that a durable change in demand 
for government bonds may change the level and volatility of bond yields and, in consequence, 
country’s debt sustainability in the long run. 
II. Literature Review 
II.1. Credit Ratings, Investment Rationale and Financial 
Regulation 
Banks, pension funds and investment funds have different investment rationale and 
face different constrains for holding government bonds. 
Banks allocate certain portion of their assets in government bonds as a liquidity buffer. 
Nouy (2011) argues that regulators have by far neglected the riskiness of government bonds. 
In fact, under Basel I, II and III, domestic-currency government bonds of OECD countries are 
assigned zero risk capital weights irrespective of the actual credit rating. This explains why 
high-yielding low-rating bonds remain highly profitable investment from banks’ point of 
view, at least as long as those assets they do not need to be marked to market. On the other 
hand, low-rated bonds are not eligible as collateral for financing transactions with central 
banks or at the money market. During episodes of tight financing conditions, holding 
downgraded bonds in bank portfolio can become more of a burden than a profitable 
investment. 
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Pension and insurance funds have buy-and-hold profiles and invest in government 
bonds to match their long-term liabilities. Institutions operating under the Solvency regulation 
are obliged by to purchase and hold bonds with a certain minimum rating.  
Finally, investment funds invest in bonds according to the specific conditions agreed 
with the clients. If the investment prospectus restricts investment in bonds below a certain 
rating, fund manager is obliged to sell those assets in case of a downgrade. 
Hypothesis 1: banks, investment funds and pension and insurance funds may need to 
sell bonds following downgrades  
II.2. Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings on Financial Assets 
Numerous studies have investigated the impact of credit ratings on asset prices. 
Cantor and Packer (1996) find that credit ratings help to explain sovereign credit ratings 
beyond publicly available information on fiscal and macroeconomic situation. They find that 
foreign currency bond spreads are more likely to react to negative rather than positive rating 
announcements, Moody’s to S&P, changes in ratings rather than in outlook, speculative grade 
rather than investment grade. 
Pukthuanthong-Le, Elayan, and Rose (2007) study the impact of changes in ratings and 
outlook on asset prices between 1990 and 2000 and find that only negative news have an 
impact on equity and bond returns. They observe that downgrades and negative outlooks 
occur mainly during bond market downturns, raising probability that rating agencies may 
exacerbate a bond bear market.  
Brooks et al. (2004) look at the reaction of national stock market and find that only 
downgrades by S&P and Fitch elicit a significant market reaction and that EMs stock 
markets’ reaction is no different from DMs. Also, while rating upgrades and downgrades in 
local currency ratings pass relatively unperceived, downgrades in foreign currency rating 
entice a negative market reaction 
Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) show that while investors tend to underestimate the signals 
from credit rating agencies during pre-crisis boom years, downgrades have significant impact 
on the bond markets and amplify the downward pressure during the bust phase. Through an 
event study they also show that imminent upgrades and implemented downgrades have a 
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significant impact on government bonds both in OECD and Emerging countries, the effect 
being strong in the latter one. 
Causation may be transmitted not only from ratings to sovereign spreads, but also from 
sovereign spreads to ratings. Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) and more recently Afonso, 
Furceri, and Gomes (2012) show that past values of changes in bond or CDS spreads are 
significant determinants of the change in ratings and vice-versa. 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) apply event study with a two-day window to analyze the 
relationship between sovereign CDS and sovereign credit ratings in 22 emerging countries 
between 2001 and 2009 and find that positive rating announcements cause relatively strong 
turbulence both in the subject country and in other economies, while negative rating signals 
affect only domestic market and to far lesser extent. Their results also indicate that investors 
may be able to use changes in CDS spreads to predict rating announcements, in particular 
negative ones, and that the impact of rating announcements on CDS markets is diminished by 
prior rating announcements. 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2013) analyze the impact of rating announcements on exchange  
rates. They find that signals sent by rating agencies not only affect the exchange rate of the 
subject country, but also induce strong spillover effects to other countries’ exchange rates in 
the region. Their findings indicate that spillover effects tend to be more intense during crisis 
episodes. The impact of outlook and watch signals is stronger than the impact of actual rating 
changes.  Negative news from all three major agencies have a market impact, whereas only 
Moody’s positive news produces a reaction.  
Hypothesis 2: rating actions, in particular downgrades, have an impact on asset prices 
II.3. Sequence and interdependence of rating changes 
Existing empirical research suggests that the impact of ratings changes may be amplified if 
up- or downgrades occur in several steps one after the other. Moreover, since reputational 
effects are an important issue in the financial markets, rating agencies are likely to follow the 
ratings of their competitors, they are more likely to issue quasi simultaneous up- or 
downgrades. 
Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) show that although rating events for individual agencies do 
not necessarily produce a significant response in yield spreads, rating announcements by two 
or more agencies can induce significant effects in the markets. In addition, results of two-way 
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Granger Causality tests indicate that, when controlling for factors common to bonds and 
ratings, in the long-term none of the three rating agencies appears to have greater impact on 
asset prices than the other agencies. 
 Kräussl (2005) investigates the impact of credit rating announcements on a generic 
speculative market pressure index encompassing change in nominal exchange rates, interest 
rate and stock market index. His findings indicate that downgrades and negative news 
signaling ‘rating outlook’ or ‘rating watch’ are significantly stronger than rating upgrades. He 
also shows that rating changes preceded by watch statement do not engender significant 
market reaction. 
Analysing the interdependence in rating actions between CRAs, Alsakka and Gwilym (2010) 
observe that probability of an upgrade by one agency is higher in case of a recent upgrade of 
another agency, while downgrades are less probable if preceded by other downgrades. 
Hypothesis 3: sequence of rating changes by different rating agencies may have different 
market effect 
The Economist (2013) underline that no AAA- or AA-rated bond has ever defaulted within 
subsequent ten years and among A-rated bonds only holders of Greek debt had to accept a 
write-off. They predict that although investors are likely to continue using safe-haven ratings 
as a benchmark and further downgrades would not affect investors’ demand, the impact on 
lower-rated bonds is still to be determined.  
Santis (2012) analyses the role of credit ratings during the Eurozone crisis and shows that 
rating downgrades in Greece, Ireland and Portugal were associated with a rise in spreads in 
fiscally constrained countries, the spillover effects from Greece being the strongest. 
Candelon, Sy, and Arezki (2011) apply VAR methods to estimate the impact of rating 
changes on international stock markets and sovereign CDS and find that the sign and 
magnitude of spillover effects depend on the type of announcements and the profile of the 
source country experiencing the downgrade. While actual rating downgrades in Peripheral 
Europe affect CDS spreads across Europe, the impact of outlook revision was mitigated.  The 
impact of rating changes depends on the agency from which the announcements originates, 
rating changes by S&P are more likely to have more significant impact than the other 
agencies. 
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Claeys and Vasicek (2012) analyse the direction of bilateral linkages between government 
bond yields of EU countries using VAR methods. Their findings indicate that spillover effets 
vary across regions and are most important in the Eurozone, whereas Central European 
countries tend to affect each other. In turn, Denmark, Sweden and UK are rather insulated. 
Using this framework authors also find that while the impact of rating news on domestic 
sovereign spreads is limited, rating-induced spillover effects are heterogeneous and become 
stronger at the lower end of the rating scale. Their results show that downgrades in the 
Eurozone Periphery affected bonds in Netherlands, France, Belgium and the UK. 
II.4. Dynamics of Capital Flows During Crisis Episodes 
Empirical research shows that cross-country capital flows, including bond portfolio flows, are 
driven by changes in global risk sentiment. 
Korinek (2011) demonstrates theoretically that when country becomes financially constrained 
global investors begin to look for other investment destinations. However, those hot money 
“flows” render recipient countries more vulnerable to adverse shocks which can lead to serial 
financial crisis simultaneously across countries. 
Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2013) investigate the term premium in emerging market 
foreign-currency sovereign bonds from the supply, i.e. new issuance, and demand angles. 
Comparing the twelve-and three-year maturities, they show that excess term premium rises 
considerably during crisis pushing governments to issue short-term bonds that remain 
relatively cheaper. 
Looking at Eurozone government bonds between 2008 and 2010, Delatte, Gex, and López-
Villavicencio (2012) find that market distress alters the price discovery process and 
transmission between CDS and bond market leading to the conclusion that in critical moments 
CDS tend to lead the bond market. In an earlier study Fontana and Scheicher (2010) show that 
bond markets tend to lead CDS markets in Euro Core countries and vice versa in Euro 
Peripheral countries. 
F. Broner et al. (2013) present evidence for a heterogeneous set of over 100 countries that 
gross capital flows are pro-cyclical, with foreigners increasing their exposure in the country 
and domestic agents investing more abroad during expansions. During crisis, both in- and 
outflows come to a halt.  
Hypothesis 4: global risk aversion affects the extent of impact of rating changes 
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III. Dataset and Methodology 
III.1 The dataset 
This new dataset has been created using data from national sources, mainly central banks, 
ministries of finance, statistical authorities and depositories, as presented in detail in the first 
article, and extended by Switzerland. Data includes historical series of holdings of 
government debt by key market players: non-resident private investors, non-resident official 
holdings, domestic banks, domestic pension and insurance funds and investment funds. In 
terms of broadness, it covers local currency government debt markets in three countries from 
Core Eurozone and five from Peripheral Eurozone, four so-called Safe Haven developed 
countries, and twelve emerging economies of different size and level of development. Data is 
available in monthly frequency for 16 countries and quarterly in the remaining 8 countries; 
quarterly data is repeated at last available value. Due to limited holdings data availability I 
focus on the period between 1996M1 and 2012M12. 
III.2 Empirical Methodology 
i. Model Specification: Impact of Rating Changes on 
Bondholdings and Yields 
Studies on the impact of rating actions typically apply event studies on asset prices or 
exchange rates in daily frequency. However, in this case three factors speak in favour of 
taking on a different approach. First, holdings data is provided in monthly or quarterly 
frequency. Second, rating changes are often preceded by rating outlooks within two to three 
months before the rating change. Third, rating actions are often anticipated by the markets 
well in advance and an event study with a short window would not capture the anticipation 
effect. Fourth, institutional investors holding sovereign bonds are likely to modify their 
positions within a given time frame, in particular if they hold large positions of less liquid 
bonds or if the country loses or gains investment grade status. To take into account those 
factors I adapt framework of analysis applied by Broner et al. (2013) to analyse behaviour of 
capital flows around crisis episodes in a cross-country setting. 
Formally, for each country j I examine the relationship between the change in bond holdings 
of investor i over the period of two months ahead and two months following the rating action 
which can be expressed as follows: 
Eq. 9                                                            
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Where X stands for the following control variables, i.e. debt to GDP, primary budget balance, 
political risk and, last but not least, the rating outlook. The choice of control variables is based 
on previous research results on demand for government debt as well as relevant literature, see 
Santis (2012) among others. 
The model is separately estimated in four different settings: 
- general rating changes,  
- rating up- or downgrade preceded (or not) by respectively positive or negative outlook, 
- rating action preceded by earlier rating action that took place over 24 month horizon, i.e. 
serial up- or downgrade, 
- multi-notch up- or downgrade, i.e. rating change by 1,2, or 3 and more notches within a 
single rating action 
ii. Investor Types and Yields 
For the aggregated debt figured in each country I use nominal amounts of bond 
holdings di held by specific investors, namely (i=1) for private non-resident investors, (i=2) 
for official non-resident investors, (i=3) for domestic banks, (i=4) for domestic pension and 
insurance funds, (i=5) for domestic investment and mutual funds. Sum of parts 1 to 5 together 
with other unidentified holdings represents total outstanding local currency debt of a given 
country. To account for heterogeneity resulting from differences in country size, indebtedness 
and use of local currency values I take log values of holdings. 
Eq. 10                                                                    
As for the market-related variable I chose the local currency 5-year government bond 
yield for two reasons. First, 5-year bonds are liquid throughout the period of analysis both in 
advanced economies and in emerging markets with less developed financial markets. Second, 
market conventions suggest that, compared to other typical maturities like 2Y and 10Y, on 
average 5-year maturity represents a fair middle point between liquidity risk, credit risk and 
interest rate risk across countries. 
iii. Pre-estimation Tests and Estimation Technique  
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Data stationarity has been verified both in level and first difference using Fisher-type 
unit root test for panel data, combined with Philips-Perron estimation method. Results in 
Table 27 indicate that series in level for non-official residents, banks, pensions and insurance 
funds, and government yields contain unit root in level, but not in first difference. Hence all 
the following tests are conducted in first difference. 
To verify whether fixed or random effects are preferable in this setting I run a series of 
Hausman tests. Although test statistics in Table 28 indicate that random effects would be 
more suitable, none of the tests is consistently positive. In result I follow the approach 
undertaken by similar studies, e.g. Broner et al. (2013), and apply country fixed effects model. 
Presence of fixed time effects is verified using linear joint parameter tests. Results in Table 29 
indicate that use of time effects would be advisable in case of both private and official non-
residents as well as sovereign yields. To maintain consistency throughout the analysis I use 
fixed time effects in all further tests. Tests for heteroskedasticity are conducted using 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity under individual fixed effects. Test 
statistics in Table 30 suggest that all data series are heteroskedastic. To verify whether 
autocorrelation of error terms is an issue in our dataset I use the methodology proposed by 
Woolridge (2002). Table 31 shows that serial correlation is an issue in all categories except 
pension and insurance funds. Finally, to verify whether data exhibits signs of cross-section 
dependence typical for macro panels with limited N and large T, I use the Pesaran Test for 
cross-section dependence. Test results in Table 32 indicate that the panels exhibit cross-
section dependence.  
Summing up, in the current setting data should be analyzed in first difference and under 
fixed country effects and time effects. What makes the choice of the estimation technique 
more complex, however, is that the dataset exhibits presence of serial autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, cross-section dependence. The typical estimation method to deal with the 
last three issues would be the technique developed by Driscoll-Kraay (1998). However, this 
method is not compatible with the use of fixed time effects which are likely to be affect the 
magnitude of the impact of rating changes. Hence, following the discussion in De Hoyos and 
Saraﬁdis (2006) and the estimation approach by Broner et al. (2013) I use standard errors 
clustering method on country level and fixed time effects. 
IV. Empirical Results 
IV.1. Stylized Facts on Dynamics of the Investor Structure 
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Countries under analysis differ strongly in terms of the initial investor structure and 
dynamics in the last decade. Evidence presented in Table 1 shows that Eurozone countries 
have the highest share of non-resident holdings ranging from 36% for Spain up to 79% for 
Ireland, while large developed markets such as the Japan, UK and US rely to greater extent on 
domestic investors. Variation of holdings of non-resident investors is also highest in Eurozone 
countries and lowest in developed non-euro economies. Graphs 20 to 36 demonstrate the 
dynamics of the investor holdings in high-rating developed countries through the prism of 
credit default swaps and credit ratings. As benchmark for market-implied perception of credit 
riskiness I use CDS spreads. The key advantage over yields is that they do not depend on 
underlying benchmark bonds like in case of spreads and are available for all the countries 
irrespective of the currency of denomination. 
While all safe-haven countries benefited from flight to safety effects during the 2008-
2012 periods, paradoxically in Japan, US and France rating downgrades and spikes in CDS 
prices were associated with bond purchases by foreign investors.  
Graphs 27 to 30 paint an entirely different picture for the Peripheral Eurozone. In fact, 
until late 2009 sovereign downgrades and that plagued those countries were associated with 
further increase in foreign participation that reached over 90% in Greece and 50% in Spain. 
The situation changed dramatically in 2010 when foreign investors revaluated the underlying 
risk of insolvency and withdrew brusquely from those markets. 
As for emerging economies, the investor landscape is dominated by domestic banks 
and pensions and insurance funds, while non-resident investors hold between 1% and 25% of 
outstanding local currency debt instruments. Countries with larger GDP size and relatively 
open financial account such as Poland, Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey experience greater 
participation of foreign investors which is in line with the findings of Mehl and Reynaud 
(2010) among others. Graphs 9 to 19 demonstrate that from 2009 onwards share of non-
resident holdings began to increase not only in emerging countries that succeeded in 
improving their sovereign rating, but also in Hungary, Mexico and Thailand that underwent 
rating downgrades in the recent years.  
Another interesting pattern emerges with regard to pricing of sovereign bonds. To 
make the interpretation of graphs more intuitive across different countries and currencies 
instead of bond yield I plot sovereign CDS in USD as percentage of maximum country-
specific level of CDS price. Graphs 9 to 19 reveal that spikes in perceived sovereign risk were 
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accompanied with a marked outflow of foreign bondholders only in a handful of cases around 
2008/09: Malaysia, Peru, Hungary and Czech Republic. In turn, numerous episodes of 
sovereign instability around 2009 and 2011 were actually coupled with an inflow of foreign 
investors into EM bonds. Last but not least, holdings of domestic investors do not seem to be 
co-move significantly with sovereign risk or ratings. 
IV.2. Stylized Facts on Sovereign Rating Actions 
It is common knowledge that both the business model and de facto behaviour of rating 
agencies are strongly based on reputation effects. In absence of a gain potential for providing 
a positive rating, analysts have greater incentive to be pessimistic about the asset under review 
in order to limit their reputation loss in case of deterioration of the actual credit quality. Table 
2 demonstrates that the distribution of rating actions is clearly skewed. In total, rating 
agencies have announced 207 downgrades compared to 166 upgrades. In terms of reactivity, 
with 86 downgrades S&P has undertaken more downgrades than its peers.  
Decomposition of rating actions by country group and sub-periods reveals an interesting 
pattern. First, between 1996 and 2007 most rating downgrades concerned emerging 
economies while less than 10% of downgrades referred to advanced economies. At the same 
time, years of economic stabilization in EMs and boom years in the Eurozone resulted in over 
100 notches in upgrades. The global financial crisis turned the situation upside down, EMs 
have been downgraded by 29 notches, Peripheral Eurozone by 73 notches and non-euro 
advanced economies by 7 notches. Relatively few countries have been upgraded during this 
period. 
Graphical analysis 
In the aftermath of large-scale sovereign defaults in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe 
at the end of XXth century, Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999) argued that rating agencies tend to 
publish benign reviews during expansion phases and become excessively pessimistic during 
recessions. Such a sequence of downgrades that destabilize financial markets would lead to 
capital outflows that further exacerbate the downturn. Data in this sample confirms this rating 
analyst’s behavior, as rating agencies undertake both multi-notch downgrades and sequences 
of downgrades. 
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Results in the bottom part of Table 2 suggest that on average one downgrade action resulted 
in a downward revision by 1.4 to 1.7 notches, whereas upgrades oscillate around 1.1 to 1.2 
notches on the upside.  
To provide a more detailed picture on sequential up- and downgrades, I calculate the number 
of notches changed upon one downgrade as well as cumulative number of notches 
downgraded on 2-year rolling basis. Tables 3 and 4 show that Peripheral Eurozone countries 
have been among the most punished in our sample, most countries have been downgraded by 
2 to 4 notches in one action by at least one rating agency. Moreover, Greece, Portugal, Ireland 
and Spain have been downgraded between 7 and 14 notches within a two year horizon by at 
least one rating agency. These results go way beyond the downgrades in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand that took place during the Asian crisis in 1998. 
Compared to the downgrades around crisis episodes, the history of serial and multiple-notch 
upgrades appears far less startling. Most EM countries have been upgraded by a maximum 1 
to 2 notches in one action, while sequence of upgrades over 24 months happened less than 
20% of the time. 
IV.3. Impact of Rating Actions: Entire Sample 
I begin the econometric analysis by investigating the impact of basic rating up- and 
downgrades on bond holdings and yields for the entire sample and different sub-groups. 
Due to large heterogeneity in country characteristics, results for the entire sample 
indicate that basic rating actions do not cause significant changes in the behaviour of 
investors. Regression results in Tables 5 point towards a weak and ambiguous reaction of 
foreign private investors to rating upgrades. Table 6 demonstrates that downgrades are 
significantly related to changes in holdings of domestic pension and insurance companies and 
investment funds. Interestingly, sovereign bond yields react strongly not only to rating 
changes two months ahead of the downgrade, i.e. typically when the outlook or watch are 
issued, but also in the month of the downgrade itself. 
In the following step I examine whether the anticipation effect has a role to play and I 
conduct the tests under distinction for rating changes that are preceded or not by an outlook 
change. Results in Tables 7 and 8 show that foreign official holders and investment funds 
exhibit a stronger reaction to unanticipated downgrades and upgrades. In turn, bond yields 
increase significantly in case of downgrades preceded by negative outlooks, while unpreceded 
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downgrades induce some bond volatility 2 months before and after the rating change, the 
letter result being difficult to interpret.  
So far regression results for the full sample remain inconclusive, hence we follow the 
approach of Pukthuanthong-Le, Elayan, and Rose (2007) who argue that tests on smaller and 
less heterogeneous country groups may provide better insights into market dynamics. 
IV.4. Impact of Rating Actions in Safe Haven Countries 
I begin the analysis with the impact of sovereign downgrades on holdings and yields of Safe 
Haven countries, i.e. France, US and Japan. Table 9 indicates that downgrades were followed 
by a slight reaction among foreign investors and yield compression around two months 
following the downgrade, though these results should be taken with a pinch of salt. 
IV.5. Impact of Rating Actions in Peripheral Eurozone 
While sovereign downgrades occurred all along the Eurozone crisis, upgrade episodes took 
place both in the boom years preceding the crisis and again in 2012 when the situation when 
the dust settled. Tables 10 and 11 indicate that upgrades by Moody’s were associated with 
increases in bond purchases by private non-residents, while holdings of domestic investment 
funds increased significantly in reaction to upgrades by S&P and Fitch. Sovereign yields 
reacted positively to upgrades two months ahead of time which is again difficult to attribute to 
rating changes. 
Table 12 presents the results for the reaction of bondholdings to serial upgrades that occured 
over 24 month horizon. While the first upgrade passes relatively unperceived, the second and 
third upgrades clearly provoke a significant and strong reaction before and after the rating 
action among foreign private investors, banks and investment funds. Interestingly, sovereign 
yields do not react to any of serial upgrades. 
Results in Table 14 demonstrate that rating downgrades, in particular these undertaken by 
S&P and Moody’s, are associated with outflows of foreign private investors two months 
before the event and in the month following the rating event. While holdings of domestic 
investors are relatively unaffected. Sovereign bond yields widen considerably two months 
before and in the month when the downgrade took place, which is consistent with the broad 
literature in this fields. 
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Results for serial downgrades in Table 16 show that the third and further downgrades 
engender an extremely strong spread widening two months ahead of the downgrade. The 
strongest reaction in holdings of foreign private and official investors and domestic banks 
within two months of the rating action.  
Tests for multi-notch downgrades included in Table 17 indicate that 1- and 3-notch 
downgrades induce foreign private investors to sell government bonds. 
IV.6. Impact of Rating Actions in Emerging Economies 
Results in Table 18 show that while rating upgrades of Emerging Market countries do not 
affect significantly investor holdings, sovereign yields fall prior and following upgrades by 
S&P. However, analysis of serial rating upgrades presented in Table 19 provides valuable 
insights into investor behavior. Foreign private investors and domestic pension and insurance 
funds increase considerably their participation following the third rating upgrade, whereas 
banks tend to sell their holdings. Interestingly, while one upgrade does not induce marked 
reactions, the impact on the second or third upgrade on sovereign yields is strong and highly 
significant. Finally, results for multi-notch upgrades located in Table 20 suggest that foreign 
private investors and domestic pension funds change their holdings significantly in reaction to 
two-notch upgrades, while sovereign yields compress ahead of 1- and 3-notch upgrades. 
Results for downgrades by rating agency for EM countries presented in Table 21 indicate that 
foreign private investors and domestic pension funds diminish significantly their holdings 
following downgrades by Fitch, while sovereign yields increase considerably ahead of those 
downgrades. In terms of serial rating changes, third and further downgrades induce significant 
outflows by non-resident and bank investors. Sovereign yields increase significantly during 
the two months preceding the third downgrade, but tend to stabilize afterwards. Finally, the 
number of notches changes upon one action appears to play a role. Similarly as in case of 
Eurozone Periphery, one-notch downgrades induce limited reaction in EM countries. 
However, non-residents, banks and pension and funds change significantly their positions and 
tend to sell bonds in case of 2- and 3-notch downgrades, while yields increase most following 
2-notch downgrades. 
V. Conclusions 
To date, empirical research focused mainly on the reaction of asset prices to changes in 
credit ratings, while the impact on holdings of underlying assets remained relatively 
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unexplored. This paper fills this gap using a new proprietary dataset on sovereign 
bondholdings and aims to shed new light on the changes in investor structure and bond yields. 
Econometric analysis is conducted on a broad and heterogeneous panel of countries under 
consideration for different country types and rating agencies, anticipative effects related to 
rating outlooks, and general vs. serial rating changes vs. multi-notch rating changes. The main 
results are as follows. 
Findings for the full sample indicate that upgrades exert no consistent and significant 
impact neither on investor holdings nor on bond yields, no matter whether they are preceded 
by an outlook warning or not. However, in case of Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging 
Economies rating upgrades pushed domestic asset managers and pension funds to change 
their allocation to domestic government bonds. 
In contrast, results for the full sample of countries indicate that sovereign yields and all 
types of domestic investors are affected by rating downgrades, in particular those preceded by 
negative outlooks. In case of Eurozone Periphery and Emerging Economies, foreign private 
investors and sovereign yields were influenced in particular by the second and third 
downgrades over two-year horizon. 
Downgrades by S&P and Moody's in Peripheral Eurozone were associated not only with 
significant changes in holdings among non-resident private investors and non-resident central 
banks, but also with intensification of yield volatility. In Emerging Economies, downgrades 
by Fitch affected the holdings of foreign investors, domestic banks and pension funds, and 
sovereign bonds. Last but not least, investors in Emerging Economies reacted differently to 
1st and 3rd downgrades over a two year horizon and to multi-notch downgrades. 
Presented results convey meaningful policy and investment implications. First, rating 
changes not only affect the bond yields, but more importantly they change the structure of 
investor holdings. Even though at this stage of research the holdings-yields relationship has 
not been entirely identified, it is conceivable that a permanent change in demand for 
government bonds may change the level and volatility of bond yields and, in consequence, 
overall debt sustainability in the long run. Finally, this analysis could be extended into a 
broader theoretical and empirical framework for examining inter-dependence between 
macroeconomic capital flows, i.e. equity and bond flows, and credit ratings.  
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Table 1 
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
Brazil Monthly N 9% 3% 37% 5% 20% 1% 30% 3%
Czech Republic Monthly Y 8% 4% 52% 12% 20% 6% 4% 2%
Denmark Monthly Y 30% 4% 19% 6% 26% 11% 0% 0%
France Monthly N 48% 13% 14% 4% 30% 8% 8% 4%
Germany Quarterly Y 79% 11% 6% 4% 2% 1% 10% 5%
Greece Quarterly Y 60% 14% 22% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Hungary Quarterly Y 23% 9% 27% 4% 21% 6% 7% 2%
India Quarterly N 1% 0% 42% 3% 21% 6% 12% 5%
Indonesia Monthly N 18% 12% 71% 24% 19% 1% 7% 1%
Ireland Monthly N 76% 19% 14% 6% 4% 3% 2% 2%
Israel Monthly Y 6% 4% 20% 3% 48% 3% 19% 3%
Italy Monthly Y 60% 11% 18% 5% 0% 0% 14% 7%
Japan Quarterly Y 6% 2% 39% 6% 22% 2% 5% 1%
Malaysia Quarterly Y 10% 13% 18% 4% 63% 11% 0% 0%
Mexico Monthly Y 17% 11% 20% 6% 52% 15% 12% 11%
Netherlands Quarterly Y 74% 6% 9% 1% 13% 4% 1% 1%
Peru Monthly N 25% 13% 16% 8% 52% 6% 3% 3%
Poland Monthly Y 21% 6% 29% 6% 37% 3% 8% 2%
Portugal Quarterly N 62% 14%
Spain Monthly Y 36% 12% 7% 6% 11% 2% 20% 13%
Thailand Monthly Y 6% 5% 30% 7% 39% 6% 0% 0%
Turkey Monthly N 13% 4% 55% 5% 0% 0% 4% 1%
UK Quarterly Y 24% 7% 6% 4% 48% 12% 10% 4%
US Quarterly N 27% 6% 2% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1%
Table 1 Data Availability and Descriptive Statistics
Country
Data 
Frequency
Series for Bills and 
Bonds
Domestic BanksNon-residents
Domestic Insurance and Pension 
Funds Domestic Investment Funds
Note: Averages and Standard Deviations based on Quarterly Data
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Table 2 
Table 2  Number and Magnitude of Rating Actions 
    Downgrades   Upgrades 
    Fitch S&P Moody's   Fitch S&P Moody's 
Number of Rating Actions                 
Full Sample 1996-2012   68 86 53   53 51 62 
                
Sub-sample 1996-2007 34 47 17   38 36 45 
Emerging Economies 24 36 16   32 31 32 
Euro Periphery 3 4 0   6 5 10 
Safe Havens 0 0 0   0 0 2 
                  
Sub-sample 2007-2012 34 39 36   14 17 17 
Emerging Economies 10 11 8   13 12 16 
Euro Periphery 23 25 25   1 1 0 
Safe Havens 1 3 3   0 1 0 
                  
Average Number of Notches During One Rating Action 
Full Sample 1996-2012        1.5       1.4                  1.7         1.1       1.2                  1.2  
Sub-sample 1996-2007      1.2       1.3                  1.4         1.0       1.2                  1.2  
Sub-sample 2007-2012      1.6       1.4                  1.8         1.3       1.2                  1.0  
Note:  
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Table 3 
Table 3 Magnitude Rating Changes upon of Downgrades 
  
  Maximum number of notches   Maximum number of notches 
Country   Fitch S&P Moody's   Fitch S&P Moody's 
France   0 1 1   0 1 1 
Germany   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Netherlands   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Greece   4 3 4   14 13 15 
Ireland   3 2 5   7 6 9 
Italy   2 2 3   3 3 6 
Portugal   3 3 4   8 7 10 
Spain   3 2 3   7 5 9 
                  
Denmark   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Japan   2 1 2   2 3 2 
Switzerland   0 0 0   0 0 0 
UK   0 0 0   0 0 0 
US   0 1 0   0 1 0 
                  
Brazil   1 1 1   2 1 1 
Bulgaria   1 1 0   1 1 0 
Colombia   1 1 2   2 2 2 
Czech Republic   1 1 0   1 1 0 
Hungary   1 1 2   2 2 3 
Iceland   0 0 0   0 0 0 
India   1 1 0   1 1 0 
Indonesia   3 4 4   6 8 6 
Israel   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Latvia   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Malaysia   2 2 3   2 5 5 
Mexico   1 1 0   1 1 0 
Peru   1 1 0   1 1 0 
Poland   0 0 0   0 0 0 
South Africa   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Thailand   1 1 1   1 4 5 
Turkey   1 1 0   3 2 1 
Cross-country                                                                                                           
Note:  
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Table 4 
Table 4  Magnitude Rating Changes upon of Upgrades 
  
  Maximum number of notches   Maximum number of notches 
Country 
 
Fitch S&P Moody's   Fitch S&P Moody's 
France  0 0 0   0 0 0 
Germany   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Netherlands   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Greece   4 3 2   4 3 2 
Ireland   1 1 2   0 1 0 
Italy   1 0 1   1 0 1 
Portugal   1 1 2   0 0 0 
Spain   1 1 2   1 1 2 
                  
Denmark   1 1 1   1 1 1 
Japan   0 1 1   0 1 1 
Switzerland   0 0 0   0 0 0 
UK   0 0 0   0 0 0 
US   0 0 0   1 1 1 
                  
Brazil   3 2 3   1 1 1 
Bulgaria   3 3 3   1 1 2 
Colombia   1 1 1   1 1 1 
Czech Republic   1 2 3   1 2 3 
Hungary   2 2 2   2 1 2 
Iceland   0 0 0   0 0 0 
India   1 2 2   1 1 1 
Indonesia   2 9 2   1 5 1 
Israel   1 1 1   1 1 1 
Latvia   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Malaysia   3 2 2   1 1 1 
Mexico   2 2 2   1 1 1 
Peru   2 2 2   2 2 2 
Poland   1 2 2   1 1 2 
South Africa   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Thailand   2 2 2   1 1 2 
Turkey   3 3 1   2 1 1 
                  
Cross-country Maximum   4 9 3   4 5 3 
Note:  
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Table 5 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields in All Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Foreign Foreign Banks Pension Inv. Sov. Yield 
Upgrade T-2 -0.02* 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
 (-1.82) (0.72) (-0.06) (-0.47) (-1.47) (-0.73) 
Upgrade T-1 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.19) (-0.69) (-0.02) (0.17) (0.40) 
Upgrade T 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (-0.76) (0.46) (1.45) (-0.24) (0.11) 
Upgrade T+1 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.14 
 (1.24) (1.66) (0.89) (0.33) (-1.32) (0.87) 
Upgrade T+2 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.78) (-0.62) (1.31) (1.07) (-0.58) 
Debt to GDP 0.01 -0.30* -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.28 
 (0.50) (-1.82) (-0.55) (-1.32) (1.15) (0.95) 
Budget Balance -0.00 -0.27 -0.18*** -0.18*** 0.05 0.10 
 (-0.05) (-0.98) (-3.50) (-2.96) (0.58) (0.08) 
Political Risk -0.00** -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (-2.19) (-0.08) (0.36) (-0.08) (0.76) (1.53) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.02 -0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.23*** 
 (-1.14) (-7.72) (-0.19) (-1.02) (-0.01) (-3.03) 
Positive Outlook 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.06 
 (0.49) (0.57) (-0.01) (0.80) (-0.23) (-1.09) 
R-squared 0.11 0.27 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.15 
Nb of Observations 2340 1203 2358 1828 1672 2716 
Nb of Countries 22 13 22 19 18 24 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 6 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in All Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Foreign Foreign Banks Pension Inv. Sov. Yield 
Downgrade T-2 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.18* 
 (-1.24) (1.73) (1.60) (1.41) (0.43) (2.02) 
Downgrade T-1 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02** 0.00 0.08 
 (1.08) (-1.34) (1.54) (2.80) (0.26) (1.29) 
Downgrade T -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02** -0.01 0.20** 
 (-1.41) (-0.85) (-0.50) (-2.47) (-1.25) (2.40) 
Downgrade T+1 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.54) (-0.20) (-1.48) (1.35) (0.77) (-0.13) 
Downgrade T+2 -0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 
 (-0.33) (-1.64) (0.07) (0.05) (-1.06) (-0.81) 
Debt to GDP 0.02 -0.30* -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.16 
 (0.70) (-1.88) (-0.93) (-1.30) (1.07) (0.61) 
Budget Balance -0.02 -0.35 -0.18*** -0.14** 0.02 0.30 
 (-0.23) (-1.11) (-4.46) (-2.55) (0.24) (0.25) 
GDP Growth Trend 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.09 -0.09 -0.71 
 (0.42) (-0.10) (-1.71) (1.06) (-1.54) (-0.62) 
Political Risk -0.00* -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (-1.74) (-0.03) (0.19) (-0.12) (0.83) (1.50) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.02 -0.08*** -0.03 -0.03** -0.03* 0.08 
 (-1.32) (-7.19) (-0.89) (-2.17) (-2.07) (1.22) 
Negative Outlook -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03* 0.10 
 (-1.47) (0.39) (0.40) (1.08) (-1.95) (0.65) 
R-squared 0.11 0.28 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.16 
Nb of Observations 2340 1203 2358 1828 1672 2716 
Nb of Countries 22 13 22 19 18 24 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses. Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 7 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields: Preceded vs. Unpreceded by Outlook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Pension & Ins Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
 Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. 
Upgrade T-2 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.03* 0.05 -0.14 0.01 -0.01 -0.05* -0.06* -0.06 0.51 
 (-0.15) (-1.08) (-1.57) (1.99) (1.13) (-1.38) (0.51) (-0.50) (-1.83) (-1.99) (-0.53) (1.13) 
Upgrade T-1 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03* -0.06 0.08 0.01** 0.00 0.01 0.05** 0.11 -0.08 
 (-0.05) (-0.16) (-0.06) (1.93) (-1.18) (1.54) (2.86) (0.10) (0.53) (2.19) (1.06) (-0.64) 
Upgrade T -0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.21*** 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.16 -0.04 
 (-0.14) (1.51) (-0.94) (-6.70) (0.32) (-1.11) (1.50) (0.45) (-1.21) (-0.61) (0.76) (-0.17) 
Upgrade T+1 0.04* 0.01 -0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.08** -0.03 1.22 
 (1.79) (0.30) (-0.97) (1.97) (0.80) (0.77) (0.13) (0.19) (-1.03) (-2.63) (-0.34) (1.23) 
Upgrade T+2 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.03* -0.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.00 -0.04 -0.19 
 (0.86) (-0.36) (0.67) (1.97) (-0.01) (-1.41) (1.01) (-1.12) (0.91) (-0.01) (-0.68) (-0.95) 
Debt to GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.30* -0.30* -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.26 
 (0.47) (0.52) (-1.82) (-1.81) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-1.39) (-1.32) (1.13) (1.12) (0.93) (0.86) 
Budget Balance -0.00 -0.00 -0.27 -0.27 -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18** 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.01 
 (-0.06) (-0.04) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-3.71) (-3.53) (-2.93) (-2.76) (0.51) (0.47) (0.08) (0.01) 
Political Risk -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-2.21) (-2.13) (-0.07) (-0.06) (0.33) (0.53) (-0.05) (-0.11) (0.82) (0.82) (1.55) (1.43) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.23*** -0.24*** 
 (-1.14) (-1.15) (-7.73) (-7.75) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-1.02) (-1.04) (0.51) (0.52) (-3.04) (-3.07) 
Positive Outlook 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.06 -0.04 
 (0.62) (0.49) (0.52) (0.47) (0.01) (-0.09) (0.81) (0.79) (-0.58) (-0.41) (-1.18) (-1.00) 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.27 0.28 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.17 
Nb of Observations 2340 2340 1203 1203 2358 2358 1828 1828 1672 1672 2716 2716 
Nb of Countries 22 22 13 13 22 22 19 19 18 18 24 24 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses. Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 8 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields: Preceded vs. Unpreceded by Outlook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Pension & Ins Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
 Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. Prec. Unprec. 
Downgrade T-2 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.05 -0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.27 -0.21** 
 (-1.36) (0.67) (1.76) (0.08) (0.82) (0.94) (1.34) (-0.17) (-1.41) (1.21) (1.70) (-2.19) 
Downgrade T-1 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.04*** -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.18 
 (-0.59) (1.46) (-0.92) (0.47) (3.82) (-0.39) (1.44) (1.28) (-0.31) (0.53) (0.56) (1.21) 
Downgrade T -0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.05** 0.01 0.02 -0.02* -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.26** 0.15 
 (-0.06) (-1.19) (0.70) (-2.68) (0.69) (0.33) (-1.76) (-1.37) (-0.38) (-0.04) (2.59) (0.94) 
Downgrade T+1 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.00 -0.04* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.08* 0.14 -0.03 
 (-1.30) (1.58) (1.54) (-0.08) (-1.86) (0.27) (-0.66) (0.82) (-0.58) (1.99) (1.22) (-0.32) 
Downgrade T+2 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03** 0.04 -0.18** 
 (-1.33) (0.17) (-1.59) (-0.39) (0.30) (0.13) (1.33) (0.30) (-0.26) (-2.20) (0.51) (-2.33) 
Debt to GDP 0.02 0.01 -0.30* -0.30* -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.22 0.27 
 (0.69) (0.56) (-1.86) (-1.83) (-0.65) (-0.49) (-1.34) (-1.31) (1.21) (1.20) (0.79) (0.89) 
Budget Balance -0.02 0.00 -0.29 -0.29 -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.17** 0.01 0.04 0.34 0.13 
 (-0.25) (0.00) (-0.98) (-1.04) (-3.91) (-4.03) (-3.37) (-2.37) (0.16) (0.53) (0.26) (0.10) 
Political Risk -0.00* -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-1.97) (-2.17) (-0.02) (-0.10) (0.31) (0.34) (-0.12) (-0.11) (0.88) (0.83) (1.47) (1.54) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.03 -0.02 -0.03* -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.08 
 (-1.32) (-1.42) (-7.68) (-8.46) (-0.91) (-0.85) (-2.01) (-1.12) (0.61) (0.58) (1.33) (1.44) 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.28 0.27 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.15 
Nb of Observations 2340 2340 1203 1203 2358 2358 1828 1828 1672 1672 2716 2716 
Nb of Countries 22 22 13 13 22 22 19 19 18 18 24 24 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 9 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Safe Haven Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Pension & Ins Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
Downgrade T-2 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.10 0.07 
 (-0.51) (0.58) (-0.32) (1.01) (1.32) (0.95) 
Downgrade T-1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.00 
 (-0.93) (-0.92) (-0.34) (1.04) (-1.59) (0.10) 
Downgrade T 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00** 0.02 
 (0.93) (-1.13) (1.18) (1.16) (3.13) (0.38) 
Downgrade T+1 0.07 -0.04** 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 
 (2.05) (-3.90) (1.03) (0.01) (0.75) (0.05) 
Downgrade T+2 0.04* -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.05*** 
 (2.35) (-0.57) (0.51) (1.24) (-0.30) (-4.13) 
Debt to GDP -0.07 0.02 -0.23 -0.03 -0.03 0.19 
 (-1.51) (0.72) (-2.01) (-0.88) (-0.76) (1.46) 
Budget Balance -0.40 -0.12 -1.23 -0.02 0.36 -0.21 
 (-1.54) (-1.12) (-1.69) (-0.20) (1.04) (-0.37) 
GDP Growth Trend -0.39 0.20 -2.99 -1.11*** -0.76 -0.18 
 (-0.60) (0.46) (-1.53) (-7.29) (-1.30) (-0.24) 
Political Risk 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (1.50) (-5.83) (-0.95) (-1.99) (-1.44) (0.34) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04*** 
 (-0.37) (1.49) (-0.91) (-1.75) (-0.92) (-4.28) 
Negative Outlook -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02** -0.06* -0.06 
 (-1.25) (0.36) (0.17) (2.95) (-2.69) (-1.71) 
R-squared 0.24 0.54 0.19 0.25 0.27 0.77 
Nb of Observations 398 398 398 398 398 474 
Nb of Countries 5 5 5 5 5 6 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 10 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields in Peripheral Eurozone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks 
 Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s 
Upgrade T-2 -0.01 0.01 -0.03*** -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.05 -0.21 0.14 -0.01 
 (-0.52) (0.65) (-5.91) (-1.59) (0.61) (0.25) (0.83) (-0.47) (0.36) (-1.58) (1.53) (-0.03) 
Upgrade T-1 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02** -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.10 0.06 -0.09 -0.27 
 (0.37) (-0.53) (0.33) (3.34) (-0.84) (0.08) (-0.56) (-0.47) (-0.97) (0.78) (-1.50) (-1.28) 
Upgrade T 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.04** -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.14) (-0.91) (0.35) (3.78) (-0.09) (0.54) (-0.97) (-0.54) (-0.04) (-0.52) (-0.49) (0.82) 
Upgrade T+1 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.09 -0.00 -0.02 
 (-0.51) (-1.40) (1.21) (-1.24) (0.70) (-0.13) (0.97) (-0.16) (0.79) (1.02) (-0.01) (-0.38) 
Upgrade T+2 0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.09 -0.04 -0.14 -0.11 
 (0.58) (1.06) (-0.19) (0.20) (-0.31) (0.44) (-0.02) (-0.67) (-1.21) (-0.59) (-0.77) (-1.27) 
Debt to GDP -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
 (-1.35) (-1.39) (-1.35) (-1.34) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.17) (-0.42) 
Budget Balance -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 -0.23 -0.24 -0.24 -0.20 
 (-2.13) (-2.08) (-2.15) (-2.16) (0.91) (0.90) (0.91) (0.94) (-1.55) (-1.50) (-1.45) (-1.47) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.32) (-1.11) (-1.34) (-1.37) (0.01) (-0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (-0.84) (-0.93) (-1.09) (-0.46) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (-2.30) (-2.45) (-2.33) (-2.19) (-13.65) (-13.60) (-13.60) (-13.59) (1.09) (1.11) (1.21) (0.86) 
Positive Outlook -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
 (-0.20) (0.01) (-0.16) (-0.66) (1.14) (1.00) (0.95) (0.95) (0.14) (-0.36) (0.09) (-0.38) 
R-squared 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Nb of Observations 544 544 544 544 524 524 524 524 544 544 544 544 
Nb of Countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 11 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields in Peripheral Eurozone - continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
 Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s 
Upgrade T-2 -0.00 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 0.36 0.78* -0.08 1.07** 
 (-0.46) (2.27) (-6.36) (0.35) (1.93) (2.22) (-1.16) (3.85) 
Upgrade T-1 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.18 -0.28 -0.13 -0.23 
 (0.11) (-1.79) (-0.53) (1.23) (-1.47) (-1.48) (-1.18) (-0.79) 
Upgrade T -0.00 0.02* -0.01** -0.00 -0.27 -0.47 -0.15 -0.55 
 (-0.46) (4.22) (-4.72) (-0.05) (-1.28) (-1.72) (-1.45) (-1.56) 
Upgrade T+1 0.03** 0.02* 0.04*** 0.03 -0.32 -0.53 -0.16 -0.57 
 (7.09) (4.22) (17.90) (1.30) (-1.29) (-1.69) (-1.87) (-1.50) 
Upgrade T+2 -0.03** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.00 -0.24 -0.37 -0.14 -0.39 
 (-4.31) (-2.26) (-17.28) (-0.05) (-1.23) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.12) 
Debt to GDP 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 0.75 0.72 0.78 0.74 
 (3.30) (3.28) (3.31) (3.29) (0.54) (0.53) (0.55) (0.53) 
Budget Balance 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 3.42 3.33 3.24 3.34 
 (1.23) (1.24) (1.23) (1.23) (0.98) (0.96) (0.96) (0.94) 
Political Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04* 0.04* 0.04** 0.04* 
 (0.92) (0.95) (0.93) (0.93) (2.58) (2.63) (2.79) (2.58) 
Risk Aversion Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 
 (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.71) (-1.09) (-1.14) (-1.06) (-1.12) 
Positive Outlook -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 -0.16*** 
 (-4.95) (-4.87) (-4.87) (-5.12) (-1.77) (-2.00) (-1.45) (-7.73) 
R-squared 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.38 
Nb of Observations 386 386 386 386 696 696 696 696 
Nb of Countries 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 12 
Impact of Serial Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields in Peripheral Eurozone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Investment Fund Sovereign Yield 
 1st Upg 2nd Upg 3rd Upg 1st Upg 2nd Upg 3rd Upg 1st Upg 2nd Upg 3rd Upg 1st Upg 2nd Upg 3rd Upg 1st Upg 2nd Upg 
Upgrade T-2 -0.00 -0.05*** -0.02 0.01 -0.01  0.15 0.24*** -0.93*** 0.01 -0.06**  -0.13 -0.05 
 (-0.28) (-6.33) (-0.97) (0.59) (-0.42)  (1.49) (37.11) (-8.78) (0.93) (-8.32)  (-1.18) (-0.39) 
Upgrade T-1 -0.00 0.04*** 0.03* -0.00 -0.01  -0.09 -0.43*** 0.01 0.01 -0.04**  -0.12 -0.14 
 (-0.31) (6.18) (2.74) (-0.58) (-0.42)  (-0.97) (-65.73) (0.26) (0.84) (-5.43)  (-0.95) (-0.85) 
Upgrade T -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01  -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.00 -0.03  -0.16 -0.15 
 (-0.44) (1.55) (1.19) (0.01) (-1.23)  (-0.29) (1.84) (0.78) (-0.04) (-1.86)  (-1.13) (-1.03) 
Upgrade T+1 0.01 0.05*** -0.28*** 0.01 -0.01  0.01 0.07** 0.04 0.05** -0.03  -0.14 -0.14 
 (1.07) (9.38) (-11.07) (0.73) (-0.59)  (0.17) (5.55) (0.54) (6.65) (-1.86)  (-1.12) (-1.08) 
Upgrade T+2 0.01 -0.02 0.04* -0.00 -0.01  -0.11 -0.16*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.06*  -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.39) (-1.56) (2.94) (-0.18) (-0.59)  (-1.27) (-24.36) (-0.42) (-2.11) (-3.69)  (-1.19) (-0.86) 
Debt to GDP -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.31* 0.32* 0.31* 0.77 0.77 
 (-1.35) (-1.35) (-1.56) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (-0.21) (-0.13) (-0.58) (3.30) (3.47) (3.33) (0.55) (0.54) 
Budget Balance -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 0.18 0.18 0.18 -0.24 -0.24 -0.21 0.63 0.64 0.63 3.37 3.22 
 (-2.11) (-2.16) (-1.88) (0.90) (0.90) (0.91) (-1.53) (-1.44) (-1.71) (1.24) (1.28) (1.25) (0.99) (0.94) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04* 0.04** 
 (-1.30) (-1.31) (-0.53) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (-1.14) (-1.10) (0.07) (0.95) (0.95) (0.95) (2.77) (2.80) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.12 -0.13 
 (-2.33) (-2.31) (-2.48) (-13.61) (-13.45) (-13.73) (1.22) (1.18) (0.71) (0.70) (0.74) (0.73) (-1.06) (-1.07) 
Positive Outlook 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.11* -0.11* 
 (0.16) (-0.01) (0.11) (1.17) (1.00) (1.01) (0.07) (-0.36) (-0.27) (-4.90) (-4.97) (-4.93) (-2.20) (-2.24) 
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.37 
Nb of Observations 544 544 544 524 524 524 544 544 544 386 386 386 696 696 
Nb of Countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 5 5 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. t statistics in parentheses 
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Table 13 
Impact of Multi-notch Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields in Peripheral Eurozone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 
Upgrade T-2 -0.00   0.01   -0.04   -0.00   0.63*   
 (-0.38)   (0.61)   (-0.29)   (-0.46)   (2.59)   
Upgrade T-1 0.01   -0.00   -0.07   0.00   -0.20   
 (0.95)   (-0.84)   (-0.81)   (0.11)   (-1.54)   
Upgrade T 0.01   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.32   
 (0.45)   (-0.09)   (-0.08)   (-0.46)   (-1.49)   
Upgrade T+1 -0.03   0.01   0.03   0.03**   -0.39   
 (-1.26)   (0.70)   (1.05)   (7.09)   (-1.52)   
Upgrade T+2 0.01   -0.00   -0.07   -0.03**   -0.28   
 (0.88)   (-0.31)   (-1.03)   (-4.31)   (-1.34)   
Debt to GDP -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 0.73 0.76 0.76 
 (-1.36) (-1.36) (-1.36) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (-0.38) (-0.18) (-0.18) (3.30) (3.33) (3.33) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) 
Budget Balance -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 0.18 0.18 0.18 -0.22 -0.25 -0.25 0.63 0.63 0.63 3.43 3.20 3.20 
 (-2.14) (-2.15) (-2.15) (0.91) (0.91) (0.91) (-1.58) (-1.48) (-1.48) (1.23) (1.25) (1.25) (0.97) (0.95) (0.95) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04* 0.04** 0.04** 
 (-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.32) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (-0.56) (-1.12) (-1.12) (0.92) (0.95) (0.95) (2.48) (2.82) (2.82) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
 (-2.29) (-2.35) (-2.35) (-13.65) (-13.73) (-13.73) (0.96) (1.21) (1.21) (0.72) (0.73) (0.73) (-1.13) (-1.08) (-1.08) 
Positive Outlook -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.10 -0.11* -0.11* 
 (-0.46) (-0.01) (-0.01) (1.14) (1.01) (1.01) (0.06) (-0.36) (-0.36) (-4.95) (-4.93) (-4.93) (-1.51) (-2.28) (-2.28) 
R-squared 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.37 
Nb of Observations 544 544 544 524 524 524 544 544 544 386 386 386 696 696 696 
Nb of Countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 5 5 5 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 14 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Peripheral Eurozone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks 
 Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s 
Downgrade T-2 -0.02* -0.03* 0.01 -0.03** 0.03 0.01*** 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 
 (-3.17) (-2.61) (0.49) (-3.63) (2.11) (6.20) (0.37) (1.56) (0.37) (-0.40) (0.50) (0.61) 
Downgrade T-1 0.02 0.01** 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 (2.04) (3.24) (0.82) (0.12) (-0.45) (-0.66) (1.40) (0.24) (1.16) (0.92) (2.22) (1.38) 
Downgrade T -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 
 (-1.73) (-0.68) (-2.20) (-0.63) (0.06) (0.56) (-1.21) (1.13) (-1.47) (-2.09) (-1.07) (0.64) 
Downgrade T+1 -0.01* -0.02* -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 
 (-3.11) (-3.16) (-1.10) (-1.73) (1.62) (1.75) (-1.29) (2.13) (0.11) (-0.50) (2.01) (-1.24) 
Downgrade T+2 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03* 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.05 
 (-0.15) (-0.74) (-2.29) (-1.37) (-0.44) (-0.22) (0.74) (-2.97) (0.89) (1.18) (0.37) (0.87) 
Debt to GDP -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
 (-1.39) (-1.22) (-1.59) (-1.29) (0.01) (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.09) (0.02) (-0.08) (-0.23) 
Budget Balance -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.22 -0.19 -0.24 -0.26 
 (-0.82) (-0.23) (-1.14) (-0.56) (0.29) (0.14) (0.12) (0.22) (-0.93) (-0.76) (-1.12) (-1.18) 
GDP Growth Trend 0.18 0.18* 0.14 0.18* -0.35 -0.30 -0.31 -0.34 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 
 (2.02) (2.47) (1.76) (2.42) (-1.96) (-2.05) (-1.90) (-1.98) (-0.12) (0.21) (-0.07) (-0.17) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.81) (-1.52) (-1.48) (-1.60) (0.53) (0.17) (0.29) (0.69) (-1.31) (-1.94) (-1.40) (-1.48) 
Risk Aversion Index 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 
 (1.28) (0.78) (0.51) (1.25) (-7.93) (-8.65) (-7.29) (-8.89) (2.00) (1.89) (1.67) (1.49) 
Negative Outlook 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 
 (0.21) (-0.07) (0.15) (0.13) (0.72) (0.74) (0.86) (0.87) (1.68) (1.43) (1.70) (1.73) 
R-squared 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Nb of Observations 544 544 544 544 524 524 524 524 544 544 544 544 
Nb of Countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. t statistics in parentheses 
 
ARTICLE 2 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 175 
Table 15 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Peripheral Eurozone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
 Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s 
Downgrade T-2 -0.06 -0.16 -0.02 -0.03 0.23 0.66** 0.29 0.20 
 (-1.01) (-1.04) (-0.24) (-1.09) (1.86) (3.41) (1.49) (1.07) 
Downgrade T-1 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.07 -0.09 
 (1.70) (1.41) (-0.26) (0.88) (0.02) (0.54) (0.32) (-0.26) 
Downgrade T -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.18** 0.22 0.42* 0.12 
 (-1.02) (1.27) (-1.03) (-0.32) (3.99) (2.05) (2.46) (0.86) 
Downgrade T+1 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.20 -0.04 0.13 
 (1.85) (-1.49) (2.40) (1.36) (0.24) (0.92) (-0.11) (1.48) 
Downgrade T+2 -0.04 0.14 -0.20 0.06 -0.05 0.15 -0.16 0.01 
 (-1.31) (1.98) (-2.12) (1.07) (-0.25) (0.42) (-0.68) (0.03) 
Debt to GDP 0.34** 0.41* 0.29** 0.37* 0.72 0.71 0.76 0.71 
 (5.90) (4.22) (9.78) (4.24) (0.54) (0.60) (0.59) (0.53) 
Budget Balance 0.72 1.26 0.41 0.93 2.75 2.45 2.84 2.77 
 (1.94) (1.48) (2.52) (1.78) (0.88) (0.90) (0.91) (0.87) 
GDP Growth Trend 0.27 0.43 0.19 0.30 -2.66 -2.96 -2.51 -2.38 
 (1.70) (1.53) (1.79) (1.47) (-1.06) (-1.11) (-0.92) (-0.89) 
Political Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 
 (1.04) (0.86) (1.09) (1.10) (3.25) (3.61) (3.20) (3.18) 
Risk Aversion Index 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.17 -0.13 -0.16 -0.15 
 (1.67) (2.11) (2.02) (1.02) (-1.52) (-1.29) (-1.77) (-1.44) 
Negative Outlook 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.26 -0.18 -0.27* -0.25 
 (0.35) (-0.44) (-0.61) (-0.65) (-1.88) (-1.40) (-2.17) (-1.88) 
R-squared 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.38 
Nb of Observations 386 386 386 386 696 696 696 696 
Nb of Countries 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses.  p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 16 
Impact of Serial Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Peripheral Eurozone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Investment Fund Sovereign Yield 
 1st Dg. 2nd Dg. 3rd Dg. 1st Dg. 2nd Dg. 3rd Dg. 1st Dg. 2nd Dg. 3rd Dg. 1st Dg. 2nd 3rd Dg. 1st Dg. 2nd 3rd Dg. 
Downgrade T-2 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.18 -0.03* -0.01 0.00 -0.31 -0.17 -0.08 0.93*** 
 (-0.79) (-0.49) (-2.34) (1.41) (1.28) (1.14) (-0.14) (1.37) (-2.49) (-0.51) (0.00) (-1.40) (-0.76) (-0.16) (5.01) 
Downgrade T-1 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.07 0.13 0.19 -0.22 
 (0.36) (1.16) (0.62) (-0.22) (-1.65) (0.91) (0.37) (0.83) (1.10) (1.91) (0.91) (-1.34) (1.84) (0.52) (-0.63) 
Downgrade T -0.00 -0.02 -0.03*** 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.02 -0.16 0.07 -0.15 0.74 0.24 
 (-0.18) (-0.98) (-6.93) (1.15) (-0.14) (-0.87) (-0.25) (-1.06) (0.03) (0.36) (-0.86) (1.34) (-0.67) (2.00) (0.93) 
Downgrade T+1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02* 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 -0.13 0.19 0.25 
 (-1.22) (-0.68) (-1.42) (2.94) (0.98) (0.38) (0.19) (1.89) (-0.60) (0.91) (0.68) (0.93) (-0.56) (0.99) (1.16) 
Downgrade T+2 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.03** -0.04** 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.06 -0.13 0.31 0.13 -0.05 -0.35 
 (-1.51) (0.55) (-0.05) (0.80) (-3.73) (-4.65) (0.99) (0.02) (0.99) (-0.59) (-0.71) (1.74) (1.76) (-0.17) (-0.96) 
Debt to GDP -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.34** 0.35** 0.52 0.74 0.78 0.67 
 (-1.22) (-1.26) (-1.35) (-0.02) (0.01) (-0.21) (-0.07) (-0.10) (-0.02) (5.55) (5.80) (2.50) (0.55) (0.57) (0.54) 
Budget Balance -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.07 -0.23 -0.21 -0.19 0.77 0.75 1.63 2.64 2.72 2.44 
 (-0.50) (-0.55) (-0.59) (0.34) (0.28) (-0.28) (-0.81) (-1.22) (-0.99) (1.77) (1.78) (1.46) (0.79) (0.84) (0.86) 
GDP Growth Trend 0.17 0.15 0.16* -0.36* -0.30 -0.34 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.22 0.31 0.66 -2.22 -2.57 -2.50 
 (1.72) (1.63) (2.68) (-2.55) (-1.92) (-2.33) (0.08) (0.10) (0.28) (2.53) (1.94) (1.55) (-0.81) (-0.95) (-0.92) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 
 (-1.54) (-1.36) (-1.44) (1.14) (0.39) (0.55) (-1.40) (-1.48) (-1.71) (0.95) (0.88) (1.00) (3.43) (3.35) (3.27) 
Risk Aversion 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.03* 0.03* 0.06 -0.08 -0.12 -0.17* 
 (0.70) (0.68) (0.81) (-6.62) (-9.16) (-7.89) (1.71) (1.68) (1.73) (3.50) (2.98) (1.91) (-0.93) (-1.04) (-2.14) 
Negative Outlook 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.19 -0.23 -0.25 
 (0.03) (-0.25) (-0.01) (0.73) (1.00) (0.82) (1.31) (1.45) (1.47) (-0.81) (-0.56) (0.01) (-1.71) (-1.88) (-2.03) 
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.41 
Nb of Observations 544 544 544 524 524 524 544 544 544 386 386 386 696 696 696 
Nb of Countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 5 5 5 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses. Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 17 
Impact of Multi-notch Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Peripheral Eurozone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3- 1- 2- 3- 1- 2-notch 3-
Downgrade T-2 -0.01 -0.02 0.02* 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02** 0.01 0.02 -0.15 0.21 0.01 -0.03 
 (-2.11) (-2.19) (2.40) (1.33) (1.33) (0.96) (0.12) (0.70) (4.51) (0.43) (0.29) (-0.80) (1.74) (0.03) (-0.17) 
Downgrade T-1 0.01 0.02*** 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.08** 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.13 -0.31 -0.39 
 (1.05) (6.38) (1.42) (0.65) (-1.02) (0.93) (0.27) (-0.53) (3.36) (1.09) (-0.79) (-1.11) (0.88) (-1.13) (-1.06) 
Downgrade T -0.01 -0.01 -0.02** 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.09 -0.28** 0.31 
 (-0.52) (-0.41) (-3.34) (0.06) (-0.32) (-0.42) (-1.05) (1.02) (0.15) (1.73) (1.03) (-0.37) (0.88) (-3.41) (1.00) 
Downgrade T+1 -0.02*** 0.01 -0.03 0.02* 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.15 -0.15 0.39 
 (-6.33) (1.45) (-2.03) (2.86) (0.44) (1.74) (0.30) (0.04) (0.28) (0.58) (1.22) (1.14) (1.33) (-0.47) (1.83) 
Downgrade T+2 0.01 -0.00 -0.03*** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.20 
 (1.56) (-0.62) (-6.10) (-0.27) (0.08) (-0.84) (-0.27) (1.89) (0.48) (1.03) (-0.45) (0.68) (-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.51) 
Debt to GDP -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.33** 0.34** 0.40 0.76 0.67 0.76 
 (-1.18) (-1.08) (-1.32) (-0.09) (-0.05) (-0.09) (-0.10) (-0.05) (-0.28) (6.88) (4.86) (2.83) (0.58) (0.52) (0.54) 
Budget Balance -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.24 -0.24 -0.18 0.76 0.73 1.19 2.62 2.58 2.77 
 (-0.24) (-0.33) (-1.67) (0.01) (0.10) (0.04) (-0.78) (-0.92) (-1.39) (1.78) (1.79) (0.97) (0.84) (0.79) (0.82) 
GDP Growth 0.18 0.15 0.13 -0.38* -0.29 -0.31 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.26 0.45 -2.78 -1.76 -2.31 
 (2.03) (1.70) (1.92) (-2.41) (-2.13) (-1.91) (0.26) (-0.14) (-0.13) (0.20) (1.86) (0.90) (-0.95) (-0.60) (-0.83) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04** 0.03** 0.04** 
 (-1.57) (-1.31) (-1.69) (0.81) (0.18) (0.01) (-1.40) (-1.10) (-1.09) (1.11) (0.99) (0.87) (3.27) (3.05) (3.26) 
Risk Aversion 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.15 -0.11 -0.12 
 (0.93) (0.73) (0.48) (-8.03) (-9.38) (-7.83) (1.85) (1.72) (1.78) (1.12) (2.28) (1.07) (-1.60) (-0.93) (-1.08) 
Negative Outlook 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.25* -0.28 -0.22 
 (0.20) (0.08) (-0.05) (0.81) (0.77) (0.83) (1.36) (1.54) (1.40) (-0.95) (-0.47) (-0.40) (-2.15) (-1.87) (-1.83) 
R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 
Nb of 544 544 544 524 524 524 544 544 544 386 386 386 696 696 696 
Nb of Countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 5 5 5 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
t statistics in parentheses. Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 18 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Emerging Economies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Foreign Private Banks Pension & Ins Sov. Yield 
 Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s 
Upgrade T-2 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 - 0.03 - 0.41 -0.06 
 (-1.50) (-0.86) (-0.40) (-1.40) (- (- (1.23) (- (- (- (- (-2.31) (0.19) (-2.80) (0.71) (-
Upgrade T-1 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.04* -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.03 
 (0.37) (-0.99) (0.90) (0.40) (0.45) (0.17) (- (0.58) (1.06) (- (0.35) (1.95) (- (-0.19) (- (0.34) 
Upgrade T -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.13 0.36 
 (-0.83) (0.60) (-1.40) (-0.55) (- (- (0.25) (- (- (0.12) (- (0.25) (0.72) (0.04) (- (1.55) 
Upgrade T+1 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 0.11 -0.12** -0.02 0.42 
 (0.46) (0.51) (-1.31) (1.01) (- (- (0.33) (- (- (- (0.01) (-1.21) (0.68) (-2.26) (- (1.09) 
Upgrade T+2 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 
 (-0.27) (-0.74) (-1.02) (1.08) (- (- (0.66) (- (0.86) (1.31) (- (0.47) (- (-0.40) (0.71) (-
Budget Balance 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.63) (0.63) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (1.19) (1.05) (1.06) (1.10) (- (-0.81) (- (-
GDP Growth -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24* 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 0.98 1.17 1.02 0.95 
 (-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.60) (-1.67) (0.54) (0.59) (0.48) (0.49) (- (- (- (-0.61) (1.35) (1.59) (1.49) (1.33) 
Risk Aversion - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.05* 
 (-3.23) (-3.21) (-3.12) (-3.20) (1.53) (1.57) (1.58) (1.54) (- (- (- (-0.79) (- (-1.84) (- (-
Positive Outlook 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 
 (1.01) (1.05) (1.08) (1.04) (0.73) (0.79) (0.64) (0.63) (0.04) (- (- (-0.16) (- (-0.19) (- (-
R-squared                 
Nb of 1392 1392 1392 1392 1423 1423 1423 1423 929 929 929 929 1842 1807 1814 1826 
Nb of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 12 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 19 
Impact of Serial Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields in Emerging Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Foreign Private Banks Pension & Ins Sov. Yield 
 1st Upg 2nd Upg 3rd Upg 1st Upg 2nd Upg 3rd Upg 1st Upg 2nd Upg 3rd Upg 1st Upg 2nd Upg 3rd Upg 
Upgrade T-2 0.00 -0.13* 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.19*** -0.01 
 (0.03) (-1.99) (1.78) (-0.96) (0.98) (0.80) (-0.54) (0.56) (-0.63) (-1.52) (-3.29) (-0.15) 
Upgrade T-1 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.11 2.32*** 
 (-0.78) (0.46) (1.63) (0.60) (-0.96) (-1.00) (-0.31) (-0.60) (0.01) (0.37) (-1.46) (30.01) 
Upgrade T 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.05* 0.03 -0.00 -0.03*** 0.01 0.31** 3.01*** 
 (0.13) (-0.47) (0.94) (0.38) (-1.02) (2.16) (1.36) (-0.24) (-4.22) (0.14) (2.49) (35.87) 
Upgrade T+1 0.05 0.02 0.26*** -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.07** 0.24 0.09 -0.11 
 (1.18) (0.26) (6.83) (-0.79) (0.58) (1.36) (-0.82) (0.10) (2.81) (1.46) (0.53) (-1.70) 
Upgrade T+2 -0.01 -0.03 0.41*** 0.00 0.00 -0.07*** 0.03 -0.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.37*** 
 (-0.64) (-1.50) (7.94) (0.21) (0.29) (-4.38) (1.25) (-0.04) (-1.69) (0.51) (-0.66) (4.49) 
Debt to GDP 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03** -0.03* -0.03* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.14* 0.12 0.12* 
 (0.26) (0.48) (0.12) (-2.26) (-2.11) (-2.07) (-0.03) (-0.15) (-0.13) (2.00) (1.75) (1.84) 
Budget Balance 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.15* -0.14* -0.14* -1.04 -0.97 -0.87 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.35) (0.42) (0.15) (0.15) (-2.20) (-1.93) (-1.95) (-1.59) (-1.45) (-1.78) 
Political Risk -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.11) (0.03) (0.07) (-0.65) (-0.57) (-0.57) (1.90) (1.68) (1.70) (-0.53) (-0.44) (-0.24) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.43*** 
 (-0.86) (-0.85) (-0.83) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-2.45) (-2.52) (-2.51) (-4.49) (-4.52) (-4.56) 
Positive Outlook -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 
 (-0.18) (0.22) (0.08) (0.20) (0.11) (0.12) (0.88) (0.79) (0.80) (-0.83) (-0.89) (-0.84) 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.24 
Nb of Observations 1319 1319 1319 1337 1337 1337 1129 1129 1129 1467 1467 1467 
Nb of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 12 12 12 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 20 
Impact of Multi-notch Sovereign Rating Upgrades on Investor Holdings and Yields in Emerging Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Foreign Private Banks Pension & Ins Sov. Yield 
 
1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 
Upgrade T-2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.27*** 
 (-1.13) (-0.38) (-1.08) (-0.50) (-0.65) (-0.24) (0.29) (-0.78) (-1.16) (-1.07) (-1.34) (-3.60) 
Upgrade T-1 -0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02* 0.02** 0.13** 0.17 0.13 
 (-0.54) (0.08) (0.98) (-0.08) (-0.72) (-1.39) (0.11) (-2.09) (2.59) (2.50) (1.10) (0.81) 
Upgrade T 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.06*** 0.02 0.29 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.46) (-0.24) (0.65) (0.89) (-0.05) (1.21) (0.98) (-8.67) (0.66) (1.17) (0.38) 
Upgrade T+1 0.03 0.04** 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.16 0.07 -0.09 
 (1.08) (2.41) (1.24) (-0.97) (0.68) (1.70) (-0.89) (1.86) (-1.48) (1.29) (1.13) (-1.28) 
Upgrade T+2 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.04 
 (0.25) (0.87) (1.65) (0.59) (0.53) (-0.99) (1.06) (0.19) (-0.72) (0.02) (0.94) (-0.22) 
Debt to GDP 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02* -0.03* -0.03* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.15* 0.16* 0.13* 
 (0.33) (0.25) (0.10) (-1.90) (-2.13) (-2.04) (-0.12) (-0.14) (-0.09) (2.15) (2.09) (1.80) 
Budget Balance 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.15* -0.13 -0.14* -1.10 -0.98 -1.00 
 (0.21) (0.29) (0.26) (0.07) (0.25) (0.13) (-1.99) (-1.73) (-1.95) (-1.55) (-1.65) (-1.45) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.18) (-0.12) (-0.07) (-0.68) (-0.57) (-0.58) (1.65) (1.75) (1.71) (-0.52) (-0.44) (-0.41) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01** -0.01** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.44*** 
 (-0.88) (-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.67) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-1.35) (-2.44) (-2.55) (-4.56) (-4.49) (-4.52) 
Positive Outlook -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (-0.03) (-0.12) (-0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.18) (0.81) (0.82) (0.81) (-0.79) (-0.76) (-0.87) 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Nb of Observations 1319 1319 1319 1337 1337 1337 1129 1129 1129 1467 1467 1467 
Nb of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 12 12 12 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses. Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 21 
Impact of Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Emerging Economies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Foreign Private Banks Pension & Ins Sov. Yield 
 Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s Cross S&P Fitch Mdy’s 
Downgrade T-2 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.14* 0.25*** 0.01 
 (-1.00) (-1.09) (1.13) (0.61) (0.60) (1.06) (-1.65) (-0.05) (0.32) (0.55) (-0.63) (0.79) (1.48) (1.96) (3.89) (0.14) 
Downgrade T-1 0.03 0.00 0.04** 0.04 -0.02** -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.02** 0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.11 0.19 0.55*** 0.06 
 (0.86) (0.06) (2.46) (1.51) (-2.52) (-1.68) (-1.50) (-0.54) (2.50) (0.83) (0.93) (2.22) (1.35) (1.76) (5.65) (0.55) 
Downgrade T -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.05** -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03** -0.02 0.16 0.20 0.66*** 0.21 
 (-0.77) (-0.73) (1.40) (-0.90) (0.05) (0.66) (-2.40) (-1.21) (-1.39) (-0.34) (-2.49) (-0.84) (1.44) (1.24) (5.17) (1.59) 
Downgrade T+1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11*** -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05* -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 -0.09 0.01 
 (-0.42) (-0.73) (-4.61) (-1.28) (-1.24) (0.48) (-0.57) (-1.03) (-1.18) (-0.12) (-1.99) (-1.05) (-0.50) (-0.98) (-0.79) (0.10) 
Downgrade T+2 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.02 
 (-0.54) (-0.13) (-1.48) (-0.73) (-0.12) (-0.94) (0.30) (0.01) (1.13) (0.02) (0.55) (0.58) (-0.24) (0.12) (0.99) (-0.21) 
Debt to GDP 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.28** 0.28** 0.27** 0.29** 
 (0.43) (0.36) (0.49) (0.44) (-1.81) (-1.79) (-1.55) (-1.79) (0.68) (0.75) (0.98) (0.69) (2.69) (2.78) (2.62) (2.81) 
Budget Balance 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.11** -0.11** -0.11* -0.10** -0.70 -0.67 -0.69 -0.67 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.28) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.03) (-0.09) (-2.30) (-2.30) (-2.21) (-2.33) (-1.00) (-0.96) (-0.92) (-0.91) 
GDP Growth Trend 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 1.99** 2.01** 2.02** 1.90** 
 (0.36) (0.29) (0.40) (0.41) (-0.40) (-0.42) (-0.48) (-0.40) (3.78) (4.03) (3.21) (3.72) (2.77) (2.84) (2.87) (2.65) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.14) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.11) (-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.49) (1.20) (1.20) (1.18) (1.20) (-0.88) (-0.83) (-0.86) (-0.87) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01*** 0.02 0.03 -0.00 -0.49*** 
 (-1.25) (-1.19) (-1.25) (-0.76) (-1.11) (-1.14) (-1.11) (-0.64) (-1.52) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-3.91) (0.32) (0.51) (-0.01) (-4.53) 
Negative Outlook -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.35 0.36 0.30 0.36 
 (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.65) (-0.38) (-0.08) (-0.19) (0.57) (-0.07) (0.31) (0.23) (0.38) (0.23) (1.69) (1.71) (1.46) (1.74) 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 
Nb of Observations 1319 1319 1319 1319 1337 1337 1337 1337 1129 1129 1129 1129 1467 1462 1467 1467 
Nb of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 22 
Impact of Serial Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Emerging Economies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Foreign Private Banks Pension & Ins Sov. Yield 
 1st Dg. 2nd Dg. 3rd Dg. 1st Dg. 2nd Dg. 3rd Dg. 1st Dg. 2nd Dg. 3rd Dg. 1st Dg. 2nd Dg. 3rd Dg. 
Downgrade T-2 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.16*** 
 (-1.00) (-0.35) (1.37) (1.27) (0.35) (0.07) (0.27) (0.36) (0.09) (1.72) (0.51) (3.23) 
Downgrade T-1 0.03 0.02 0.06* -0.03** 0.02 -0.04** 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.15 0.56** 
 (0.66) (0.49) (1.91) (-2.55) (0.69) (-2.74) (1.75) (1.54) (0.48) (0.93) (0.79) (2.34) 
Downgrade T -0.06 -0.02 0.03** 0.01 0.03 -0.07** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.17 0.94*** 
 (-0.86) (-0.90) (2.28) (0.38) (0.46) (-2.76) (-1.30) (-0.27) (-1.63) (0.84) (1.46) (6.07) 
Downgrade T+1 0.02 -0.05 -0.17*** -0.02 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.43** 
 (0.46) (-1.59) (-6.57) (-1.21) (-1.41) (1.42) (-0.96) (-0.99) (-1.64) (0.01) (-0.05) (-2.21) 
Downgrade T+2 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.08 
 (-0.88) (0.71) (-1.17) (0.66) (-0.39) (-0.87) (1.19) (0.41) (-1.14) (-0.54) (0.36) (-0.51) 
Debt to GDP 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.29** 0.28** 0.30** 
 (0.39) (0.43) (0.48) (-1.84) (-1.82) (-1.83) (0.70) (0.75) (0.75) (2.87) (2.83) (3.05) 
Budget Balance 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.12** -0.10** -0.11* -0.74 -0.60 -0.75 
 (0.26) (0.16) (0.25) (0.26) (0.01) (0.14) (-2.47) (-3.03) (-2.21) (-1.02) (-0.76) (-1.01) 
GDP Growth Trend 0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 1.88** 1.96** 1.97** 
 (0.42) (0.41) (0.39) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.42) (3.61) (3.96) (3.37) (2.62) (2.70) (2.86) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.55) (-0.46) (-0.48) (1.15) (1.15) (1.17) (-0.83) (-0.87) (-0.90) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (-1.23) (-1.21) (-1.23) (-1.12) (-1.17) (-1.12) (-1.48) (-1.55) (-1.48) (0.30) (0.34) (0.30) 
Negative Outlook -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.37 0.32 
 (-0.22) (-0.32) (-0.65) (-0.12) (-0.34) (0.38) (0.24) (0.39) (0.26) (1.70) (1.67) (1.57) 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.23 
Nb of Observations 1319 1319 1319 1337 1337 1337 1129 1129 1129 1467 1467 1467 
Nb of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 12 12 12 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses. Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 23 
Impact of Multi-notch Sovereign Rating Downgrades on Bond Holdings and Yields in Emerging Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Foreign Private Banks Pension & Ins Sov. Yield 
 
1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 1-notch 2-notch 3-notch 
Downgrade T-2 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.15** 0.00 
 (-0.79) (0.83) (-0.38) (1.24) (-0.61) (-4.81) (0.88) (-1.32) (-0.41) (0.26) (2.53) (0.03) 
Downgrade T-1 0.05 -0.02 0.08*** -0.02* 0.00 0.01 0.02** 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.30* 0.09 
 (1.13) (-0.36) (4.08) (-1.82) (0.04) (1.30) (3.16) (0.62) (-0.41) (0.05) (2.04) (0.89) 
Downgrade T -0.04* -0.02 -0.04** 0.01 -0.03** 0.02** -0.01 -0.02** 0.05*** 0.04 0.31* -0.06 
 (-1.88) (-0.53) (-2.24) (1.17) (-3.02) (2.90) (-0.78) (-2.37) (10.51) (0.82) (2.15) (-0.38) 
Downgrade T+1 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.29*** -0.00 -0.02** -0.00 0.06 -0.13 -0.11 
 (-1.31) (-1.07) (1.13) (-1.13) (-1.08) (-41.20) (-0.34) (-2.52) (-0.76) (1.64) (-1.54) (-0.67) 
Downgrade T+2 0.01 -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 0.01 0.08* 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.72) (-0.48) (-2.15) (-0.28) (0.91) (2.02) (0.30) (1.46) (0.79) (0.50) (-0.45) (-0.23) 
Debt to GDP 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.28** 0.26** 0.29** 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.42) (-1.78) (-1.73) (-2.17) (0.70) (0.88) (0.79) (2.78) (2.60) (2.98) 
Budget Balance 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.10** -0.12** -0.11** -0.65 -0.65 -0.73 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.20) (-0.21) (0.10) (0.26) (-2.23) (-2.26) (-2.29) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.98) 
GDP Growth Trend 0.05 0.06 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 1.92** 2.12** 1.83** 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.43) (-0.39) (-0.47) (-0.36) (4.26) (3.28) (3.45) (2.77) (2.98) (2.36) 
Political Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.11) (-0.08) (-0.14) (-0.55) (-0.46) (-0.73) (1.18) (1.19) (1.16) (-0.83) (-0.87) (-0.76) 
Risk Aversion Index -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 (-1.18) (-1.22) (-1.23) (-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.48) (0.23) (-0.16) (0.45) 
Negative Outlook -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.30 0.38 
 (-0.75) (-0.09) (-0.37) (-0.20) (0.82) (-0.18) (0.11) (0.60) (0.28) (1.71) (1.66) (1.72) 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.23 0.22 
Nb of Observations 1319 1319 1319 1337 1337 1337 1129 1129 1129 1467 1467 1467 
Nb of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 12 12 12 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors clustered on country basis. t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 24 
Table 24A Results Summary for Upgrades 
  Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Pension & Ins. Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
Entire Sample             
Standard Upgrade T-2           
Preceded by Outlook T+1     T-1 T-2   
Unpreceded by Outlook   T-2, T-1, T ,T-1, T-2     T-2,T-1,T+1   
Peripheral Eurozone             
Upgrade by Rating Agency Cross, FI, MO       S&P,FI S&P, Mo 
Serial Upgrade 2nd, 3rd   2nd, 3rd   1st, 2nd 1st, 2nd 
Multi-notch Upgrade       1-notch     
Emerging Economies             
Upgrade by Rating Agency       MO   S&P 
Serial Upgrade 2nd,3rd   3rd 3rd   2nd,3rd 
Multi-notch Upgrade 2N     2N, 3N   1N, 3N 
Note: T refers to months before or after the downgrade. Serial Downgrades are calculated over 24 month horizon. Multi-notch changes are marked 1N for one-
       Table 24B Results Summary for Downgrades 
  Foreign Private Foreign Official Banks Pension & Ins. Inv. Fund Sov. Yield 
Entire Sample           T-2, T 
Standard Downgrade       T-1, T     
Preceded by Outlook   T T-1,T+1 T T   
Unpreceded by Outlook           T-2, T+2 
Safe Havens             
Standard Downgrade T+2 T+1     T T+2 
Peripheral Eurozone             
Downgrade by Rating Agency Cross, S&P, MO S&P, MO       Cross, S&P, FI, MO 
Serial Downgrade 3rd 1st, 2nd, 3rd 3rd     3rd 
Multi-notch Downgrade 1N, 2N, 3N  1N 3N     2N 
Emerging Economies             
Downgrade by Rating Agency FI   Cross, FI Cross, FI, MO   FI 
Serial Downgrade 3rd   1st, 3rd     3rd 
Multi-notch Downgrade 1N, 3N   1N, 2N, 3N 1N, 2N, 3N   2N 
Note: T refers to months before or after the downgrade. Serial Downgrades are calculated over 24 month horizon. Multi-notch changes are marked 1N for one-
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Appendix  
Table 25 
 
 
Region Country Data Frequency Data Availability Distinction for Maturity Form and Valuation Coverage Source
France Abs Monthly 10/1999 - 06/2013
Only government 
and central bank 
bonds Stocks, N/A N/A Agence France Tresor. Monthly Bulletin.
Germany Abs Quarterly 12/1999 - 03/2013 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government
I. Courtesy of Bundesbank. Department of "Bankenstatistik und andere Finanzstatistiken"
II. Alternative, less detailed dataset with longer history of general government debt: 
Bundesbank. Statistics. Time series. Public finances. Sovereign debt developments. Creditors.
III. Bundesbank Depot Statistik - Verschuldung des Bundes  for data starting before 2005
Netherlands Abs Quarterly 12/1999 - 03/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government Courtesy of Balance of Payments Department of the Dutch National Bank
Greece Abs Quarterly 12/1997 - 03/2013 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government Bank of Greece. Statistics.  Financial Accounts. Central Government. Quarterly Data
Ireland Abs Monthly 09/2001 - 12/2012
Only government 
and central bank 
bonds Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government Central Bank of Ireland. Securities Statistics
Italy Abs Monthly 01/1997 - 02/2013
1. Bills, 
2. Bonds, 
3. Zero Coupon 
Bonds,
4. Variable rate 
treasury credit 
certificates Stocks, market value
Central 
Government
Base informative pubblica. Supplements to the statistical bulletin.
I. The Public Finances. Borrowing Requirement and Debt. General Government Debt. By 
residual maturity
II. The Financial Market. Securities: stocks by groups of investors. Table TDEE0060.
Portugal Abs Quarterly 12/2007 - 04/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, market value
Central 
Government
Bank of Portugal. Statistical Bulletin. Statistics. Statistical publications. Statistical Bulletin. 
Publications Document List. Chapter K
Spain Abs Monthly 12/1996 - 12/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominal value N/A
1) Banco de Espana Statistics. Boletín Estadístico. Chapter 22: Mercados secundarios de 
valores
2) Tesoro Publico. Boletín de Estadisticas. 
Denmark Abs Monthly 12/1999 - 06/2013 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominal value
Federal 
Government
Central Bank. Securities Statistics. DNVPDKS: VP-registered securities by issuer and 
investors sector. 
Israel Abs Monthly 01/2006 - 12/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government Bank of Israel. Publications. Annual Reports. Bank of Israel Annual Report - by year
Japan Abs Quarterly 12/1997 - 12/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, market value
Central 
Government
Bank of Japan.  Time Series Data Search. Flow of Funds.  Data Selection By List of Series. 
Flow of Funds. Financial Assets and Liabilities
UK Abs Quarterly 03/1987 - 03/2013 Bills and bonds No information provided
 Tradable 
Government 
Securities
1) UK Debt Management Office. Gilt Market Data.
Data on average maturity and duration available as "gross" debt and "net" debt from 2004 and 
2005 respectively.
2) Office for National Statistics. Courtesy.
US Abs Quarterly 03/2001 - 12/2012
Total marketable 
debt Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government
I. The Bureau of the United States Department of Treasury. Treasury Bulletin. Ownership of 
Federal Securities
II.  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Fred Economic Data.  Money, Banking, & Finance. 
Monetary Data. Securities, Loans, & Other Assets & Liabilities Held by Fed . U.S. Treasury 
securities held by the Federal Reserve: All Maturities 
Table: Data Sources and Frequency
Eurozone 
Periphery
Developed Non-
euro
Eurozone Core
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Table 26 
 
 
Region Country Data Frequency Data Availability Distinction for Maturity Form and Valuation Coverage Source
Indonesia Abs Monthly 05/1999 - 03/2013
Total marketable 
debt Stocks, market value
Central 
Government
1. Bank of Indonesia. Statistics. Indonesian Financial Statistics. Government Finance Sector. 
Outstanding of Government Securities
2. Directorate General of Debt Management. Statistics. Ownership of Tradeable Government 
Securities  
Malaysia Abs Quarterly 03/1996 - 03/2013 Bills and bonds N/A N/A
Central Bank of Malaysia. Publications & Research Paper. Periodicals. Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin. Table 3.1.5 Federal Government Domestic Debt: Classification by Holder
Thailand Abs Monthly 01/2003 - 04/2013 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominal value
Federal 
Government
I. Bank of Thailand. Statistics. Financial Markets. Debt Securities - series from 2009 onwards
II. Datastream based on Bank of Thailand
Czech Republic Abs Monthly 12/1996 - 03/2013
1. Bills and bonds 
2. By maturity: T-
bills to 50y bonds Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government Ministry of Finance. State Debt. Debt Statistics. Treasury Securities by Type of Holder.
Hungary Abs Quarterly 12/1997 - 12/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, N/A
Federal 
Government
I. Government Debt Management Agency. Publication, Statistics. Statistics. Ownership 
structure of government securities
II. Hungarian Central Bank. Statistics. Statistical Data and Information. Statistical Time Series. 
Table XIII: Securities Data on securities issued by Hungarian residents with breakdown by 
issuer and holding sectors
Poland Abs Monthly 01/1996 - 06/2013
1. Bills and bonds
2. By instrument, 
i.e. year of 
maturity Stocks, market value
Central 
Government
Ministry of Finance. Public Debt. Publications. 
1) Investors. Secondary Market.  Nominal T-bonds and T-bills outstanding  
2) State Treasury Debt
Turkey Abs Monthly 01/2006 - 05/2013
Total marketable 
debt Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government
Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury. Statistics. Public Finance. 
Central Government Domestic Debt Statistics. Composition of Domestic Debt Stock by 
Holders.
Brazil Abs Monthly 01/2007 - 05/2013
Total marketable 
debt Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government I. Tesouro Nacional. Public Debt. Federal Public Debt Monthly Report. 
Mexico Abs Monthly 01/1999 - 06/2013 Bills and bonds Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government
1) Financial system. Financial markets. Debt outstanding.
2) Public Finances. Average Maturity of Government Securities.
Peru Abs Monthly 11/2003 - 11/2011
By instrument, 
i.e. year of 
maturity Stocks, nominal value
Central 
Government Courtesy of Dirección General de Endeudamiento y Tesoro Público de la República del Perú 
Table: Data Sources and Frequency
Emerging Asia
Emerging Europe
Emerging Latin 
America
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Table 27 
Table : Data Sources for Explanatory Variables   
Indicator Frequency Source 
Debt to GDP Annual IMF WEO 
Primary Budget Balance  Annual IMF WEO 
Citigroup Global Macro Risk Aversion Indicator Monthly Citigroup 
Political Risk Monthly Economist Intelligence Unit via Bloomberg 
S&P Rating and Outlook Daily Courtoisy of S&P Ratings 
Moody's Rating and Outlook Daily Courtoisy of Moody's 
Fitch Rating and Outlook Daily Courtoisy of Fitch 
 
Table 28 
Table: Panel Unit Root Test                                  
    Non-resident   Non-resident   Domestic   Pension and Ins   Investment   Sovereign 
Statistic   Level 1st Dif   Level 1st Dif   Level 1st Dif   Level 1st Dif   Level 1st Dif   Level 1st Dif 
Inverse chi-squared   103.3 1429.4   19.1 885.7   75.8 1510.5   92.7 1269.7   82.8 1205.2   36.5 1500.5 
Inverse normal   -2.6 -35.7   2.5 -28.3   0.0 -37.0   -1.3 -33.8   -2.7 -33.1   1.4 -36.7 
Inverse logit   -3.8 -84.4   2.9 -68.2   -0.5 -89.2   -2.3 -80.7   -3.4 -78.7   1.3 -84.8 
Modified inv. chi- 6.3 147.7   -1.0 119.2   3.4 156.3   6.3 141.3   5.5 137.8   -1.2 148.2 
                                      
P-value                                     
Inverse chi-squared   0.0 0.0   0.8 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.9 0.0 
Inverse normal   0.0 0.0   1.0 0.0   0.5 0.0   0.1 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.9 0.0 
Inverse logit   0.0 0.0   1.0 0.0   0.3 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.9 0.0 
Modified inv. chi- 0.0 0.0   0.8 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0   0.9 0.0 
 Note : Fisher-type Test using Phillips-Perron method, with time trend and demeaning 
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Table 29 
Table: Fixed vs. Random Effects Test 
    Non-resident Private   Non-resident Official   Domestic Banks   Pension and Ins Funds   Investment Funds   Sovereign Yield 
Chi2 Stats 1.63*   5.74*   1.02*   5.73*   1.94*   9.27* 
Probability 97%   57%   99%   57%   96%   23% 
H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic. All variables in first difference. *Test results inconsistent 
 
Table 30 
Table: Fixed Time Effects Test 
    Non-resident Private   Non-resident Official   Domestic Banks   Pension and Ins Funds   Investment Funds   Sovereign Yield 
Chi2 Stats 213.3   423.7   171.6   177.4   160.0   401.3 
Probability 0%   0%   28%   19%   52%   0% 
Note: Linear parameter tests for joint nullity of residuals. 
 
Table 31 
Table: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
    Non-resident Private   Non-resident Official   Domestic Banks   Pension and Ins Funds   Investment Funds   Sovereign Yield 
Chi2 Stats 35566   7507   1600000   38239   59210   57728 
Probability 0%   0%   0%   0%   0%   0% 
Note: HO : sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2, i.e. series are homoscedastic 
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Table 32 
Table: Presence of Serial Correlation 
    Non-resident Private   Non-resident Official   Domestic Banks   Pension and Ins Funds   Investment Funds   Sovereign Yield 
F (1, 21) Stats 3.504   16.65   9.15   1.156   4.358   9.567 
Probability 8%   0%   1%   30%   5%   1% 
Note: H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
 
Table 33 
Table: Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence 
    Non-resident Private   Non-resident Official   Domestic Banks   Pension and Ins Funds   Investment Funds   Sovereign Yield 
Chi2 Stats 4.807   24.123   2.713   3.358   1.813   42.47 
Probability 0%   0%   1%   0%   7%   0% 
Note:  
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Do local or foreign currency bonds react differently to local risk factors?  
Abstract 
 Using a new dataset composed of individual bonds for 30 developed 
and emerging countries, this article investigates and contrasts the 
determinants of foreign and local currency yields.  
In emerging economies political risk has significant and positive impact 
on both LC and FC yields with similar magnitude. Inflation, current account 
balance and debt to GDP have stronger effects on unhedged LC yields than 
on FC yields. More importantly, our findings that not only higher foreign 
participation, but also higher share of LC debt to total debt render valuation 
of government bonds more prone to local risk factors. 
Findings indicate that the spread between FC yield and FX-hedged LC 
Yield is relatively high for risky countries and it is significantly and 
positively related to credit ratings and political risk in all countries. 
Interestingly, both rising inflation and debt to GDP increase the FC hedged-
LC spread for emerging economies, but decrease the spread for advanced 
economies. 
Keywords: Sovereign Default, Local Currency Debt, Foreign Currency 
Debt, International Bonds 
JLE Classification: F31, F33, F34, F41, H63 
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I. Introduction 
For many years emerging economies were stigmatized as unreliable borrowers and limited to 
short-term borrowing in foreign currencies. However, over the last two decades numerous 
countries successfully developed local currency (LC) bond markets, yet foreign currency (FC) 
issuance remains an important source of funding for numerous emerging economies. As 
emerging economies open up their capital accounts and LC government bonds became liquid and 
tradable, they gained popularity among international investors which exposed the LC bonds and 
issuing governments to fluctuations in global demand for yield, as it was the case previously with 
foreign currency bonds.  In consequence, understanding the evolution of the debt structure and 
drivers of LC and FC yields became of outmost importance to investors, treasury agencies and 
policymakers. Existing empirical literature on currency denomination of government debt was 
divided into three main flows. First focused on development of LC bond markets and original sin, 
for instance Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), Mehl and Reynaud (2010), second mechanisms 
and history of domestic and external defaults, e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), and third 
analyzed the determinants of FC bond spreads or LC bond yields, e.g. Eichengreen and Mody 
(1999). Newest research by Peiris (2010) and Gadanecz and al. (2014) added the link between 
foreign participation in LC yields. Finally, Du and Schreger (2013) investigated the impact of 
global risk factors on LC and FC yields and the determinants of corresponding sovereign 
defaults. 
This article combines these schools by analysing how fundamental and political indicators 
related to sovereign risk determine the LC and FC yields and the FX-hedged difference between 
them. The novelty of our approach consists in comparing local currency bonds with foreign 
currency bonds using a broad dataset of individual bonds that covering both developed and 
emerging countries. On top of that, we use data for the currency structure of government debt and 
foreign participation to analyse how the reactivity of LC yields evolves under different structures.  
To provide a complete picture we investigate separately the unhedged LC yields, FC yields 
and the spread between FX-hedged LC yields and FC yields. Empirical findings lead us to 
conclusion that in general LC yields react more to local risk factors than FC yields and the 
reactivity increases when the share of LC debt to total debt or foreign participation in LC debt 
increase. Three major patterns emerge with regard to this conclusion. 
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First, basic statistical patterns help explain why government continue to issue in foreign 
currencies. In fact, the spread between LC and FC yields in high rating advanced economies has 
been relatively low, while in emerging economies the FC yield remains lower by 1% to 3% than 
the unhedged LC yield. Moreover, the duration of FC bonds issued by emerging economies has 
almost doubled between 1998 and 2013 and remains considerably higher than duration of local 
currency bonds. We compare the econometric determinants of the LC and FC yields and 
demonstrate that in emerging economies political risk has significant and similar impact on 
LC and FC yields, whereas inflation, current account balance and debt to GDP are 
significant and have stronger effects on unhedged LC yields than on FC yields. 
Second, empirical results suggest that sovereign risk on FC debt might be perceived 
differently from sovereign risk of LC debt causing the deviations from covered interest parity. 
The spread between FC yields and FX-hedged LC yields is marginally low in developed 
countries and investment grade-rated emerging economies, yet it becomes high in riskier 
developed and emerging countries such as Greece, Spain, Russia or Turkey. Econometric results 
for all countries indicate that the spread between FC yield and FX-hedged LC yield is 
significantly and positively related to credit ratings and political risk. Interestingly, both 
rising inflation and debt to GDP significantly increase the FC hedged-LC spread for 
emerging economies, but decrease the spread for advanced economies.  
Third, in emerging countries with high share of LC debt and high share of foreign 
participation the estimated coefficients for political risk, inflation, credit rating and current 
account are significant and considerably stronger than for the full sample. Interestingly, under 
high foreign participation and high share of LC debt, the coefficients are also stronger for LC 
yield than for FC yield. These findings suggest that not only higher foreign participation, but 
also more developed local currency bond markets, i.e. higher share of LC debt to total debt, 
render valuation of government bonds more prone to local risk factors. 
The article begins motivation and literature review, then it moves to data and estimation 
methodology and in the final section we present the descriptive statistics and econometric results. 
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II. Motivation 
Currency and sovereign crisis that wreaked havoc in emerging economies throughout the 
1970s to 1990s stigmatized governments of those countries as unreliable borrowers. Underlying 
economic uncertainty, low credibility of monetary institutions and high inflation resulted in 
limited confidence in local currency (LC) securities and many sovereign borrowers were 
constrained to borrow in foreign currencies (FC), mainly dollar, sterling or mark. However, over 
the last two decades developing economies switched to the path of stable growth, reduced 
external vulnerability, financial liberalization and improved statistical coverage. As a result, 
exchange rates of several emerging economies stabilized as well as local equity and bond 
markets.  
As a result, the global market for government debt, once dominated by bonds of advanced 
countries, began to embrace emerging market bonds denominated in local currencies. Graph Błąd! 
Nie ŵożŶa odŶaleźć źródła odwołaŶia. demonstrates that the share of foreign debt issued by 
developed economies historically oscillated around 5 per cent, emerging economies reduced their 
dependence on foreign funding from over 50 per cent in 1993 to less than 20 per cent in 2003 and 
have maintained this level since. As of 2013 total outstanding foreign currency emerging 
government debt equalled USD 1700bn, or 5 per cent of globally outstanding sovereign debt. It is 
noteworthy that governments of advanced countries have been issuing more foreign-currency 
debt than emerging economies, as indicated by Graph Błąd! Nie ŵożŶa odŶaleźć źródła odwołaŶia..  
In a nutshell, holding LC bonds, as compared to FC bonds, exposes the investor to three 
serious risks. First, in case of default, the creditor is likely to face losses not only on bond prices 
due to the haircut, but also to lose money on currency depreciation that usually comes along. 
Should the country experience an inflationary shock or capital outflows, than the currency is 
likely to depreciate lowering the return on the initial investment. Second, in most developing 
countries holding local currency instruments implies serious liquidity risk for not only on 
currency hedging instruments, sovereign CDS, but also on LC bonds themselves. Third, lack of 
enforcement in international law holding LC debt may be risky in case of default, as the issuing 
government may easily amend the local law and discriminate between local and foreign 
bondholders. Fourth, borrowing government’s willingness to pay may fall if the majority of debt 
is held by foreign investors and the government prefers to shift the burden on foreign investors to 
protect the wealth of domestic agents. Although, FC bonds do not expose the investor to these 
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risks, they might eventually be riskier since they are by definition held predominately by foreign 
investors and a government could decide to default on them in the first place.  
Foreign-currency bond yields are traditionally benchmarked against risk-free government 
paper in corresponding currency, i.e. US Treasuries for USD-denominated bonds, German Bunds 
for Euro, Gilts for GBP and JGB for JPY. The resulting sovereign spread for foreign currency 
bonds remains the uncontested measure of sovereign credit risk. However, lack of equivalent 
benchmarks for local currency sovereign bonds renders the comparison between countries and 
maturities a more challenging task.  
The bulk of the existing literature is dedicated to valuation and drivers of foreign currency 
bonds, exchange rates or deviations from covered and uncovered interest rate parity. However, a 
gap persists with regard to the valuation of bond yields and credit risk of the same issuer in 
different currencies. The objective of this study is to determine the drivers of local and foreign 
currency bonds through the prism of political risk, macroeconomic fundamentals such as 
inflation, global risk aversion and the investor base. The rationale of our approach is explained as 
follows. 
First, political risk reflects the coherence, stability and creditworthiness of the government 
and established institutions. It is also a proxy for the willingness to repay the debt. Second, 
macroeconomic fundamentals influence the valuation of bonds and the appreciation or 
depreciation of currency in the long run. If we consider two countries with identical fundamentals 
and one of them experiences a macroeconomic shock of high inflation, it would most imply the 
currency depreciation of the affected country in the long term. Third, global risk aversion 
influences the capital flows from risky assets to safe assets. Assets held or exposed to re-
evaluation by global investors are more likely to react to global shocks than locally held assets. 
Fourth, the investor base reflects the cost and stability of government financing. If the provision 
of funds by investors should match the supply of assets, long-term refinancing risk for the 
government should be limited. In countries where bonds are held mainly by domestic agents bond 
yields should react less to domestic political and inflation shocks. 
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III. Literature Overview and Hypothesis Development 
In this section we aim to pin down potential channels through which macroeconomics, political 
and demand-related factors could affect local and foreign currency bond yields. 
III.1 Sovereign default, Currency Composition and Inflation 
Investors, credit rating analysts and academics tend to disagree on the formal boundaries of 
sovereign default. In case of the foreign currency debt the situation is more clearcut, as the failure 
to meet a principal or interest payments on the originally fixed date would automatically trigger 
the default mechanism specified in the bond legal documentation.  
In contrast, debt in domestic currency can be repudiated in several ways. If the 
government can control the central bank, it may steer the economy into the territory of higher 
inflation rates, or report inflation rates that are lower than actual figures19, which would reduce 
country’s debt liability in real terms. To maximize this effect the troubled government could 
freeze bank deposits, force conversion of deposits in foreign currencies into domestic currency, 
cap rates on deposits and increase required reserves ratio which would shift the loss to the private 
sector20. 
In the seminal work on the government’s default choices, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 
demonstrate that in absence of international enforcement mechanisms the debtor government is 
more likely to repay its external debt if it is facing the threat of being permanently excluded from 
the debt markets. Moreover, Gersovitz (1983) postulates that the government would not default 
on external debt if domestic financial institutions are dependent on foreign financing, since 
reduced refinancing capacity would translate into a welfare loss to the domestic private sector. 
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) further extend this theory showing that legal rights and institutions in 
the creditor’s country, i.e. rule of law and law enforcement in the jurisdiction where debt is 
issued, determine the willingness to repay its debt. Empirical research confirms discrimination 
between local and foreign bondholders. Díaz-Cassou and Erce (2010) report that episodes of 
discrimination between domestic and foreign creditors indeed occurred in the past. Out of ten 
recent default episodes, four discriminated against foreign creditors, three adopted equal 
                                                          
19
 countries may inflate or falsify statistics on inflation like Argentina in 2011-2013 or amend the indexation clauses. Also the 
recent case of Kazakh devaluation reminded investors that the central bank credibility and independence can be easily put at 
stake in certain emerging countries. 
20
 In a study on financial repression Brock (1989) showed that inflation and required reserves are positively correlated 
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treatment and particularly dramatic default episodes, specifically in Argentina, Russia and 
Ukraine, afforded preferential treatment to foreign creditors.  
Interestingly, rating agencies perceive local currency debt as less risky than foreign 
currency debt. Packer (2003) reports that in 2003 S&P and Fitch were assigning a higher local 
currency rating to over 50% of sovereigns under coverage. The LC to FC gap was in range 1 to 3 
notches and occurred most frequently around BBB rating. The key rationale behind the 
superiority of LC debt goes back to soverign’s capacity to increase taxation of residents to repay 
LC debt. 
Empirical research on the number and severity of government defaults remains relatively 
scarce. In the seminal article on the history of sovereign defaults, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
identified 250 cases of external defaults and only 68 documented cases of outright domestic 
default between 1900 and 2010. However, authors underline that the actual number of domestic 
defaults related to financial repression and high inflatio, i.e. cases of debt being inflated away, 
appears to be significantly higher. Interestingly,empirical evidence shows that not only frequency 
distributions of domestic and external debt differ significantly, but also domestic and external 
default are vaguely correlated with each other. In fact, even though domestic bankruptcies were 
less frequent, these episodes were marked by greater fall in output and significantly higher 
inflation rates that persisted for several years after the occurrence. As a bottomline, these 
empirical findings give ground to believe that default in domestic defaults are less likely, but 
more severe, hence rational and knowledgeable investors holding local currency bonds should be 
at least as cautious as with external default risk.  
Recent empirical evidence on debt servicing in developing countries by Kohlscheen 
(2010) also demonstrates that between 1980 and 2006 sovereign default rates for domestic debt 
were lower than those for external debt. What is noteworthy is that while external defaults trigger 
domestic defaults, the reverse causality is less clear. 
In contrast to the above mentioned findings, analyzing default events between 1996 and 
2012 Jeanneret and Souissi (2014) demonstrate that local and external defaults are equally likely. 
Their results indicate that currency denomination of sovereign debt explains a large share of 
probability of default as such. Moreover, a government is more likely to default on its bonds 
when the country exhibits weaker long-term economic growth and higher inflation. As for the 
letter effect, inflation raises the default probability on both types of debt but has a greater effect 
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for local currency debt. Finally, level of indebtedness does not affect the probability of default as 
such. 
 
Hypothesis 1: unhedged local currency yields and foreign currency yields should respond 
differently to unfavorable changes in inflation, debt fundamentals and political risk 
 
III.2 Sovereign Credit Ratings and Bond Yields 
Investment grade bonds are broadly considered to have significantly lower probability of 
default than non-investment grade bonds. Hence, investors who pay attention to credit ratings are 
likely to demand a higher premium for lower rated bonds. Analyzing foreign currency bond 
spreads in 35 emerging economies between 1997 and 2010 Tejada and Jaramillo (2011) find that 
the switch from non-investment grade to investment grade reduces the spread by ca. 35%, 
whereas similar upgrades within investment grade led to a reduction in spreads by 5 to 10% and 
there was no impact for movements within the speculative grade. Results of empirical studies on 
interest parity also suggest that credit quality influences bond yields and foreign exchange 
derivatives. Skinner and Mason (2011) find hat while covered interest rate parity holds for large 
and small AAA-rated economies, it holds for emerging markets only for a three-month maturity. 
Covered interest rate parity does not hold for medium to long-term horizons in Brazil, Chile, 
Russia and South Korea. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Shocks in risk factors have a higher impact on the FCLC spread of non-investment 
grade bonds than on investment grade bonds.  
 
III.3 Development of local currency bond markets and discrimination 
 
While advanced economies have been able to borrow in local currency bond markets for over 
half a century, until late 1990s most emerging economies were contrained to borrow either short-
term, with floating rates or in foreign currencies. This phenomenon has been outlined by 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) as the ‘original sin’. Low credibility of local authorities, high 
inflation rates and economic instability discouraged investors from embracing local currency 
debt. In the result, emerging economies were raising funds in foreign currency, while local 
ARTICLE 3 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 207 
currency debt was either non-existent, short-duration or inflation-indexed. Mehl and Reynaud 
(2010) show evidence on composition of government debt in 33 emerging economies over 1994-
2006 and demonstrate the share of foreign currency denominated debt is related to fiscal 
soundness, size of the economy and investor base, and most importantly, rate of inflation. 
Nevertheless, Hausmann and Panizza (2011) find that over time emerging economies have 
reduced their dependence on foreign currency funding and reduced their debt levels and external 
vulnerabilities in general. Authors warn that this effect may be temporary and due to the 
relatively expensive cost of foreign borrowing. 
 Broner et al. (2014) analyse the Eurozone debt crisis from the perspective of creditor 
discrimination and crowding-out. Their empirical and theoretical findings indicate that, in 
turbulent times, domestic sovereign debt offers a higher expected returns for domestic investors 
than for foreign investors. This happens because the probability of default on domestic debt is 
lower than for foreign investors. Moreover, from domestic investors’ point of view, domestic 
sovereign debt offers greater returns than domestic private debt due to financial frictions.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: countries with more developed local currency bond markets, i.e. where the share 
of local currency debt to total debt is high, are more immune to risk factors. As a result, local 
currency bonds should react less to political and inflation shocks than foreign currency bonds. 
Inversely, foreign investors may fear to be discriminated if the share of foreign currency debt is 
too high. 
 
III.4 Empirical studies on foreign participation in local currency 
bonds 
 
In a review of existing work on sovereign debt and default Tomz and Wright (2013) find that 
there is limited empirical literature why governments honour domestic debt depending on the 
currency of borrowing. They also find that the rise in the foreign participation in domestic debt 
made incentives for default on domestic debt foreign debt. 
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) point towards the ‘missed link’ between local and foreign 
currency debt, namely that the incentives of domestic and external default should converge at 
high participation of foreign investors in domestic debt, as high inflation would scare foreign 
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investors off. Now, if we consider the progress in central bank independence and external 
prowess that emerging economies have made in the recent decade, government’s capacity to 
inflate should be limited and hence credit risk on external and internal debt should be similar. 
 Peiris (2010) analyzes the relationship between local currency yields and foreign 
participation in 10 emerging markets between 2000 and 2009. His results show that greater 
foreign participation in the domestic government bond market tends to significantly reduce long-
term government yields. Moreover, greater foreign participation does not necessarily result in 
increased volatility in bond yields in emerging markets and could even dampen volatility in 
certain situatons. Gadanecz, Miyajima, and Shu (2014) analyze the determinants of LC bond 
yields at 5-year maturity between 2012 and 2014 in 12 EM countries and find that foreign 
participation in LC bond markets tends to lower bond yields. For each additional percentage point 
increase in foreign nonbank holdings, local currency bond yields fall by 8–9 basis points. In turn, 
Ebeke and Yinqiu (2014) analyze at the period Q2 2009 to Q1 2013 in a similar panel of 
countries and find that foreign holdings have reduced bond yields but increased yield volatility in 
the post-Lehman period.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: at high levels of foreign participation in local currency bonds, determinants of 
local currency yields should resemble those of foreign currency yields  
 
 
III.5 Factors determining spreads on foreign currency bonds 
 
Academic literature documents relatively well that foreign currency bond yields are prone to 
changes in the US interest rates and shocks in global risk aversion. 
 Eichengreen and Mody (1999) look at FC issuance choices of EM debtors between 1991 
and 1996 and find that an increase in issuance is more likely in times of an economic slowdown, 
i.e. when US interest rates are lower and investors are looking for higher yields in foreign 
markets, even though issuer’s macroeconomic conditions are weaker, i.e. reserves are low and 
budget deficits are larger. 
 Kodres, Hartelius and Kashiwase (2008) look at FC spreads between 1991 and 2007 and 
find that the gradual spread compression that took place over this period was due to the 
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improvement in country fundamentals on one hand and volatility of expectations of US yields on 
the other.  
 Arora and Cerisola (2001) find that while country-specific fundamentals are important in 
explaining fluctuations in country risk, the stance and predictability of U.S. monetary policy are 
also important for stabilizing capital flows and capital market conditions in emerging markets. 
 Bellas Dimitri, Papaioannou, Michael G, and Petrova, Iva (2010) analyse FC EM bond 
spreads through the prism of risk aversion between 1997 and 2009 and state that while debt to 
GDP and current account are key determinants of sovereign spreads in the long term, in the short 
the term spread level becomes strongly correlated to the financial stress index.  
Using panel vector autoregression (PVAR) Akıncı (2013) the impact of global financial 
conditions on FC country spreads and macroeconomic fluctuations in six EM countries between 
1994 and 2011. His findings reveal that while shocks in the risk free rate have a limited and 
short-lived effect, global financial shocks explain about 20% of movements both in the country 
spread and in the aggregate activity. Last but not least he finds that country spread shocks explain 
about 15 percent of the business cycles in emerging economies.  
 Uribe and Yue (2006) apply panel VAR methodology to disentangle the risk-free rate, 
country spreads and macroeconomic fundamentals for six EM countries between 1994 and 2005. 
Their findings suggest that US interest rate and country spread shocks explain respectively 20%  
and 12% of movements in aggregate activity in emerging economies, while the subsequent 
feedback from fundamentals to country spreads significantly exacerbates business-cycle 
fluctuations. Interestingly, in response to an increase in US interest rates, country spreads first fall 
and then display a large, delayed overshooting. 
Using GARCH models Thuraisamy, Gannon, and Batten (2008) identify a strong 
relationship between Latin American euro credit spreads, country-specific exchange rate and the 
US term premium, the letter being a proxy of the business cycle. 
 Riedel, Thuraisamy, and Wagner (2013) use Markov Switching models to analyse USD 
Latin American sovereign spreads between 2000 and 2011 and state that the magnitude of spread 
determinants varies with the states of the cycle variable, in particular the US term structure 
factors exhibit much higher magnitudes under high volatility state. Their results also indicate that 
both local currency exchange rate and the Euro/USD rate are significant spread drivers. 
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 Burger and Warnock (2006) analyse capital flows into emerging market local currency 
bonds and observe that, despite potential diversification benefits, mutual fund investors avoid 
those assets due to macroeconomic uncertainty and they tend to invest in countries with low 
inflation and strong institutions. Burger, Warnock, and Warnock (2010) underline that 
development of local currency bond markets depends mainly on legal rights and inflation 
volatility. 
 
III.6 Factors determining spreads on local currency bonds 
 
As for LC bonds yields the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Gadanecz, Miyajima, and Shu 
(2014) find that exchange rate risk is a key determinant of EME local currency sovereign bond 
yields. Exchange rate risk could rise due to both domestic and international factors and amplify 
the negative impact of these factors on bond yields. Du and Schreger (2013) compare the 
currency-hedged local currency yield with pure foreign currency yield for emerging sovereigns 
bonds and find that the local currency yield responds less to global fluctuations in yields. 
 
 
III.7 Link between LC and FC Debt, Currency Hedging, Covered 
Interest Rate Parity and Basis Swap 
 
 
To make the default risk on LC and FC bonds of the same issuer comparable Du and 
Schreger (2013) introduce a new measure of sovereign risk based currency swaps. Their 
approach shows that the LC spread over UST can be decomposed into currency- and credit-
specific spreads, with KC currency spread accounting for ca. two thirds of the entire LC spread. 
Interestingly, this decomposition indicates that LC credit spreads are generally lower and less 
correlated with global risk factors than FC credit spreads.  
 Popper (1993) analyses the covered interest rate parity for long-maturity bonds of major 
risk-free developed economies as compared to shorter maturities. Her findings for the 1985 to 
1988 period indicate that the deviation for longer maturities does occur, but the extent of 
deviations in the long part of the yield curve is only slightly larger, ca. 10 bps, than in the short 
part. 
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 McBrady and Schill (2007) focus on the currency choice of sovereign and sub-sovereign 
issuers from developed and emerging economies in terms of market timing and prove that 
borrowers tend to exploit cross-currency differences in covered and uncovered interest yields. 
Their results indicate also that the average new bond offering precedes a large and beneficial 
depreciation of the issue currency of around 150 bps over the course of the following year. 
 Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) find that investors on average earn large excess returns 
simply by taking long positions in baskets of currencies with high interest rates and shorting 
baskets of currencies with low interest rates, regardless of the history of interest rate differences 
for individual currency pairs. Also, they establish that currencies sorted by interest rates share a 
lot of common variation and that returns on carry trade currencies depend on the state of risk 
aversion and world consumption growth rates. 
As for anomalies in corporate bond markets, Zvi Wiener and Dan Galai (2009) find that 
even if the issuing company is not an exporter companies, its foreign currency borrowing is 
cheaper when the exchange rate is positively correlated with the return on the company’s assets. 
 Munro and Wooldridge (2011) analyse the borrowing behavior of governments issuing in 
both local and currency markets. They find that numerous borrowers prefer to issue interest-rate- 
swap-covered foreign currency bonds instead of tapping directly the local currency market.  
 
Hypothesis 4: assuming that FX-hedged LC default risk equals the FC default risk, hedged LC 
yields should fit the covered interest rate parity, i.e. the spread between FX-hedged LC yield and 
foreign currency yield should be marginally small or equal to transaction costs. 
 
IV.1. Default Risk and Bond Maturity 
 
Cristina Arellano (2008) and Cristina and Ramanarayanan (2012) establish a theoretical model 
explaining that changes in the sovereign spread curve result from the shocks in GDP growth and 
issuance dynamics on one hand, and risk aversion on the other. Their results indicate that during 
periods of high risk aversion issuers tend to auction short-maturity debt. Jeanne (2003) presents a 
theoretical model where for both private and public issuers the share of foreign currency debt is 
related to the credibility of monetary policy and inflation volatility.  
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Both authors argue that governments facing long-term liabilities have more incentives to inflate 
the debt away than with short-term liabilities since higher inflation would be reflected in higher 
interest rates on debt that has to be rolled over. In the later case government needs to inflate very 
aggresively to achieve a significant reduction of the debt burden. 
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
IV.1. Data 
The novelty of our approach consist in merging local currency bonds with foreign 
currency bonds into one dataset. At the beginning of our data identification process we have 
searched for all available foreign currency bonds in Bloomberg and Datastream and chose the 
first dataset due to the wider and more complete coverage. Bloomberg provides data on yields, 
bid-ask spreads, currency of issuance, maturity and outstanding amount. At the outset of the 
project we have identified 20 emerging economies and 10 advanced countries that issued 1350 
foreign currency bonds with sufficient historical data to conduct the analysis, as indicated in 
Appendix Table 1. In the first step of the data identification process we have excluded bonds all 
that require non-conventional pricing methods and are labelled by Bloomberg as restructured, 
exchanged, funged or based on a step-up coupon. 
The availability of foreign currency bonds is not the only factor limiting the scope of our 
analysis, however. We attempted creating a similar database for local currency bonds, but the 
coverage range for emerging economies ranged from zero to mediocre at best. This is why we 
decided to use historical series of yield curves provided by Datastream for maturities between 1-
year and 30-years. On average the breadth and historical availability of local currency yields 
exceeded the availability of foreign currency yields. Statistics for the average starting date of 
historical data for individual countries presented in Appendix Table 1 indicate that for seven 
countries local currency curves provided by Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters start later than the 
series for foreign currency bonds. 
On top of that we have not been able to identify zero coupon curves for Argentina and 
Venezuela, whereas in the case of South Africa the local currency yield turned out to be, to a 
great extent, incomplete and inconsistent. To overcome these issues we have analyzed historical 
series for individual local currency bonds, but the curves constructed in this way generated less 
data points than the curves provided directly by Bloomberg.  
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Last but not least, Table 1 provides an overview of the control variables and their 
respective sources. For holdings of government bonds denominated in local currencies we use the 
dataset compiled by Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014). For the duration measures by country we use 
country data from JPM Indices. 
IV.2. Calculation of Bond Yields and Foreign Currency 
Hedging 
In this section we outline our approach to calculate the yields in local and foreign 
currency, foreign currency hedging and finally we present the econometric approach. 
i. Yields 
If we took the conventional yield for the foreign exchange bonds, we would implicitly 
assume a flat yield curve. We thus take into account the fact that the foreign exchange yield curve 
might have a positive or negative slope. For instance, if the foreign exchange yield curve has a 
positive slope, the yield of the foreign exchange bond is higher than the conventional yield and 
vice versa. Mathematically, we calculate the z-spread of the foreign currency bonds over the US 
zero coupon yield curve. By doing so we assume the slope of the foreign currency yield to be the 
same as the slope of the US yield curve.  
ii. Foreign Exchange Hedging 
For each local currency bond yield in our sample we calculate future curves against the 
dollar by supposing a piecewise linear relation ship between each maturity. For each local 
currency bond we match its maturity with a synthetic currency future in order to calculate the 
hedge: 
Eq. 11                                          
Where FC stands for foreign currency, LC for local currency, m for the maturity and t for time. 
 
We match exactly the maturity of the local and foreign currency bonds, whereas a real portfolio 
manager would most likely use a 3 months rolling hedge to protect his investment as 3 months 
currency futures are the most liquid. From an academic standpoint, matching the maturity is the 
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accurate way to do it. As a result, we take the exact match and use the 3 months hedge as a 
robustness check. 
 
The FCLC spread is calculated as follows: 
Eq. 12                                           
Where n is the bond issue,            is the observed foreign currency yield,           is 
the local currency yield derived from the local currency yield curve and FCLC the resulting 
spread between the foreign currency yield and the hedged local currency yield. 
  
In a second step we calculate in the same fashion future curves against the dollar for all 
foreign currencies in our sample. We are thus able to compare bonds in Yen, Euro and Pounds 
against the dollar. 
IV.3. Econometric Approach 
 
We smooth our dataset to reduce noise by taking the average over three months of any 
given variable. We think this gives our results additional stability compared to Du and Schreger 
(2013) who use monthly observations for their regressions. Our results are robust to not 
smoothing at all or smoothing over 6 months. We perform panel regressions by using time, 
country and currency fixed effects. Our results are robust to fixed effects on the bond level 
instead of the country level. The panel autocorrelation test by Wooldridge (2001) detects a first 
order autocorrelation. A likelihood ratio test detects heteroscedaticity. We thus control for both at 
the residual level. All results are robust to regressions without the financial rating. Controlling for 
the debt crisis in 2009 does not alter the meaning of the results. We also used the dynamic linear 
panel regression by Arellano and Bond (1991) on the data to check if autocorrelation alters the 
results. The dynamic linear panel seems to exhibit unstable results with our data. As previously 
noted by David Roodman (2009), the model is very sensitive to changes on the 
instrumentalization and the lag structure of the explanatory variables.  
 
Moreover, we restrict the sample to maturities between 1 and 5 years. We chose to make 
this our sample of reference for two reasons: first, bonds below one year loose most of their 
default risk and second, the future currency curves beyond a maturity of 5 years are very illiquid. 
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We include three bond specific control variables: the maturity, the squared maturity and the issue 
size.  
V. Empirical Results 
In this section we present the information on data distribution, descriptive statistics and 
econometric results. 
V.1. Data Distribution by Country, Currency and Maturity 
The originality and broad coverage of our dataset require a thorough investigation of the 
underlying data before the analysis. 
Statistics in Table 2a indicate that USD remains the main currency of issuance of foreign 
currency bonds. Interestingly, while emerging countries tend to issue foreign currency bonds 
denomination mainly in EUR, JPY and USD, while developed countries issue also in CHF and 
GBP. Table 2b shows that the majority of observations is available for USD bonds (over 6500), 
followed by Euro and its predecessors (over 1800), whereas JPY and GBP bonds have around 
1400 observations each. Relatively few observations are available for the CHF. 
Graphs 3 and 4 present the historical distribution of observations of foreign bond yield by 
issuance currency. While most data points for developed countries are located between 1998 and 
2006 and distribution is equally spread over time, data for emerging economies begins in 2003 
and most observations can be found between 2009 and 2013. This is why it is important to be 
cautious about analysing FC yields during sub-periods. 
Following the same approach we also studied the time distribution of data by maturity 
segments. Graphs 5 and 6 indicate that the short, medium and long-term maturities are evenly 
distributed for developed countries, but not for the emerging economies. We find that the 
majority of FC yields for developed economies are located in the 1Y to 5Y segments, while 
observations for emerging markets yields are concentrated on long-term maturities between 7-
10Y and above 10Y. We need to account for this distribution pattern of maturity structure in the 
further analysis. 
Finally, Table 3a shows the data availability of the FCLC spread differs strongly from 
country to country. For instance Sweden has 92 foreign currency denominated bonds in our 
sample whereas South Africa has only 2. Note that Brazil, Ireland and South Africa do not have 
any observations in the final sample due to missing observations of the hedge. 
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V.2. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we describe the statistical findings on foreign and local currency bond 
yields. 
Data from JPM Indices reveals interesting patterns concerning duration of local and 
foreign currency bonds in emerging economies represented by GBI-EM and EMBI indices 
respectively. First, it is remarkable that the duration of foreign currency bonds increased 
from 4Y in 1998 to over 7Y in 2013 indicating that investors’ confidence towards emerging 
economies increased over time. Second, Graph 7 shows that between 2004 and 2014 
duration of foreign currency bonds was over 2 years longer than local currency bonds. 
Graphs 8 to 10 show that only in South Africa and Russia there was no duration difference in late 
2013, in Poland, Peru and Indonesia it was around 2Y, whereas in Brazil, Colombia and Turkey 
FC bonds have on average 4Y longer duration than LC bonds. 
 
Table 4 depicts the average spread between the USD-hedged foreign currency yield and 
the hedged local currency yield in advanced economies. Canada, Denmark and Sweden and 
Core Eurozone the foreign currency yield oscillates very closely around the FX-hedged 
local yield within 1% range. Conversely, in Greece and Spain FC yield is consistently higher 
than hedged LC yield during the period of euro introduction and the euro-crisis. It is 
remarkable that the strong spread deviations ranging between 5% and 14% appear mainly in long 
maturities above 5 years where the currency hedge is difficult to establish. As for the spread 
between foreign yield and unhedged local currency yield, Table 5 shows that the unhedged 
spread was relatively high during the period 1996-2001, diminished over time to 1%-2% by 2007 
and stabilized at this level everywhere except for Greece. Graphical analysis of the spreads of 
foreign vs. local hedged bond spreads for maturities of 1Y and 5Y confirm our findings. The 
spread between foreign and FX-hedged local currency yields were historically in the range of -
0.5% to 1.5% which is relatively low. It is however noteworthy that in Austria, Belgium and 
Finland the spread jumped to around 4% around 2000-2001 crisis, as shown in Graph 11. 
In contrast, in emerging economies the spread between FC yield and FX-hedged LC yield 
is positive and we can observe strong differences between countries. Results in Table 6 indicate 
that in Brazil, Chile, Israel, Malaysia, Poland and Philippines the spread 1Y to 5Y ranges 
between low 1% to 4%,  whereas in Hungary, Mexico, Russia and Turkey spreads broadly 
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exceeded 8%. In a nutshell, this shows that foreign investors require higher yields on FC 
bonds than local investors require on LC bonds hedged into USD. Hence we can argue that 
the default risk on FX-hedged local default risk is different from the FC default risk, which also 
means that the covered interest rate parity is not maintained and we refute hypothesis 4. 
Moreover, at longer maturities the spreads often exceed 15%. Graphical representation can be 
found in Graphs 13 to 16. In Hungary, Turkey, Russia and Philippines skyrocketed around the 
2008 crisis breaking the 8% level. Finally, it is noteworthy is that Israel and Thailand 
experienced short-lived jumps during the periods of political and military tensions.  
Investigation of the spread between FC yield and unhedged LC yield reveals different and 
highly interesting results for emerging economies. Table 7 shows that the spread between FC 
yields and unhedged LC yields in emerging economies moved from positive between 2002-2007 
period, when data coverage was relatively weak, to negative in 2007-2013. During the most 
recent period in most emerging economies the LC local bond yields were higher than FC 
yields by 1% to 3%, while in Russia, Indonesia and Turkey LC yields were higher than FC 
yields by 4% to 8%. This explains why it remains interesting for those countries to issue 
debt in foreign currencies. 
To sum up the results for the uncovered interest rate parity, the spread between LC and 
FC yields in advanced economies has been relatively low except for Greece and Spain, while in 
emerging economies the FC yield remains lower by 1% to 3% than the unhedged LC yield. 
Moreover, the duration of FC bonds issued by emerging economies has almost doubled between 
1998 and 2013 and remains considerably higher than duration of local currency bonds. These two 
effects explain why emerging economies continue to issue debt in foreign currencies despite the 
associated risks. 
As for the spread between FC yields and FX-hedged LC yields, it is marginally low in 
developed countries and investment grade emerging economies, but becomes high in riskier 
developed and emerging countries, e.g. Greece, Spain, Russia or Turkey, reaching at times 8% 
level. These results suggest that sovereign risk on FC debt might be perceived differently from 
LC debt causing the deviations from covered interest parity. In consequence we refuse hypothesis 
four.  
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V.3. Panel Regression Results 
Based on divergences in yields and spreads observed in the descriptive statistics we 
separate our sample into emerging and developed countries. We then regress the local currency 
yield, the hedged local currency yield, the USD-hedged foreign currency yield as well as the 
spread between the USD-hedged foreign exchange yield and the hedged local currency yield 
(FCLC spread) on political risk indicator, macroeconomic and fiscal indicators, ratings and bond-
specific variables. To ensure the robustness of our work and verify the validity of the proposed 
hypothesis we run the regressions for different subsamples. We begin at the entire sample, than 
we focus at the sample that has only observations common to local currency and foreign currency 
yields. Subsequently we split the sample into bonds that qualify as investment grade and non-
investment grade. In the third stage we differentiate between countries where the share of local 
currency debt to total debt is above or below the sample average of 83%. Next we distinguish 
between countries where the share of foreign investors is high and low, i.e. above or below the 
sample average of 40%. Finally, we investigate the specific case where over 40% of debt is held 
by foreign investors and the government debt is predominately denominated in local currency. 
Complete econometric results are presented in Tables 9 to 17. To simplify the 
interpretation we summarized the estimated coefficients by indicator and setting in Tables 18 to 
23. In terms of econometric results for control variables the maturity always has the expected 
positive and significant sign, i.e. the higher the maturity the higher the maturity premium and 
hence the yield. The squared maturity hast the expected negative sign. The variable issue size, 
used as proxy for liquidity of the bond issue, is only slightly significant for the unhedged local 
currency yield and it has the expected negative sign.  
iii. LC and FC Yields Reaction to Political Risk 
Table 18 demonstrates that political risk is generally significant across constellations and has the 
expected positive sign. Findings on the broad sample indicate that the unhedged local currency 
yield and foreign currency yield are relatively uncorrelated with political risk in emerging 
markets, but the relationship is positive and significant for developed economies.  
Interestingly, in emerging countries with high share of LC debt and high share of 
foreign participation, the coefficients for LC yield and FC yield are significant and stronger 
than for the broad sample. Specifically, in emerging economies the broad sample estimates for 
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LC yield are non-significant, the coefficient for investment grade equals 0.03, whereas 
coefficients for high share of LC debt, high foreign participation and combination of both equal 
respectively 0.12, 0.14 and 0.21 and on top of that are highly significant. For FC yield the broad 
sample coefficient is 0.02, high share of LC debt 0.08, high share of foreign participation 0.07, 
and combination of both 0.10. The result for developed economies are difficult to interpret due to 
non-linearities. These findings suggest not only higher foreign participation, but also more 
developed local currency bond markets render valuation of government bonds more prone 
to local political risk factors. This rejects the hypothesis 3a. 
Moreover, results for emerging economies are significant and have similar magnitudes for 
unhedged LC and FC yields in the following settings: high share of LC debt (0.12 vs. 0.08), high 
share of foreign participation (0.14 vs. 0.07), and both combined (0.21 vs. 0.10). Hence, the 
hypothesis 3b is confirmed, i.e. at high levels of foreign participation political risk has 
significant and similar effect on LC yields as on FC yields. 
Results for the common sample indicate that the spread between FC and hedged LC Yield 
tends is significantly and positively related to political risk, i.e. for 1% rise in political risk 
foreign yield increases by 11 to 53 bps more than the hedged local currency yield. Also, it is 
surprising that the FCLC spread has a stronger coefficient for developed economies than for 
emerging countries. This might be due to non-linearities around the Eurozone crisis, as results 
vary along with credit worthiness. While for investment grade bonds the results are non-
significant, for non-investment grade the coefficient is significant and very strong. 
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Table 18 Result Summary for Political Risk 
 
LC Yield   Hedged LC Yield   FC Yield   
Hedged FC LC 
Spread 
Sample EM DM   EM DM   EM DM   EM DM 
Full Sample n/s n/s 
 
0.13** n/s 
 
0.02* 0.38*** 
 
0.11*** 0.53*** 
Common Sample n/s 0.05** 
 
0.13** n/s 
 
n/s 0.59*** 
 
0.11*** 0.53*** 
Investment Grade 0.03* 0.03** 
 
0.23*** n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
0.20*** n/s 
Non-investment Grade -0.27*** -0.13*** 
 
n/s -0.23*** 
 
n/s 3.11*** 
 
n/s 3.13*** 
High Share of Local Currency Debt 0.12*** 0.05* 
 
0.20** n/s 
 
0.08*** 0.52*** 
 
n/s 0.44*** 
Low Share of Local Currency Debt n/s n/s 
 
0.34* n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
0.36** n/s 
High Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings 0.14*** n/s 
 
0.41*** n/s 
 
0.07* 0.45*** 
 
0.19** 0.47*** 
Low Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings 0.10*** 0.33*** 
 
0.40*** 0.29*** 
 
n/s 0.21*** 
 
0.22*** n/s 
High Share of Foreign Holdings and High 
Share of LC Debt 
0.21*** 0.32***   0.33*** 0.32***   0.10*** 0.23***   
n/s n/s 
Note: n/s stands for not significant 
iv. LC and FC Yields Reaction to Inflation 
Results in Table 19 indicate that under rising inflation LC and FC yields increase in emerging 
economies, but decrease in developed economies. For developed economies this effect is 
unexpected and might be due to the unconventional monetary policies or the behaviour of 
Eurozone yields during the crisis. 
In case of LC yields in emerging economies, the coefficient for inflation is lower when 
the country has the investment grade status, but the coefficient increases when the 
country’s debt is mainly in local currency and when the foreign participation is high. These 
results are in line with the findings on political risk. 
The impact of inflation on the FX-hedged LC yields is positive considerably stronger than 
on unhedged yields or FC yields. Nevertheless, the FC LC spread is positively correlated to 
inflation for emerging economies and negatively for developed ones. 
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Table 19 Result Summary for Inflation 
 
LC Yield   Hedged LC Yield   FC Yield   
Hedged FC LC 
Spread 
Sample EM DM   EM DM   EM DM   EM DM 
Full Sample 0.41*** n/s 
 
1.36*** -0.45*** 
 
n/s -0.74*** 
 
0.49*** -1.27*** 
Common Sample 0.45*** 
-
0.16*** 
 
1.36*** -0.47*** 
 
0.05** -1.11*** 
 
0.49*** -1.27*** 
Investment Grade 0.15*** 
-
0.21*** 
 
0.62*** -0.41*** 
 
n/s -0.22*** 
 
0.37** -0.22* 
Non-investment Grade n/s n/s 
 
0.37* n/s 
 
0.15*** n/s 
 
0.54** n/s 
High Share of Local Currency Debt 0.59*** n/s 
 
1.43*** n/s 
 
0.07** -2.46*** 
 
0.35*** -2.46*** 
Low Share of Local Currency Debt 0.34*** n/s 
 
1.57*** n/s 
 
0.07** n/s 
 
0.87*** n/s 
High Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings n/s -0.13** 
 
-0.40** -0.60*** 
 
0.03 -0.70*** 
 
-0.29* -1.07*** 
Low Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings 0.57*** 0.80** 
 
1.75*** 1.27** 
 
0.11*** n/s 
 
0.70*** n/s 
High Share of Foreign Holdings and High Share of 
LC Debt 
0.95*** 0.83***   2.42*** 1.24***   0.09*** n/s   0.66*** n/s 
Note: n/s stands for not significant 
 
v. LC and FC Yields Reaction to Sovereign Rating 
The findings in Table 20 confirm that higher credit rating is significantly associated with lower 
yields and lower FC LC Spreads, which suggests that higher rating reduces the difference in 
foreign currency and FX-hedged local currency default risk. We also observe that in 
emerging economies the relative importance of rating increases when the share of LC debt 
and foreign participation rise. 
Again, the effect of ratings is stronger for hedged LC yield than for unhedged LC yield. It is also 
remarkable that foreign currency yields are significantly related to ratings only in developed 
economies. 
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Table 20 Result Summary for S&P Rating 
 
LC Yield   Hedged LC Yield   FC Yield   
Hedged FC LC 
Spread 
Sample EM DM   EM DM   EM DM   EM DM 
Full Sample 
-
0.19*** 
-
0.37*** 
 
-0.84*** -0.45*** 
 
n/s -0.71*** 
 
-0.22*** -0.38*** 
Common Sample 
-
0.31*** 
-
0.28*** 
 
-0.84*** -0.30*** 
 
n/s -0.64*** 
 
-0.22*** -0.38*** 
Investment Grade n/s 
-
0.16*** 
 
n/s -0.19*** 
 
n/s -0.18*** 
 
n/s n/s 
Non-investment Grade 0.52*** 
-
0.67*** 
 
n/s -0.84*** 
 
0.19*** n/s 
 
n/s 0.59*** 
High Share of Local Currency Debt 
-
0.51*** 
-
0.28*** 
 
-1.14*** -0.29*** 
 
-
0.07*** 
-
0.62*** 
 
-0.20** -0.37*** 
Low Share of Local Currency Debt 
-
0.39*** n/s 
 
-1.41*** 
n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
-0.55** n/s 
High Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings n/s 
-
0.29*** 
 
n/s -0.32*** 
 
n/s -0.74*** 
 
n/s -0.48*** 
Low Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings 
-
0.35*** -0.06* 
 
-0.99*** n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
-0.27*** n/s 
High Share of Foreign Holdings and High Share of 
LC Debt 
-
0.77*** -0.06*   -1.60*** n/s   
-
0.09*** n/s   -0.21* n/s 
Note: n/s stands for not significant 
vi. LC and FC Yields Reaction to Debt to GDP 
The relationship between yields and debt to GDP is characterized by a certain dichotomy 
between emerging and developed economies. In emerging economies higher debt to GDP is 
related to higher LC yields and FC LC Spreads, while in developed economies FC yields 
and spreads tend to be lower. In emerging economies the coefficient for debt to GDP again 
becomes stronger under high share of foreign holdings and high share of LC debt.  
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Table 21: Result Summary for Debt to GDP 
 
LC Yield   Hedged LC Yield   FC Yield   
Hedged FC LC 
Spread 
Sample EM DM   EM DM   EM DM   EM DM 
Full Sample 0.06*** n/s 
 
0.40*** 
n/s 
 
n/s 
-
0.16*** 
 
0.14** -0.34*** 
Common Sample 0.12*** n/s 
 
0.39*** 
n/s 
 
n/s 
-
0.29*** 
 
0.14** -0.34*** 
Investment Grade n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
Non-investment Grade 0.40*** 0.07*** 
 
n/s 0.11** 
 
n/s 0.33** 
 
n/s 0.29* 
High Share of Local Currency Debt 0.23*** n/s 
 
0.43*** 
n/s 
 
n/s 
-
0.42*** 
 
n/s -0.43*** 
Low Share of Local Currency Debt 0.16** n/s 
 
0.66** n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
High Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings 0.10*** 0.08*** 
 
0.46*** n/s 
 
n/s -0.17* 
 
0.24** -0.35*** 
Low Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings 0.25*** 
-
0.22*** 
 
0.72*** -0.19*** 
 
n/s 
-
0.13*** 
 
0.24*** 
n/s 
High Share of Foreign Holdings and High Share of 
LC Debt 
0.42*** -0.21***   0.86*** -0.20***   n/s 
-
0.13***   n/s 
0.09** 
Note: n/s stands for not significant 
vii. LC and FC Yields Reaction to FX Reserves to External 
Debt 
Table 22 indicates that the external coverage ratio has limited impact on LC yields and no 
significant impact on FC yields. Only in investment grade countries the LC yields shrink under 
better external coverage and the coefficient is relatively low. 
 
Table 22: Result Summary for FX Reserves to External Debt 
 
LC Yield   Hedged LC Yield   FC Yield   
Hedged FC LC 
Spread 
Sample EM DM   EM DM   EM DM   EM DM 
Full Sample 0.02*** n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
Common Sample n/s n/s 
 
n/s -0.23** 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
Investment Grade -0.01** -0.09** 
 
-0.08*** -0.29*** 
 
n/s n/s 
 
-0.05*** n/s 
Non-investment Grade n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
High Share of Local Currency Debt 0.02** n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
Low Share of Local Currency Debt 
-
0.11*** n/s 
 
-0.36*** n/s 
 
-
0.03*** n/s 
 
-0.16* n/s 
High Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings n/s n/s 
 
n/s -0.49*** 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
Low Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings 0.02*** 0.04* 
 
0.06** 0.07** 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
High Share of Foreign Holdings and High Share of 
LC Debt 
n/s 5.70***   -0.09*** 7.99***   n/s 3.29*   -0.08*** n/s 
Note: n/s stands for not significant 
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viii. LC and FC Yields Reaction to Current Account Balance 
Results in Table 23 indicate that external sustainability matters. Countries with higher current 
account balance have significantly lower LC yields and this effect becomes more important 
when government debt is mainly in local currency and foreign participation is high. 
Moreover, in developed countries CA balance is associated with lower FC yields and FC LC 
Spreads. 
 
Table 23: Result Summary for Current Account Balance to  GDP 
 
LC Yield   Hedged LC Yield   FC Yield   
Hedged FC 
LC Spread 
Sample EM DM   EM DM   EM DM   EM DM 
Full Sample -0.13*** -0.31*** 
 
n/s -0.53*** 
 
n/s -0.44*** 
 
n/s -0.31** 
Common Sample -0.13*** -0.30*** 
 
-0.25* -0.40*** 
 
0.05** -0.51*** 
 
n/s -0.31** 
Investment Grade -0.16*** -0.08*** 
 
-0.31* -0.22*** 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
Non-investment Grade -0.20*** -0.95*** 
 
-0.44** -1.01*** 
 
n/s -3.01*** 
 
n/s -2.15** 
High Share of Local Currency Debt -0.31*** -0.18*** 
 
-0.58*** -0.23*** 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
Low Share of Local Currency Debt -0.19*** n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
 
n/s n/s 
High Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings n/s -0.32*** 
 
n/s -0.51*** 
 
n/s -0.47*** 
 
n/s -0.40** 
Low Share of Foreign Investors' Holdings -0.16*** -1.47*** 
 
-0.44** -1.03*** 
 
0.04* -0.66** 
 
n/s 1.31* 
High Share of Foreign Holdings and High Share of LC Debt 
-0.75*** -1.42***   -1.63*** -1.15***   n/s -0.73**   n/s 0.94** 
Note: n/s stands for not significant 
 
ix. Summary of empirical results 
Between 1993 and 2013 the amount of government debt issued in foreign currency 
increased from approx. $350bn to over $1800bn. While foreign currency debt represented less 
than 5% of debt of developed economies over this period, emerging economies successfully 
reduced their reliance on foreign lending from 60% to 30%. Having said that, the issuance of FC 
debt by emerging economies has picked up in the recent years and foreign indebtedness is likely 
to remain an important risk factor for those countries in the years to come.  
Statistical findings help explain why emerging economies continue to issue in foreign 
currencies. In fact, the spread between LC and FC yields in advanced economies has been 
relatively low except for Greece and Spain, whereas in emerging economies the FC yield remains 
lower by 1% to 3% than the unhedged LC yield. Moreover, the duration of FC bonds issued by 
emerging economies has almost doubled between 1998 and 2013 and remains considerably 
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higher than duration of local currency bonds. These two effects explain why emerging economies 
continue to issue debt in foreign currencies despite the associated risks. 
Subsequently we synthetize the econometric results through the prism of the hypotheses 
set earlier. 
 
Hypothesis 1: unhedged local currency yields and foreign currency yields should respond 
differently to unfavorable changes in inflation, debt fundamentals and political risk 
In emerging economies political risk has significant and similar impact on LC and FC 
yields, yet inflation has a stronger effect on LC yields than on FC yields. Surprisingly, LC yields 
in those countries react strongly to changes in current account balance and debt to GDP, while 
foreign yields remain immune to those indicators. In contrast, in developed economies FC yields 
react more strongly to changes in political risk, inflation, credit rating and current account than 
LC yields. Hence, in general we accept the hypothesis one. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Shocks in risk factors have a higher impact on the FCLC spread of non-
investment grade bonds than on investment grade bonds.  
Econometric results show that yields of non-investment grade bonds exhibit stronger reaction to 
political risk in developed economies than investment grade bonds. In emerging economies we 
observe that non-investment grade bond yields have slightly stronger coefficients than high rated 
bonds. Hence, credit worthiness determines in certain cases determines the reactivity of yields to 
risk indicators, which qualifies the hypothesis two as partly confirmed. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: countries with more developed local currency bond markets, i.e. where the 
share of local currency debt to total debt is high, are more immune to risk factors. As a result, 
local currency bonds should react less to political and inflation shocks than foreign currency 
bonds. Inversely, foreign investors may fear to be discriminated if the share of foreign 
currency debt is too high. 
Hypothesis 3b: at high levels of foreign participation in local currency bonds, determinants of 
local currency yields should resemble those of foreign currency yields  
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We do not find unambiguous confirmation for the hypothesis 3a and 3b, i.e. neither the share of 
LC debt nor the foreign participation alone seem to influence yield reactivity to risk factors. 
However, in emerging countries with high share of LC debt and high share of foreign 
participation the estimated coefficients for political risk, inflation, credit rating and current 
account are significant and considerably stronger than for the full sample. Interestingly, under 
high foreign participation and high share of LC debt, the coefficients are stronger for LC yield 
than for FC yield. These findings suggest that not only higher foreign participation, but also more 
developed local currency bond markets render valuation of government bonds more prone to 
local risk factors.  
 
Hypothesis 4: assuming that FX-hedged LC default risk equals the FC default risk, hedged LC 
yields should fit the covered interest rate parity, i.e. the spread between FX-hedged LC yield 
and foreign currency yield should be marginally small or equal to transaction costs. 
The spread between FC yields and FX-hedged LC yields is marginally low in developed 
countries and investment grade emerging economies, yet it becomes high in riskier developed 
and emerging countries, e.g. Greece, Spain, Russia or Turkey, reaching at times 8% level. These 
results suggest that sovereign risk on FC debt might be perceived differently from sovereign risk 
of LC debt causing the deviations from covered interest parity. In consequence we refuse 
hypothesis four.  
Econometric results for the common sample indicate that the spread between FC and 
hedged LC Yield tends is significantly and positively related to political risk, i.e. for each 1% rise 
in political risk foreign yield increases by 11 to 53 bps more than the hedged local currency yield. 
Interestingly, both rising inflation and debt to GDP significantly increase the FC LC spread for 
emerging economies, but decrease the spread for advanced economies.  
 
VI. Conclusions and Implications for Policymakers and Investors 
Over the last two decades numerous countries successfully developed local currency bond 
markets, yet foreign currency issuance remains an important source of funding for many 
emerging economies. To date, empirical literature on currency denomination of government debt 
was divided into two flows, one on development of LC bond markets and original sin, and second 
on foreign or local currency bond yields. This article combines these two schools by analysing 
ARTICLE 3 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 227 
how fundamental and political indicators related to sovereign risk determine the LC and FC 
yields and the FX-hedged difference between them. The novelty of our approach consists in 
comparing local currency bonds with foreign currency bonds using a broad dataset of individual 
bonds that covering both developed and emerging countries. On top of that, we use data for the 
currency structure of government debt and foreign participation.  
To provide a complete picture we investigate separately the unhedged LC yields, FC yields 
and the spread between FX-hedged LC yields and FC yields. Empirical findings lead us to 
conclusion that in general LC yields react more to local risk factors than FC yields and the 
reactivity increases when the share of LC debt to total debt or foreign participation in LC debt 
increase. Three major patterns emerge with regard to this conclusion. 
First, basic statistical patterns help explain why government continue to issue in foreign 
currencies. In fact, the spread between LC and FC yields in high rating advanced economies has 
been relatively low, while in emerging economies the FC yield remains lower by 1% to 3% than 
the unhedged LC yield. Moreover, the duration of FC bonds issued by emerging economies has 
almost doubled between 1998 and 2013 and remains considerably higher than duration of local 
currency bonds. We compare the econometric determinants of the LC and FC yields and 
demonstrate that in emerging economies political risk has significant and similar impact on 
LC and FC yields, whereas inflation, current account balance and debt to GDP are 
significant and have stronger effects on unhedged LC yields than on FC yields.  
Second, empirical results suggest that sovereign risk on FC debt might be perceived 
differently from sovereign risk of LC debt causing the deviations from covered interest parity. 
The spread between FC yields and FX-hedged LC yields is marginally low in developed 
countries and investment grade-rated emerging economies, yet it becomes high in riskier 
developed and emerging countries such as Greece, Spain, Russia or Turkey. Econometric results 
for all countries indicate that the spread between FC yield and FX-hedged LC Yield is 
significantly and positively related to credit ratings and political risk. Interestingly, both 
rising inflation and debt to GDP significantly increase the FC hedged-LC spread for 
emerging economies, but decrease the spread for advanced economies.  
Third, in emerging countries with high share of LC debt and high share of foreign 
participation the estimated coefficients for political risk, inflation, credit rating and current 
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account are significant and considerably stronger than for the full sample. Interestingly, under 
high foreign participation and high share of LC debt, the coefficients are also stronger for LC 
yield than for FC yield. These findings suggest that not only higher foreign participation, but 
also more developed local currency bond markets render valuation of government bonds 
more prone to local risk factors. 
The empirical results are relevant for policymakers, investors and governments issuing 
foreign currency debt. Policy makers need to take into account that countries with low foreign 
debt, but high foreign participation in LC debt are more vulnerable to political and 
macroeconomic risk factors. In turn, investors dealing with both FC and LC emerging market 
debt need to consider that FC yield exhibit stronger reaction to political and inflation risks than 
the FX-hedged LC yield. Finally, ministries of finance and treasury agencies should need to 
adjust their risk management and issuance policies to the currency denomination, foreign 
participation and country’s credit risk . 
In terms of further development, we see potential of extension on the empirical model to 
theoretical grounds, for instance investigating the impact of risk factors on yields and country’s 
fundamentals for evolving share of LC debt and changing investor structure.  
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Table 1: Data Sources  
Indicator Unit Source 
CB Policy Rate Percentage National Sources, Bloomberg 
CPI Percentage YoY Change National Sources, Bloomberg 
Current Account 
Balance Percentage of GDP IMF IFS 
Debt Servicing Cost Interest to Total Debt. Percentage IMF IFS 
EMBI Weight Percentage Share in the Index JPM Indices 
Exchange Rate 
Stability Score 0 to 1 Chinn-Ito (2007) 
External Debt Percentage of GDP IMF IFS 
Financial Openness Score 0 to 1 Chinn-Ito (2007) 
Fiscal Balance Percentage of GDP IMF IFS 
Fitch Rating FC  Score 0 to 1 Fitch 
Fitch Rating LC  Score 0 to 1 Fitch 
FX - LC Bond Yield Percentage Bloomberg 
FX Bond Yield Percentage Bloomberg 
FX Hedge Change in Currrency Futures in Percentage Bloomberg 
FX Regime Score 1 to 4 Reinhart and Rogoff (2007) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt Percentage IMF IFS 
GBI Weight Percentage Share in the Index JPM Indices 
GDP Growth Percentage YoY Change IMF IFS 
GDP Size bn USD IMF IFS 
Government Debt  Percentage of GDP IMF IFS 
Issue Size Log Local Currency Bloomberg 
LC Bond Yield Percentage Bloomberg 
Maturity Years Bloomberg 
Monetary 
Independence Score 0 to 1 Chinn-Ito (2007) 
Moody's Rating FC  Percentage Moody's 
Moody's Rating LC  Percentage Moody's 
Political Risk Score 0 to 1 Economist Intelligence Unit 
S&P Rating FC  Percentage S&P 
S&P Rating LC  Percentage S&P 
Trade Openness  Percentage of GDP IMF IFS 
VIX Volatility in Percentage Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Market  
Holdings of 
Government Debt  
Share of Total Local Currency Holdings by 
investor type 
IMF Arsanalp and Tsuda (2012, 
2013) 
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Table 2a Data Availability: Number of bond issues per currency             
  CHF DEM EUR FRF GBP ITL JPY USD TOTAL 
Developed Economies 39 45 41 19 47 6 62 192 451 
Emerging Economies 9 4 67 
 
5 3 50 187 325 
Total 48 49 108 19 52 9 112 379 776 
          Table 2b: Data Availability Number of foreign currency yield observations per currency 
  CHF DEM EUR FRF GBP ITL JPY USD TOTAL 
Developed Economies 534 665 741 317 1284 90 916 3191 7738 
Emerging Economies 60 55 1073 
 
97 36 543 3355 5219 
Total 594 720 1814 317 1381 126 1459 6546 12957 
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Table 3: Data Availability by Country 
Country 
Number of 
Foreign Currency 
Bond Issues 
Number of observations: 
Spread between Foreign and 
Local Currency Yields 
Number of observations: Spread 
between Foreign (USD-hedged) Yield 
and Local Currency Yield hedged into 
FX 
Austria 59 986 157 
Belgium 31 425 197 
Brazil 33 416 0 
Canada 22 468 400 
Chile 8 96 38 
Colombia 24 392 60 
Denmark 60 780 626 
Finland 33 453 83 
Greece 20 205 138 
Croatia 13 139 13 
Hungary 28 474 384 
Indonesia 18 338 286 
Ireland 20 133 0 
Israel 13 234 170 
Italy 49 1023 288 
Malaysia 6 124 56 
Mexico 53 810 806 
Poland 58 751 683 
Philippines 30 746 721 
Portugal 8 160 2 
Russia 9 90 88 
South Africa 2 4 0 
Spain 29 575 145 
Sweden 92 1192 958 
Thailand 14 164 83 
Turkey 44 826 793 
Total 776 12004 7175 
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Table 4: Average Spread between FX-Yield hedged into USD and LC-Yield hedged into USD, by Maturity and Time Period     
  
Canada Denmark Sweden   Austria Belgium Finland   Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Period 1: 1996-2001                           
<1Y 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
0.03 0.03 0.02 
     
0.02 
1-3Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.06 0.03 -0.01 
    
-0.01 0.00 
3-5Y 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
  
0.02 
      
0.03 
5-7Y -0.01 -0.04 0.00 
  
0.01 
      
0.16 
7-10Y 0.06 -0.01 0.02 
  
0.01 
    
0.11 
 
0.07 
>10Y     -0.04   -0.02     -0.01  -0.08 
Period 2: 2002-2007                           
<1Y 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
0.06 
    1-3Y 0.01 0.00 0.00 
     
0.02 
    3-5Y 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
     
0.03 
    5-7Y 0.07 0.01 -0.01 
          7-10Y 0.11 
 
-0.02 
          >10Y    0.00           
Period 3: 2007-2013                           
<1Y 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.08 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
1-3Y 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 
0.09 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
3-5Y 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.14 
 
0.00 
 
0.02 
5-7Y 0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 0.04 -0.01 
 
0.10 
 
0.03 
 
0.09 
7-10Y 0.02 
    
0.00 
  
0.10 
 
0.03 
 
0.10 
>10Y    0.05  0.01 0.02      -0.01  -0.01 
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Table 5: Average spread between FX-Yield hedged into USD and unhedged LC-Yield, by Maturity and Time Period 
  
Canada Denmark Sweden   Austria Finland Belgium   Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Period 1: 1996-2001                         
<1Y 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 
0.03 0.03 0.03 
  
0.03 
  
0.03 
1-3Y 0.00 0.01 0.02 
 
0.03 0.04 0.04 
 
0.01 0.03 
 
0.05 0.04 
3-5Y 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 
0.04 0.04 0.04 
  
0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06 
5-7Y 0.00 0.02 0.02 
 
0.08 0.06 0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.14 0.01 0.18 
7-10Y 0.07 0.05 0.05 
 
0.10 0.02 0.01 
 
0.01 0.03 0.15 0.28 0.09 
>10Y 0.09   -0.02  0.09 0.00 0.00    -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 
Period 2: 2002-2007 
            <1Y 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 
1-3Y 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
3-5Y 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.01 
5-7Y 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
 
0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
 
0.08 0.01 0.04 
 
0.00 
7-10Y 0.11 
 
-0.04 
 
0.01 -0.03 
    
0.04 -0.01 0.00 
>10Y    -0.03  0.05   -0.02    0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Period 3: 2007-2013                         
<1Y 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
0.08 0.01 0.01 
 
0.01 
1-3Y -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
3-5Y -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.15 
 
0.00 -0.01 0.02 
5-7Y 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.04 
 
0.12 
 
0.03 0.00 0.09 
7-10Y 0.01 
   
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.12 
 
0.04 -0.03 0.12 
>10Y 
  
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
   
0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
  
ARTICLE 3 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 241 
Table 6: Average Spread between FX-Yield hedged into USD and LC-Yield hedged into USD, by Maturity and Time Period 
  Brazil Chile Colombia Croatia Hungary Indonesia Israel Malaysia Mexico Poland Philippines Russia South Africa Thailand Turkey 
Period 1: 1996-2001 
<1Y 
         
0.01 
   
0.06 
 1-3Y 
          
0.12 
  
0.08 
 3-5Y 
          
0.13 
  
0.11 
 5-7Y 
          
0.41 
  
0.12 
 7-10Y 
          
0.31 
  
0.19 
 >10Y                     0.31         
Period 2: 2002-2007 
<1Y 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
0.02 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 
 
0.02 0.01 
1-3Y 
  
0.01 
 
0.06 
 
0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 
 
0.04 0.08 
3-5Y 
    
0.08 
 
0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.02 
 
0.04 0.15 
5-7Y 
    
0.18 0.12 0.02 
 
0.20 0.08 0.26 
  
0.08 0.36 
7-10Y 
    
0.18 0.12 0.04 
 
0.23 0.12 0.19 
   
0.37 
>10Y           0.11 0.03   0.15   0.20 0.07     0.36 
Period 3: 2007-2013 
<1Y 
 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 
0.05 0.01 
1-3Y 
 
0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.12 
 
0.04 0.08 
3-5Y 
 
0.01 
  
0.10 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.09 
 
0.05 0.12 
5-7Y 
    
0.20 0.23 0.04 
 
0.16 0.12 0.10 0.21 
  
0.27 
7-10Y 
 
0.15 
  
0.22 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.22 
  
0.28 
>10Y   0.17     0.18 0.21 0.04   0.16 0.17 0.07 0.22     0.29 
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Table 7: Average spread between FX-Yield hedged into USD and unhedged LC-Yield, by Maturity and Time Period 
  
Brazil Chile Colombia Croatia Hungary Indonesia Israel Malaysia Mexico Poland Philippines Russia South Africa Thailand Turkey 
Period 1: 1996-2001 
<1Y 
         
-0.06 
   
0.04 
 1-3Y 
    
-0.04 
    
-0.06 -0.05 
  
0.03 
 3-5Y 
    
-0.01 
  
0.03 
 
-0.05 -0.04 
  
0.04 
 5-7Y 
    
-0.02 
    
-0.05 -0.07 
  
0.01 
 7-10Y 
    
0.04 
  
0.03 
 
-0.01 -0.07 
  
0.04 
 >10Y                     -0.09         
Period 2: 2002-2007 
<1Y 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 
 
0.01 -0.05 
1-3Y -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.00 
 
0.03 -0.11 
3-5Y -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 
 
0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
 
0.03 -0.09 
5-7Y -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 
  
0.11 -0.08 
7-10Y 
 
-0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 
  
0.00 -0.08 
>10Y     -0.03     -0.07 0.00   -0.06   -0.04 -0.01     -0.08 
Period 3: 2007-2013 
<1Y -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.04 -0.04 
1-3Y -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
 
0.02 -0.09 
3-5Y -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
 
0.03 -0.07 
5-7Y -0.08 
 
-0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.00 
 
-0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 
 
0.14 -0.06 
7-10Y -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 
 
-0.05 
>10Y -0.07 -0.01 -0.02   0.00 -0.05 0.00   -0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.03     -0.05 
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Table 9: Determinants of Government Bond Yields: Maturities 1Y to 5Y  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk -0.00 0.03 0.13** -0.03 0.02* 0.38*** 0.11*** 0.53*** 
 (-0.04) (1.55) (2.01) (-0.96) (1.67) (5.20) (2.74) (4.71) 
S&P Rating LC -0.19*** -
0.37*** 
-0.84*** -0.45*** -0.01 -0.71*** -0.22*** -0.38*** 
 (-9.54) (-9.16) (-8.51) (-8.63) (-0.64) (-6.64) (-3.12) (-4.29) 
Maturity_squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-0.20) (-0.81) (-4.18) (-2.11) (-3.74) (-2.53) (-6.97) (-3.06) 
Maturity 0.00 0.00** 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
 (1.37) (2.08) (6.73) (3.42) (7.41) (3.65) (10.56) (3.87) 
Issue Size -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-2.57) (0.48) (-0.79) (1.08) (-0.11) (0.30) (0.36) (0.86) 
Debt to GDP 0.06*** -0.00 0.40*** -0.01 0.01 -0.16*** 0.14** -0.34*** 
 (3.61) (-0.16) (5.30) (-0.25) (0.83) (-3.52) (2.43) (-3.80) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
0.02*** -0.00 0.02 -0.14 -0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 
 (2.58) (-0.06) (0.71) (-1.32) (-0.03) (0.72) (-1.43) (-0.39) 
Debt Servicing 
Cost 
0.01 -0.01 0.38*** -0.15*** 0.04** -0.01 0.20** -0.17 
 (0.59) (-0.58) (3.35) (-3.14) (2.41) (-0.33) (2.50) (-1.07) 
External Debt 0.02*** 0.00* 0.04*** 0.01*** -0.01** 0.00*** 0.01 0.00 
 (6.20) (1.94) (2.91) (4.58) (-2.55) (2.82) (0.69) (0.04) 
CPI 0.41*** -0.08 1.36*** -0.45*** 0.00 -0.74*** 0.49*** -1.27*** 
 (11.20) (-1.04) (8.76) (-3.63) (0.21) (-4.67) (4.42) (-5.03) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.13*** -
0.31*** 
-0.23 -0.53*** 0.02 -0.44*** 0.06 -0.31** 
 (-4.07) (-7.35) (-1.63) (-7.61) (0.86) (-5.36) (0.53) (-2.29) 
GDP Size 0.04*** 0.04** 0.06** 0.06* -0.02*** 0.09*** 0.01 0.04 
 (7.15) (2.26) (2.06) (1.78) (-3.92) (3.59) (0.63) (0.89) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.87 0.82 0.84 0.90 0.84 0.66 0.64 0.60 
Nb of 
Observations 
1351 1530 980 811 1310 1346 940 739 
Nb of Bonds 147 162 120 107 140 145 113 97 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Full Sample with Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 10: Determinants of Government Bond Yields: Common sample and Maturities 1Y to 5Y 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk 0.03 0.05** 0.13** 0.03 0.03 0.59*** 0.11*** 0.53*** 
 (1.34) (2.40) (2.00) (1.21) (1.55) (5.24) (2.74) (4.71) 
S&P Rating LC -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.84*** -0.30*** -0.00 -0.64*** -0.22*** -0.38*** 
 (-10.92) (-11.51) (-8.52) (-8.69) (-0.17) (-7.56) (-3.12) (-4.29) 
Maturity_squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-0.32) (-0.25) (-4.03) (-1.60) (-4.06) (-2.66) (-6.97) (-3.06) 
Maturity 0.00 0.00 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
 (1.19) (1.56) (6.52) (3.04) (6.95) (3.37) (10.56) (3.87) 
Issue Size -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-1.65) (-0.09) (-0.86) (0.58) (0.30) (0.62) (0.36) (0.86) 
Debt to GDP 0.12*** 0.02 0.39*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.29*** 0.14** -0.34*** 
 (5.31) (0.82) (5.04) (-0.28) (-0.30) (-3.65) (2.43) (-3.80) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.23** -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 
 (1.64) (-0.66) (0.59) (-2.16) (-1.43) (0.22) (-1.43) (-0.39) 
Debt Servicing Cost 0.11*** 0.02 0.37*** -0.11** 0.04** -0.02 0.20** -0.17 
 (3.14) (0.66) (3.16) (-2.39) (2.31) (-0.10) (2.50) (-1.07) 
External Debt 0.01** 0.00 0.03** 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (2.34) (1.07) (2.54) (4.20) (-3.01) (-1.51) (0.69) (0.04) 
CPI 0.45*** -0.16*** 1.36*** -0.47*** 0.05** -1.11*** 0.49*** -1.27*** 
 (10.52) (-2.84) (8.65) (-4.09) (2.28) (-4.70) (4.42) (-5.03) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.13*** -0.30*** -0.25* -0.40*** 0.05** -0.51*** 0.06 -0.31** 
 (-3.54) (-8.40) (-1.74) (-6.87) (2.23) (-3.93) (0.53) (-2.29) 
GDP Size 0.01 -0.02* 0.06** 0.01 -0.03*** -0.03 0.01 0.04 
 (0.91) (-1.90) (2.01) (0.47) (-4.47) (-0.69) (0.63) (0.89) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.89 0.92 0.84 0.91 0.85 0.73 0.64 0.60 
Nb of Observations 940 739 940 739 940 739 940 739 
Nb of Bonds 113 97 113 97 113 97 113 97 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Common Sample, Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 11: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Local and Foreign Currencies: Bonds with 
Non-Investment Rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk -0.27*** -0.13*** -0.40 -0.23*** 0.06 3.11*** 0.23 3.13*** 
 (-4.07) (-9.41) (-1.54) (-3.12) (1.25) (5.33) (0.84) (4.84) 
S&P Rating LC 0.52*** -0.67*** 0.43 -0.84*** 0.19*** 0.09 -0.45 0.59*** 
 (7.52) (-115.79) (1.42) (-15.96) (3.33) (0.56) (-1.43) (3.02) 
Maturity_squared -0.00*** 0.00* -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00* -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.04*** 
 (-4.98) (1.89) (-8.74) (-7.24) (-1.88) (-3.22) (-6.66) (-4.44) 
Maturity 0.01*** -0.00 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.01*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.23*** 
 (5.08) (-0.51) (11.90) (9.71) (4.21) (3.37) (10.02) (5.08) 
Issue Size -0.00 0.02*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 -0.12 0.01 -0.14 
 (-1.10) (3.53) (0.79) (2.88) (0.76) (-0.58) (1.33) (-0.76) 
Debt to GDP 0.40*** 0.07*** 0.55 0.11** 0.10 0.33** -0.17 0.29* 
 (5.11) (13.56) (1.57) (1.98) (1.60) (2.44) (-0.48) (1.75) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 0.00 
 (0.68) (.) (-0.76) (.) (-0.29) (.) (-1.05) (.) 
Debt Servicing Cost -0.20*** 0.00 -0.75*** 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.34 0.00 
 (-2.99) (.) (-3.01) (.) (-0.20) (.) (-1.22) (.) 
External Debt 0.02 -0.02*** -0.03 -0.01** 0.00 -0.20*** -0.06** -0.16** 
 (1.46) (-14.56) (-1.02) (-2.19) (0.14) (-3.07) (-2.00) (-2.43) 
CPI 0.01 0.00 0.37* 0.00 0.15*** 0.00 0.54** 0.00 
 (0.12) (.) (1.76) (.) (4.09) (.) (2.50) (.) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.20*** -0.95*** -0.44** -1.01*** -0.00 -3.01*** -0.01 -2.15** 
 (-4.37) (-40.74) (-2.33) (-5.37) (-0.03) (-3.73) (-0.03) (-2.36) 
GDP Size -0.07** 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.12 
 (-2.28) (1.23) (-0.82) (-0.36) (1.07) (0.40) (0.76) (0.40) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.84 0.80 0.73 
Nb of Observations 328 128 328 128 328 128 328 128 
Nb of Bonds 36 24 36 24 36 24 36 24 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note:Common sample and Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 12: Determinants of Government Bond Yields: Bonds with Investment Rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk 0.03* 0.03** 0.23*** 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.20*** -0.01 
 (1.93) (2.56) (3.94) (1.41) (1.00) (1.48) (4.39) (-0.28) 
S&P Rating LC -0.02 -0.16*** -0.09 -0.19*** 0.02 -0.18*** -0.03 -0.03 
 (-0.74) (-9.20) (-0.63) (-6.06) (0.83) (-8.24) (-0.24) (-0.90) 
Maturity_squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
 (-0.77) (-0.06) (-3.40) (1.83) (-4.13) (-1.22) (-5.47) (0.88) 
Maturity 0.00** 0.00* 0.03*** -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.00 
 (2.19) (1.71) (5.04) (-0.96) (6.19) (3.42) (7.49) (0.01) 
Issue Size 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00** 
 (1.09) (-1.01) (0.15) (0.61) (0.08) (1.31) (-0.32) (2.53) 
Debt to GDP -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.01 
 (-0.27) (0.16) (0.88) (-0.55) (0.28) (0.16) (1.37) (-0.29) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
-0.01** -0.09** -0.08*** -0.29*** -0.00 0.00 -0.05*** -0.11 
 (-2.37) (-2.45) (-3.07) (-3.34) (-0.20) (0.05) (-2.80) (-1.37) 
Debt Servicing Cost 0.06* 0.01 0.40** 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.30** 0.01 
 (1.66) (0.51) (2.41) (1.22) (0.30) (-0.78) (2.35) (0.36) 
External Debt 0.01*** 0.00* 0.02 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00** -0.01 0.00 
 (3.44) (1.82) (1.48) (0.56) (-2.87) (2.29) (-0.96) (0.16) 
CPI 0.15*** -0.21*** 0.62*** -0.41*** 0.04 -0.22*** 0.37** -0.22* 
 (3.22) (-4.97) (2.68) (-3.33) (0.97) (-3.32) (2.00) (-1.71) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.16*** -0.08*** -0.31* -0.22*** 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 
 (-4.72) (-3.77) (-1.69) (-4.62) (0.04) (-0.26) (0.14) (-1.07) 
GDP Size 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.00 0.02 
 (1.38) (-0.63) (1.44) (0.20) (-4.76) (0.37) (-0.08) (0.79) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.87 0.92 0.71 0.93 0.85 0.89 0.55 0.78 
Nb of Observations 605.00 610.00 605.00 610.00 605.00 610.00 605.00 610.00 
Nb of Bonds 73.00 81.00 73.00 81.00 73.00 81.00 73.00 81.00 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note:Common sample and Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 13: Determinants of Government Bond Yields: Share of Local Currency Debt above 83% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk 0.12*** 0.05* 0.20** 0.03 0.08*** 0.52*** 0.03 0.44*** 
 (4.26) (1.73) (2.23) (1.10) (2.95) (4.68) (0.58) (3.97) 
S&P Rating LC -0.51*** -0.28*** -1.14*** -0.29*** -0.07*** -0.62*** -0.20** -0.37*** 
 (-14.80) (-8.32) (-9.91) (-7.94) (-2.61) (-6.31) (-2.52) (-3.58) 
Maturity_squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** 
 (-0.57) (-0.74) (-4.31) (0.06) (-3.34) (-2.77) (-6.65) (-2.57) 
Maturity 0.00 0.00** 0.05*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
 (1.15) (2.31) (6.55) (0.81) (5.82) (3.26) (10.15) (2.72) 
Issue Size -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.37) (0.43) (-0.23) (0.46) (0.43) (0.02) (0.90) (-0.04) 
Debt to GDP 0.23*** -0.00 0.43*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.42*** -0.03 -0.43*** 
 (6.91) (-0.03) (3.90) (-0.05) (-0.11) (-4.31) (-0.47) (-4.16) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
0.02** 0.04 0.03 -0.12 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.18 
 (2.22) (0.53) (1.04) (-1.27) (0.23) (0.12) (-0.74) (-0.62) 
Debt Servicing Cost 0.51*** -0.12*** 1.20*** -0.09** 0.23*** -0.29* 0.44*** -0.12 
 (9.12) (-3.28) (6.93) (-2.22) (5.56) (-1.84) (3.96) (-0.82) 
External Debt 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.01*** -0.01 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01* 
 (3.52) (4.76) (4.28) (3.41) (-1.10) (3.37) (2.70) (1.66) 
CPI 0.59*** -0.09 1.43*** -0.11 0.07** -2.46*** 0.35*** -2.46*** 
 (11.80) (-0.72) (8.48) (-0.78) (1.97) (-4.59) (3.25) (-4.58) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.31*** -0.18*** -0.58*** -0.23*** 0.03 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 
 (-6.35) (-3.72) (-3.88) (-4.37) (0.88) (-1.16) (0.77) (-0.58) 
GDP Size -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.07* -0.04 
 (-0.64) (0.63) (0.92) (1.26) (0.01) (-0.93) (1.92) (-0.73) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.76 0.78 0.63 
Nb of Observations 626 545 626 545 626 545 626 545 
Nb of Bonds 80 79 80 79 80 79 80 79 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Common sample and Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 14: Determinants of Government Bond Yields: Share of Local Currency Debt below 83% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk -0.01 0.00 0.34* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.36** 0.00 
 (-0.25) (.) (1.85) (.) (0.58) (.) (2.42) (.) 
S&P Rating LC -0.39*** 0.00 -1.41*** 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.55** 0.00 
 (-6.10) (.) (-4.97) (.) (1.23) (.) (-2.38) (.) 
Maturity_squared -0.00** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00* -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-2.50) (-5.01) (-6.17) (-6.42) (-2.05) (-1.90) (-5.35) (-5.10) 
Maturity 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (3.39) (6.07) (8.02) (8.87) (4.54) (3.68) (7.17) (7.64) 
Issue Size -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-1.10) (-3.29) (-0.27) (0.01) (1.14) (-1.01) (0.32) (0.24) 
Debt to GDP 0.16** 0.00 0.66** 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.29 0.00 
 (2.24) (.) (2.23) (.) (-0.38) (.) (1.27) (.) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
-0.11*** 0.00 -0.36*** 0.00 -0.03** 0.00 -0.16* 0.00 
 (-4.83) (.) (-3.31) (.) (-2.53) (.) (-1.72) (.) 
Debt Servicing Cost -0.12* 0.00 0.14 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.29 0.00 
 (-1.67) (.) (0.46) (.) (-1.31) (.) (1.26) (.) 
External Debt -0.05*** 0.00 -0.18*** -0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00*** -0.07* -0.00 
 (-4.54) (1.25) (-3.79) (-10.76) (4.04) (3.90) (-1.89) (-1.25) 
CPI 0.34*** 0.00 1.57*** 0.00 0.07** 0.00 0.87*** 0.00 
 (5.64) (.) (5.28) (.) (2.21) (.) (3.52) (.) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.19*** 0.00 -0.32 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 
 (-3.04) (.) (-1.12) (.) (-0.48) (.) (0.24) (.) 
GDP Size 0.00 0.02*** 0.07 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.01 
 (0.23) (6.80) (0.99) (1.37) (-0.43) (1.04) (0.96) (-0.32) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.75 0.77 
Nb of Observations 314 194 314 194 314 194 314 194 
Nb of Bonds 67 18 67 18 67 18 67 18 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Common sample and Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 15: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Local and Foreign Currencies: Debt held by 
foreign investors above 40% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk 0.14*** -0.01 0.41*** -0.01 0.07* 0.45*** 0.19** 0.47*** 
 (7.31) (-0.57) (5.50) (-0.45) (1.89) (4.62) (2.50) (4.50) 
S&P Rating LC 0.00 -0.29*** 0.00 -0.32*** 0.00 -0.74*** 0.00 -0.48*** 
 (.) (-11.55) (.) (-7.47) (.) (-7.61) (.) (-4.44) 
Maturity_squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.01*** 
 (-1.25) (0.69) (-3.51) (-1.63) (-1.53) (-2.44) (-3.01) (-2.99) 
Maturity 0.00*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 
 (3.33) (0.82) (6.45) (3.27) (3.28) (3.17) (5.32) (3.83) 
Issue Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (-0.53) (-0.68) (-0.04) (-0.06) (-2.06) (0.62) (-1.12) (0.81) 
Debt to GDP 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.46*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.17* 0.24** -0.35*** 
 (3.37) (2.68) (4.27) (-0.02) (-0.23) (-1.87) (2.10) (-3.24) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
-0.04** -0.11 -0.03 -0.49*** -0.00 0.11 0.03 -0.13 
 (-2.12) (-1.55) (-0.54) (-3.48) (-0.16) (0.65) (0.64) (-0.55) 
Debt Servicing Cost -0.10** 0.01 -0.36** -0.13*** 0.01 0.06 -0.11 -0.15 
 (-2.32) (0.30) (-2.20) (-2.64) (0.28) (0.42) (-0.72) (-0.99) 
External Debt -0.01* -0.00* -0.00 0.01** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.00 
 (-1.93) (-1.72) (-0.32) (1.97) (-3.09) (-3.02) (-0.55) (-0.87) 
CPI -0.00 -0.13** -0.40** -0.60*** 0.03 -0.70*** -0.29* -1.07*** 
 (-0.11) (-2.11) (-2.35) (-4.49) (0.54) (-4.05) (-1.71) (-4.86) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.03 -0.32*** -0.03 -0.51*** 0.01 -0.47*** 0.10 -0.40** 
 (-1.00) (-8.73) (-0.28) (-8.04) (0.18) (-2.90) (0.85) (-2.26) 
GDP Size -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.21*** -0.04 -0.05*** -0.05 -0.10*** 0.03 
 (-6.86) (-3.85) (-5.59) (-1.04) (-3.55) (-1.01) (-2.67) (0.58) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.77 0.83 0.63 
Nb of Observations 300 646 300 646 300 646 300 646 
Nb of Bonds 50 87 50 87 50 87 50 87 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Common sample and Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 16: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Local and Foreign Currencies: Debt held by 
foreign investors below 40% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk 0.10*** 0.33*** 0.40*** 0.29*** 0.03 0.21*** 0.22*** -0.19 
 (3.46) (5.57) (4.15) (2.82) (1.25) (2.84) (3.62) (-0.97) 
S&P Rating LC -0.35*** -0.06* -0.99*** -0.04 0.01 -0.11 -0.27*** -0.02 
 (-10.67) (-1.69) (-8.65) (-0.65) (0.67) (-1.62) (-3.18) (-0.15) 
Maturity_squared -0.00 -0.00** -0.01*** 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
 (-0.40) (-2.30) (-3.81) (1.84) (-3.89) (-1.33) (-6.21) (1.35) 
Maturity 0.00 0.01*** 0.06*** -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.07*** -0.01 
 (0.87) (4.22) (6.08) (-0.49) (6.45) (3.00) (9.61) (-1.15) 
Issue Size -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-1.35) (0.38) (-0.81) (2.01) (0.61) (0.61) (0.27) (0.80) 
Debt to GDP 0.25*** -0.22*** 0.72*** -0.19*** 0.02 -0.13*** 0.24*** 0.11 
 (7.74) (-7.34) (6.63) (-4.12) (1.09) (-4.33) (3.12) (1.16) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
-0.03*** 6.30*** -0.12*** 6.80** -0.02** 2.70 -0.08*** -3.59 
 (-3.03) (3.98) (-3.44) (2.50) (-2.37) (1.37) (-3.40) (-0.66) 
Debt Servicing Cost 0.10** -1.90*** 0.35** -1.04 0.03 -1.80*** 0.19 1.06 
 (2.08) (-3.68) (2.13) (-1.21) (1.04) (-3.69) (1.61) (0.55) 
External Debt 0.02*** 0.04* 0.06** 0.07** 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
 (2.99) (1.96) (2.43) (2.44) (0.52) (-0.89) (1.19) (-0.29) 
CPI 0.57*** 0.80** 1.75*** 1.27** 0.11*** 0.12 0.70*** -0.27 
 (10.94) (2.53) (9.01) (2.41) (3.67) (0.27) (4.89) (-0.26) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.16*** -1.47*** -0.44** -1.03*** 0.04* -0.66** -0.07 1.31* 
 (-3.09) (-6.56) (-2.22) (-2.66) (1.74) (-2.14) (-0.48) (1.66) 
GDP Size 0.01 0.18* 0.05 0.51*** -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.14 
 (1.24) (1.93) (1.38) (3.27) (-1.54) (0.30) (0.50) (0.45) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.91 0.98 0.86 0.99 0.85 0.96 0.66 0.87 
Nb of Observations 640 93 640 93 640 93 640 93 
Nb of Bonds 82 23 82 23 82 23 82 23 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Common sample and Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
ARTICLE 3 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 251 
 
Table 17: Determinants of Government Bond Yields in Local and Foreign Currencies: Debt held by 
foreign investors above 40% and Local Currency Debt above 83% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LC Yld 
EM 
LC Yld 
DM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
LC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld EM 
FC-
Hedge 
Yld DM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
EM 
FCH-
LCH Spr 
DM 
Political Risk 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.08 -0.09 
 (6.43) (5.77) (3.22) (4.18) (3.21) (3.08) (1.13) (-0.99) 
S&P Rating LC -0.77*** -0.06* -1.60*** -0.04 -0.09*** -0.11 -0.21* -0.02 
 (-17.79) (-1.87) (-11.27) (-1.16) (-2.58) (-1.58) (-1.91) (-0.24) 
Maturity_squared -0.00** -0.00** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.01*** 0.00 
 (-2.07) (-2.28) (-5.13) (1.34) (-3.11) (-2.35) (-5.83) (0.11) 
Maturity 0.00** 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.07*** -0.00 
 (2.21) (6.21) (7.29) (0.55) (5.25) (4.09) (9.03) (-0.28) 
Issue Size 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** 
 (0.50) (3.34) (0.94) (2.10) (0.79) (-0.49) (1.19) (-2.62) 
Debt to GDP 0.42*** -0.21*** 0.86*** -0.20*** 0.02 -0.13*** 0.07 0.09** 
 (11.21) (-9.21) (6.79) (-5.95) (0.53) (-4.21) (0.77) (2.24) 
FX Reserves to 
External Debt 
-0.01 5.70*** -0.09*** 7.99*** -0.01 3.29* -0.08*** -0.00 
 (-1.23) (3.91) (-2.95) (4.50) (-1.04) (1.68) (-3.27) (-0.00) 
Debt Servicing Cost 0.40*** -1.62*** 0.39* -1.57*** 0.26*** -2.00*** -0.02 -0.36 
 (6.01) (-5.61) (1.86) (-2.75) (4.69) (-4.17) (-0.13) (-0.49) 
External Debt 0.05*** 0.03** 0.23*** 0.08*** -0.00 -0.01 0.12*** 0.01 
 (5.74) (2.32) (7.09) (3.73) (-0.17) (-0.53) (4.78) (0.56) 
CPI 0.95*** 0.83*** 2.42*** 1.24*** 0.09** 0.15 0.66*** -0.25 
 (19.67) (2.64) (14.18) (3.60) (2.14) (0.33) (5.33) (-0.45) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.75*** -1.42*** -1.63*** -1.15*** 0.07 -0.73** -0.06 0.94** 
 (-10.66) (-6.70) (-7.27) (-4.79) (1.46) (-2.44) (-0.35) (2.32) 
GDP Size -0.02 0.16** 0.05 0.56*** 0.01 0.05 0.09** 0.30** 
 (-1.36) (2.20) (0.80) (4.75) (0.58) (0.54) (1.99) (2.36) 
VIX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
R-squared 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.96 0.81 0.85 
Nb of Observations 415 90 415 90 415 90 415 90 
Nb of Bonds 60 20 60 20 60 20 60 20 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Common sample and Maturities 1Y to 5Y. Standard-errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation and first-order autocorrelation. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Data Availability Data - Average Starting Date of Historical Series 
 
Country 
FX Issue by Issue Number 
of Bonds    
FX Issue by 
Issue Starting 
Date 
LC 
Thomson 
Reuters 
LC 
Bloomberg 
Par Curve 
LC 
Bloomberg 
ZC Curve 
Argentina                       142    2007 2007  #N/A #N/A 
Austria                         96    1997 2003  1994  1998  
Belgium                         38    1997 2005  1994  1998  
Brazil                         64    2003 2007  2007  1998  
Canada                         29    1999 1994  1992  1994  
Chile                           9    2006 2008  2005  2005  
Colombia                         47    2001 2004  2003  2005  
Croatia                         21    2004 2008  2003  2007  
Czech Republic                           9    2010 2002  1997  1997  
Denmark                         72    1998 1996  1994  1994  
Finland                         56    1995 2000  1998  1998  
Greece                         29    2002 2001  2001  2000  
Hungary                         30    2007 2000  1999  1998  
Indonesia                         19    2007 2004  2003  1998  
Ireland                         36    1994 2002  1995  1998  
Israel                         15    2004 2003  2005  1998  
Italy                         53    2002 1995  1997  1998  
Malaysia                         13    1998 2005  1999  1999  
Mexico                         79    2002 2005  2003  2002  
Philippines                         38    2004 2003  1998  1996  
Poland                         73    2007 2005  2000  1998  
Portugal                         11    1997 2002  1994  1998  
Russia                         25    2001 2003  2006  2007  
Slovakia                           4    2008 2006  2003  2005  
South Africa                         22    2002 2003  1994  1994  
Spain                         31    1998 1996  1994  1998  
Sweden                       124    1997 1997  2005  1994  
Thailand                         19    2001 2000  1999  1994  
Turkey                       102    2000 2006  2007  2005  
Venezuela                         44    2004 2006  #N/A #N/A 
Total / Average 1350 
 
2002 2003  2000  1999  
Note: 1. FX Issue by Issue relate to average issuance date or first date when the bond price is observed, while 
Thompson Reuters and Bloomberg present average starting date across available maturities 
2. FX bonds have been sorted according to availability from best to worst  
 
 
Appendix Table 2.  
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(  1,     321) =    324.824 
Prob > F =      0.0000 
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ARTICLE 4 
 
The Growth of Local Currency Emerging 
Market Debt 
Rui Albuquerque, Luis Brandao-Marques, Alexandre Jeanneret, and Tomasz Orpiszewski21 
 
 
Abstract 
  
Broad and rapid development of local currency bond markets in emerging economies over the 
last two centuries startled policymakers and international investors. Using a new dataset on 
foreign holdings of government debt, we show that foreign demand is a key driver of the growth 
of local currency debt in emerging markets and that the main culprit of that increased demand is 
the low interest rate environment brought about by the Federal Reserve’s unconventional 
monetary policy. The second motive of foreign currency participation is speculative, as FX 
interventions of central banks in emerging economies tend to attract foreign investors. Finally, 
although growth and inflation forecasts remain important indicators for both the development of 
local currency debt market and foreign participation therein, we find that institutional and 
political risk factors play a very limited role in both processes. 
 
 
Keywords: local currency, sovereign debt, foreign investors. 
JEL Codes: F31, F34, G15 
                                                          
21We thaŶk … AlďuƋueƌƋue is fƌoŵ BostoŶ UŶiǀeƌsity, CatóliĐa-Lisbon School of Business and Economics, CEPR, and 
ECGI; Brandao-Marques is from the International Monetary Fund; Jeanneret is from HEC Montreal; and Orpiszewski 
is from Candriam Investors Group. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Board, or its management. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After half a century of currency crisis and sovereign defaults, over the last two decades 
numerous emerging economies successfully developed local currency bond markets where 
governments could raise funds without exposing themselves to currency risk. As macroeconomic 
stabilization and capital account liberalization progressed, international investors regained 
confidence and interest in emerging market (EM) debt.  
As a result, between 1996 and 2013 foreign investor participation in local currency debt 
markets increased from 5% to 21% on average. However, the extent and historical evolution of 
foreign participation in local currency bond markets differs from country to country. At the same 
time, the average maturity of EM debt issuance has been increasing, further contributing to an 
overall improvement of these countries’ debt profile. Interestingly, Figure 27 illustrates that the 
increase in the average life of these bonds has closely mimicked the average maturity of central 
bank holdings of sovereign debt in developed markets (DM), namely by the Federal Reserve. In 
principle, the concurrent increase in maturities of securities acquired by central banks in the 
context of quantitative easing and of bond securities issued by EM sovereign and corporate, 
suggests a causal link. This trend in EM debt is most likely related with the gap filling theory of 
corporate debt developed by Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010), whereby firms and EM 
sovereigns act as large-scale liquidity providers in response to shocks to the maturity structure of 
DM government debt. 
The objective of this study is to determine empirically the contribution of foreign and local 
demand to the recent growth of local currency sovereign debt. Results show that foreign demand 
is a key driver behind the growth of local currency debt in emerging markets, and that the main 
culprit of that increased demand is the low interest rate environment brought about by the Federal 
Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy. The second motive of foreign currency participation 
is speculative, as FX interventions of central banks in emerging economies tend to attract foreign 
investors willing to benefit from currency appreciation. While growth and inflation forecasts 
remain important indicators for both the development of local currency debt market and foreign 
participation therein, we find that institutional factors like political risk, bondholder protection or 
central bank independence play a very limited role in both processes. In light of monetary policy 
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normalization in advanced economies our results remain highly relevant for investors, issuing 
governments and policymakers. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Existing empirical literature on local currency debt markets in emerging economies covers three 
distinct fields. The first one focuses on original sin, currency denomination of debt and the 
resulting macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities, the second one highlights the link between 
sovereign risk and fundamentals, while the third one links foreign participation in local currency 
bonds to bond yields and returns. 
2.1 Original sin, currency denomination and sovereign defaults 
 
Debt composition is adjacent to three important macroeconomic phenomenons, i.e. original 
sin, debt intolerance and currency mismatches.  In the seminal paper Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(1999) coined the hypothesis of the original sin where countries with weak institutions and poor 
macroeconomic track record have no choice but to issue short-term debt in foreign currencies. 
This is due to the lack of confidence of international investors who are not willing to purchase 
long-maturity debt in local currency, as high and volatile inflation, unreliable institutions and 
political instability tend to increase the probability of default risk and exchange rate depreciation. 
Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) introduced the concept of debt intolerance which 
manifests itself in the extreme duress many emerging markets experience already at low levels of 
external debt that would seem manageable by advanced country standards. Currency mismatches, 
understood as a combination of foreign indebtedness and external vulnerabilities, have been at 
origin of numerous currency, sovereign and banking crisis in the past, as explained by Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999), Guillermo A. Calvo (1996) and others. 
 Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003) argue that original sin, debt intolerance and 
currency mismatches are three inter-related but distinguishable phenomenons. In their view debt 
intolerance encompasses institutional weaknesses of emerging economies that lead to weak, 
inconsistent and unreliable policies, while the original sin school traces the problem of the 
allocation of global portfolios and demand for assets by international financial markets. Finally, 
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currency mismatches are closely related to the two effects, but the country may or may not incur 
a currency mismatch, depending on how the financial and monetary authorities respond to that 
act of borrowing. In other words, foreign borrowing as such can be seen as a policy choice rather 
than an inherent institutional or fundamental weakness. Burger and Warnock (2006b) investigate 
these relationships looking at bond markets in 49 emerging economies and present evidence that 
original sin is not an inherent element in the EM universe. Their findings indicate that countries 
with better institutional quality and policy performance tend to have more developed local 
currency bond markets, reduced currency mismatches, and lower likelihood of default. 
Several authors attempted to analyze the currency structure of government borrowing and its 
determinants. Mehl and Reynaud (2010) construct a new dataset for 33 emerging economies and 
show that while the share of inflation-indexed and short-term debt diminished significantly 
between 1994 to 2006, the proportion of foreign debt remained low but stable over time. 
Moreover, econometric results imply that the share of foreign, inflation-linked or short-term debt 
tends to be higher in countries with high inflation, narrower investor base and loose fiscal policy.  
Guscina and Jeanne (2006) introduce a similar dataset on currency and maturity composition for 
19 emerging economies and present empirical findings indicating that issuance of medium to 
long maturity debt is related to both inflation level and volatility. 
Last but not least, Hausmann and Panizza (2011) review the validity of the original sin 
hypothesis in emerging markets and find that even though the number of countries issuing mainly 
local currency debt has increased, the improvement is rather marginal. Authors conclude that 
governments prefer to “abstinate” from borrowing entirely rather than to borrow in foreign 
currency debt due to its riskiness.  
 
2.2 Determinants of Foreign Currency Sovereign Risk 
 
With the introduction of Brady bonds in 1989 most emerging economies switched from direct 
borrowing from international banks to issuance of tradable bonds in foreign currencies. From this 
moment onwards the riskiness has been continuously priced by bondholders based on key 
political, fiscal and macroeconomic criteria.  
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 As far as political and institutional setting is concerned, Duffie, Pedersen, Singleton 
(2003) demonstrate that official foreign reserves as well as the country’s political risk determine 
a large share of sovereign bond spreads.  Bekaert et al. (2014) find evidence that sovereign credit 
risk increases with political risk, while (Cosset and Jeanneret 2014) show that better governed 
countries have lower default risk and bear a smaller sovereign credit risk premium.  
In terms of macroeconomic determinants, Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) find that the 
volatility of the terms of trade tends to increase sovereign spreads, while Maltritz, Bohn and  
Eichler (2012) document that lower economic growth and greater trade openness increase 
sovereign default risk. Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Park (2013) find that while inflation, state 
fragility, external debt and volatility of terms of trade reduce the sovereign risk, trade openness 
and fiscal balance/GDP ratio are negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. 
 
2.3 Link between Foreign Participation, Bond Yields and Returns 
 
Empirical literature on foreign participation in emerging market bonds covers determinants of 
yields on one hand and the portfolio allocation of international investors on the other hand. 
 Analyzing the impact of foreign participation on bond yields in 10 emerging markets, 
Peiris (2010) shows that while foreign participation tends to reduce yield levels, it does not 
necessarily induce higher liquidity in the market and in certain cases could even dampen 
volatility. In turn, Ebeke and Yinqiu (2014) analyze the relationship between yields and foreign 
participation in 12 emerging economies using data from national sources. Empirical findings 
indicate that countries which have been able to attract a higher share of foreign investors in their 
local currency government bonds enjoy lower yields, but are more susceptible to market 
sentiment. They emphasize the fact that the benefit of lower yields arising from foreign investors 
is universal across EMs regardless of their macroeconomic fundaments. Last but not least, 
Jaramillo and Zhang (2013) investigate empirically the relationship between bond yields and 
holdings of government debt and show that while bond yields tend to rise with the debt to GDP 
ratio, this increase is partly offset if debt is held by domestic non-bank investors as well as 
foreign central banks. 
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Burger and Warnock (2006a) and Burger, Warnock, and Warnock (2010) analyze the portfolio 
allocation of US-based investors to emerging market local currency bonds and find that investors 
tend to increase participation in countries with more stable institutions and identifiable investor-
friendly institutions and policies. Burger et al. (2014) find that the allocation of US investors to 
EM bond is due not only to ‘push factors’ such as low US interest rate, but also to ‘pull factors’, 
as the EMs with greater current account balances, less volatile inflation, and stronger economic 
growth tend to attract more foreign capital. 
 Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2008) investigate the drivers of cross-country 
capital flow in bond markets using CPIS data between 2001 and 2003. Their results show that 
cross-holdings are heavily driven by financial conditions in the lender country, which means that 
bond market conditions could adjust abruptly for reasons having nothing to do with policies in 
the borrowing economy. On top of that evidence implies that international bondholders are 
attracted to the securities of countries whose returns co-vary with their own which can be 
interpreted as return-chasing rather than diversification-based behavior.  
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 
This section develops several explanations for the recent emergence and growth in 
emerging markets of the market for local currency sovereign debt. We view the demand for local 
currency sovereign debt as the main culprit for these market developments. The main reason is 
that issuing debt in local currency involves lower fixed costs and exhibits lower credit risk, all 
else equal, than issuing debt in foreign currency.  Yet, for long time governments have issued 
debt exclusively in foreign rather than in local currency. By revealed preference, this observation 
means that things were not all else equal in both markets and that demand for local currency debt 
must have been very limited. The situation has gradually changed over the last two decades and 
our goal is to explain this phenomenon. We identify in this section various domestic and foreign 
demand channels that can potentially explain the time and the cross-country variation in the 
development of the local currency sovereign debt market in emerging economies. We develop a 
set of hypotheses that we subsequently test using the new dataset. 
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3.1 Local investment risk 
 
Investors care about the riskiness of their investment holdings and the risk embedded in local-
currency government debt is twofold. First, investors fear that a rise in inflation will erode the 
value of their debt holdings, as it would do for any financial asset paying fixed nominal coupons 
in local currency. Second, the risk of default strongly matters to investors, as they recover only a 
fraction of the debt face value during debt restructurings, as explained by Cruces and Trebesch 
(2013) among others. This risk is particularly acute in emerging markets, but also in certain 
advanced economies, as the European debt crisis has attracted much attention over recent years. 
An important empirical driver of the default probability on local currency debt is the inflation 
level, as described by Jeanneret and Souissi (2014).  Governments are more likely to recourse to 
debt monetization when inflation is severe, as a further rise in inflation would be too costly for 
the economy. Hence, inflation constitutes the main risk to investors, since it affects both the real 
value of local-currency government bond and its default risk. As a result, we conjecture that 
lower investment risk, i.e. lower inflation, raises not only the demand of local-currency 
government bonds but also its supply. Lower risk premium provides governments the incentive to 
issue more debt in their local currency, as they can tap into cheaper financing. Our first 
hypothesis is thus as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: A lower level of investment risk should foster the market for local-currency 
government debt. However, it should not affect the composition of the debtholders. 
We consider testing this hypothesis with two measures of expected inflation. First, we 
analyze the inflation forecasts taken from the IMF IFS database. Second, we build on the idea 
that central bank independence can be viewed as a means of mitigating future inflation, as arguey 
by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985). Our instrument is 
the index of central bank independence constructed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). 
3.2 Local demand shocks 
 
Our second hypothesis is that incentives for increased savings in local currency by 
domestic agents raise the demand for risk-free long-term assets such as local currency sovereign 
bonds. This secular development is important in emerging markets and goes beyond a shift in 
private savings. The central pattern is related to the deregulation and financial innovation in the 
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insurance market, including new annuity insurance, life insurance and health insurance products. 
Long-term liabilities in the insurance sector require substantial amounts of assets with similar 
maturities, leading to an increased demand for long-term assets in local currency. In 
consequence, the domestic institutional investor base accelerates the growth of the local currency 
government bond market. 
This persistent demand for local-currency sovereign bonds from the insurance sector 
provides an extra incentive for international investors to invest in opportunistic manner. Global 
investors anticipate that as the demand from local agents and insurance companies grows, it will 
become relatively easier to find an adequate counterparty at the time of selling the bonds which 
makes it easier to exit the market. In a sense, the insurance sector provides a sort of implicit 
insurance of future demand and liquidity for external investors. Our testable hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 2: The development of a domestic institutional investor base increases the 
demand for local currency government bonds and provides incentives for international investors 
to enter the market. 
On the empirical side, we propose to exploit variation in the size of pension funds and 
insurance sector to instrument the future demand in local-currency government debt. Our 
measure consists of the sum of the assets of insurance companies and pension funds, as a 
percentage of the country’s GDP. 
3.3 Foreign demand for risky assets 
 
The next set of hypothesis relates to the changing appetite of  foreign investors for 
emerging market local currency debt. We explore different channels that offer incentives for 
higher/lower currency risk exposure: i) the global interest-rate environment and the 
diversification offered to international investors; ii) the level of exchange rate uncertainty; and iii) 
the development of the derivative market for currency hedging. 
3.3.1 Global interest-rate environment and diversification 
 
Monetary authorities such as the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of 
England or the Bank of Japan typically adjust their policies to the economic and financial 
environment. These institutions have pursued low short-term interest rate policies which have 
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been coupled with innovative policy tools named broadly Quantitative Easing (QE). Under this 
type of program central banks not only buy pre-determined amounts of sovereign bonds from 
their respective domestic governments, but also purchase fixed income securities backed by 
mortgages or similar risky assets. These unconventional policies have reduced long-term interest 
rates in the government bond market to extremely low levels. 
As a consequence, many of the financial institutions, pension funds, and private investors that 
rely on long-term fixed income securities tend to search for higher yields abroad. The low 
interest-rate environment has thus led to renewed interest in international investments and has 
been an engine for the growth of the local-currency sovereign bond market. The third hypothesis 
thus states that 
Hypothesis 3a: Accommodative monetary policies in developed countries provide global 
investors incentives to invest in the local-currency debt market in emerging economies. 
We instrument the role of monetary policies using the U.S. shadow policy rate developed by 
Krippner (2014). This rate captures the global interest rate environment, while accounting at the 
same time for the unconventional monetary policies. 
Diversification motives can also lead foreign investors to enter the local-currency sovereign debt 
market. Du and Schreger (2014) show that local-currency debt is less correlated to US factors 
than foreign-currency debt, thus providing diversification to global investors. The related 
hypothesis that we consider is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3b: Greater asset diversification provides global investors incentives to invest in the 
local-currency debt market in emerging economies. 
To test whether higher diversification fosters growth in the local-currency debt market through a 
greater demand from foreign investors, we compute the correlation between XXX and the US 
equity market. 
3.3.2 Exchange rate risk 
 
Local currency bonds in emerging markets attract foreign investors because such 
securities typically offer higher yields than the government bonds issued in developed countries. 
In addition to this yield differential, investors speculate that emerging currencies will not 
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depreciate relative to the low interest rate currencies (e.g., USD and JPY), as the uncovered 
interest rate parity would imply. An investment in high yield currencies funded by low interest 
rate currencies, with the expectation that the currency depreciation will not offset the interest rate 
differential, is essentially a carry trade investment strategy.  This strategy, which has been 
thoroughly analyzed in recent studies, offers negative returns when the currency market becomes 
more volatile (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen, 2009; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Bakshi 
and Panayotov, 2013). We thus expect that investors have greater confidence in investing in high-
yield currencies when the uncertainty related to exchange rate movements is low. We thus 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 4a: International investors are more likely to invest in local-currency 
government bonds if the exchange rate displays less uncertainty. 
We test whether exchange rate uncertainty affects international investors using the central 
bank’s commitment to exchange rate stability as an instrument for future currency volatility 
reduction. We measure this commitment with an index of public announcements by central 
officials and media comments on foreign exchange interventions by the local monetary 
authorities aimed at curbing currency volatility. We have manually collected these news events 
through the Bloomberg analytics engine. 
Among all investors buying emerging market bonds, not all of them wish to maintain 
local currency exposure. Unfortunately, hedging exchange rate risk in emerging markets has been 
difficult and costly for a long time, as the market for Over the Counter (OTC) foreign exchange 
derivatives remained rather illiquid for such currencies. Hence, the exchange rate has been an 
important source of unhedgeable risk for foreign investors, encouraging the emergence of the 
popular Brady bonds in the 80s and 90s. Nevertheless, we have experienced a gradual increase in 
standardized derivative contracts on emerging currencies over the recent years.  We suggest that 
the development of such products allows foreign investors to better hedge their currency 
exposure and thus encourages them to buy local-currency debt in emerging markets. 
Hypothesis 4b: The introduction of derivative contracts for currency hedging should 
increase the participation of foreign investors in the local-currency government bond market. 
ARTICLE 4 
Thèse de doĐtoƌat | Page 263 
We test this hypothesis with the introduction of standard futures contracts in the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME). The introduction date, which varies by currency, is our instrument 
of foreign investors’ ability to hedge currency risk in emerging markets.   
4. Data and empirical strategy  
4.1 Government debt holdings 
 
We construct a new dataset, which has been meticulously compiled using data from 
national sources such as central banks, ministries of finance, statistical authorities and securities 
depositories. It includes historical series of government debt holdings issued in local currencies in 
19 emerging countries located in EMEA, Asia and Latin America which differ in terms of size, 
level of development and level of debt. Our dataset decomposes government debt into two 
dimensions: local vs foreign currency debt denomination and local vs. foreign debt holders of 
local currency debt. This paper is unique in this regard, and thus departs from other existing 
studies, as explained in the comparison with other datasets in Appendix Part 2. The main 
variables of interest are the size of the local currency government debt market, measured as a 
percentage of the country’s GDP, and foreign participation, which is computed as the fraction of 
local currency government debt held by foreign investors. 
This study considers quarterly data for the period 1996 to 2013, which covers several 
crises in emerging and developed markets and the gradual development of local currency debt 
markets in emerging economies. Data availability differs across countries, as can be seen in Table 
1. Table 2 presents the size of the local-currency debt market at the country level, which equals 
28.2% on average while the foreign investor share equals 12.3% on average.  
Table 1 suggests that the foreign investor share in the local currency bond market 
substantially increased between 1996 and 2013.  The average foreign share rises from 5.7% to 
21.3% over this period, though the extent and historical evolution of foreign participation in this 
market greatly differs across countries. Most countries exhibit a rapid increase in the importance 
of foreign investors in this market, which typically represent about a third of the investor base. In 
contrast, Table 2 illustrates that some countries such as Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, India, and 
Israel, have consistently displayed a low foreign participation in this market. The data also 
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implies strong heterogeneity regarding the time of inception of the local currency debt market. In 
the next step we exploit the cross-country and the time-varying information provided by the data. 
4.2 Econometric Approach 
 
Following the discussion in the previous section, we choose the following specification to 
test the main hypothesis.  
Eq. 1 1 2 ,it i it it it itLC DD FS        x b   
where LC is the total local currency-denominated sovereign debt of country i in quarter t, as a 
percentage of that country’s GDP, DD is a vector with variables representing domestic investor 
demand variables, FS is the foreign participation in country i’s local currency sovereign bond 
market, . The vector x contains a set of country controls which include the interest differential 
between country i’s short-term interest rate the Eurodollar rate for the U.S. dollar, the 12-month 
ahead GDP growth and inflation forecasts, the lagged fiscal balance, and the lagged Political Risk 
Rating measured by ICRG. In an alternative specification, we have added a linear time trend in 
order to capture an overall financial globalization trend. 
The fundamental problem in our econometric investigation is one of joint determination 
of the total local currency–denominated sovereign debt and the share of the same debt that is 
owned by foreign investors. For this reason, we estimate Equation 1 using two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) with country fixed effects. In line with the hypothesis development discussion, and 
subject to data availability, we use several instruments, detailed in Table 5. 
5. Results 
 
In terms of general demand indicators and control variables, results in Table 3 
demonstrate that higher GDP growth expectations and higher inflation expectations are 
associated with lower levels of local currency debt. The former probably reflects the fact that 
debt as share of GDP tends to fall when countries are growing fast, while the latter supports the 
notion that low inflation limits the risk of debt monetization and deepens domestic debt markets 
by making local currency bonds more appealing to foreign investors, as observed by Burger and 
Warnock (2006b) and Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003). Surprisingly, the interest rate 
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differential relative to the U.S. rates is not significant in any of the settings which might be due to 
the use of short term interest rates. 
However, when controlling for the endogenous nature of foreign demand of local 
currency debt, the domestic demand variables are no longer significant while, for the most part, 
foreign demand retains explanatory power. In fact, using the 2SLS results in columns (2) through 
(9), we can see that the strongest candidates in terms of explanatory hypothesis are monetary 
policy and the low interest-rate environment (column 2), development of the FX market (column 
6) and bond market liquidity. Overall, the coefficients in the first regressions of all instruments 
have the expected signs despite the varying degree of significance and the only variable which is 
not significant at all is the correlation of the local equity market index with the S&P 500.  
The benchmark 2SLS results for the full set of instruments are summarized in columns (8) 
and (9).  From a statistical point of view, the results are valid since Hansen’s J-statistic is low and 
we cannot reject the instruments being valid. In column (10) we report a 2SLS regression using 
only the regressors which showed to have explanatory power in (8) and (9), i.e. the shadow 
policy rate and the index of FX interventions. For this narrower set of instruments, the F statistic 
of the first stage regression is 13.70, well above the conventional threshold value of 10. This 
signals that our results are not affected by the weak instruments problem, as explained by Angrist 
and Pischke (2009). Since the results are very similar to (8) and (9), we conclude that they are not 
being driven by weak instruments. 
Most importantly, the results in these columns (8) through (10) suggest that foreign 
demand is a key driver of the growth of local currency debt in emerging markets, and that the 
main culprit of that increased demand is the low interest rate environment brought about by the 
Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy. The second most important instrument are 
the foreign exchange interventions of central banks in emerging economies that are deemed to 
increase currency valuation. 
Our results are in line with previous work by Moore, Nam, Suh, and Tepper (2013) on the 
foreign ownership of local currency sovereign debt for a smaller set of countries. In their paper, 
they show that the large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) by the Federal Reserve reduce long-term 
U.S. Treasury yields, which raises the foreign ownership share of emerging market debt.  
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However, their article does not explain the issuance of local currency bonds, which is the main 
focus of our work.   
6. Conclusion 
 
After many years of currency crisis and sovereign defaults, over the last two decades 
numerous emerging economies successfully developed local currency bond markets where 
governments could raise funds without exposing themselves to currency risk. As macroeconomic 
stabilization and opening up to capital flows advanced, international investors started to regain 
confidence. In consequence, between 1996 and 2013 foreign investor participation in local 
currency debt markets increased from 5% to 21% on average, yet the extent and historical 
evolution of foreign participation in local currency bond markets differs from country to country.  
The objective of this study is to determine empirically what shapes domestic bond markets on 
one side and what attracts foreign investors on the other. Empirical results show that foreign 
demand is a key driver of the growth of local currency debt in emerging markets, and that the 
main culprit of that increased demand is the low interest rate environment brought about by the 
Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy. The second motive of foreign currency 
participation is speculative, as FX interventions of central banks in emerging economies tend to 
attract foreign investors. While growth and inflation forecasts remain important indicators for 
both the development of local currency debt market and foreign participation therein, we find that 
institutional factors like political risk, bondholder protection or central bank independence play a 
very limited role in both processes. 
After nearly a decade of zero interest rate policy in the US and other advanced economies, the 
incertitude about investors’ behavior remains a night-breaking dilemma for issuing governments, 
policymakers and investors. Our results call for close monitoring of foreign investors’ behavior 
during the period of interest rate normalization in advanced economies. 
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Table 1 – Foreign Ownership of Local Currency Debt by Country and Year 
           
       
        Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
                                      
Brazil 
    
       
      
3.7 6.7 7.5 10.9 11.3 12.9 14.8        
Bulgaria 
    
       
    
1.0 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 
 
       
Chile 
    
       
    
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.5 3.5 3.1        
Colombia 
    
       
         
1.4 3.0 3.3 5.3        
Czech Republic 3.9 5.3 7.1 5.8 3.1 4.0 4.8 5.2 10.5 8.6 8.1 10.9 14.3 8.0 8.9 14.2 12.9 13.7 14.5 
Hungary 
 
2.8 8.3 9.1 15.0 19.7 23.3 27.8 27.8 28.4 27.7 29.2 26.8 20.4 21.4 32.4 37.8 38.0        
India 
    
       
      
0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.5        
Indonesia 
    
       0.0 0.1 1.1 2.0 5.5 12.6 16.9 17.6 15.6 26.3 31.9 29.8 33.2        
Israel 
    
       
     
2.3 3.9 2.0 2.4 7.1 10.4 5.4 
 
       
Latvia 15.0 5.0 0.2 0.2 2.2 10.5 1.2 3.0 2.5 5.3 6.0 24.3 16.0 2.2 
 
       
  
       
Malaysia 2.9 2.5 1.6 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.9 6.3 6.9 12.1 18.1 13.9 24.6 33.0 40.6 46.2        
Mexico 
   
2.9 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.5 5.8 9.0 8.9 9.1 13.0 10.7 15.8 24.4 31.6 37.7        
Peru 
    
       
   
0.0 18.9 25.7 27.9 33.5 21.1 27.9 44.2 
  
       
Poland 
   
8.8 16.2 15.7 16.1 16.5 19.8 23.0 21.4 20.4 16.1 15.7 22.8 28.9 33.3 35.9        
Romania 
    
       
         
6.5 12.0 8.0 21.6 19.0 
Russia 
    
       
    
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 11.2 24.6 22.4 
South Africa 
    
       
     
7.8 10.4 12.9 13.4 20.7 28.0 32.5 37.2        
South Korea 
    
       
 
0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 1.4 5.7 10.1 8.0 11.8 14.4 13.8 13.0        
Thailand 
    
       
  
1.5 2.4 2.7 2.2 0.7 4.9 5.1 9.1 13.9 15.6 17.0        
Turkey 
    
       
     
10.8 14.6 12.0 8.8 11.2 16.1 20.0 24.9        
      
 
          
  
  Total 5.7 4.2 4.3 4.0 6.4 8.3 6.6 6.5 7.3 9.1 8.9 10.6 11.4 8.5 12.2 17.1 18.2 21.3 17.4 
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Table 2 - Dependent Variables by Country 
Country Number of Observations 
LC Debt 
Foreigh Share of LC 
Debt 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Brazil 15 62.56 1.418 11.44 1.775 
Bulgaria 29 5.264 0.762 0.889 0.296 
Chile 31 4.169 3.306 1.442 1.742 
Colombia 16 25.54 0.699 3.256 1.532 
Czech Republic 57 25.57 5.725 9.189 4.321 
Hungary 53 49.42 2.726 26.21 6.271 
India 27 33.23 2.068 0.737 0.391 
Indonesia 14 13.52 0.506 29.87 3.619 
Israel 28 57.42 1.782 4.794 3.090 
Latvia 16 5.952 1.512 12.16 9.965 
Malaysia 53 39.59 6.935 12.80 13.88 
Mexico 56 15.64 6.700 12.36 11.17 
Peru 32 8.474 2.618 24.90 13.21 
Poland 45 33.15 4.167 21.99 6.350 
Romania 14 17.01 2.991 13.72 6.824 
Russia 35 20.64 6.644 4.189 8.477 
South Africa 32 28.40 5.434 20.33 10.63 
South Korea 37 44.32 2.512 8.212 5.345 
Thailand 40 26.60 2.770 6.201 5.414 
Turkey 30 27.94 1.921 14.12 4.758 
      Total 660 28.25 15.85 12.27 11.26 
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Table 3 - Determinants of Local Currency Sovereign Debt 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of total local currency sovereign debt as a percentage of GDP (LC) on the share of such debt 
owned by foreign investors, two variables representing domestic investor demand (Domestic Institutional Investor  Assets  and an index of property rights), and a set 
of controls. The table shows OLS (column 1) and 2SLS (columns 2 through 4) estimation results using specification (1). For 2SLS estimations, the bottom panel 
shows the first-stage regression results.  Variable definitions are provided in Table X. Robust p-values adjusted for country-level clustering are reported in brackets. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
 Second-stage regressions LC Debt to GDP  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
                  
 
Foreign Share 0.294*** 0.497*** 0.360* 0.796** -0.095 0.316 0.369*** 0.478*** 0.447*** 0.490*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.025) (0.877) (0.536) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Institutional Investor  Assets 0.091*** 0.030 0.071 -0.058 0.206 0.084 0.059* 0.036 0.037 0.033 
 
(0.001) (0.334) (0.213) (0.605) (0.215) (0.560) (0.071) (0.196) (0.157) (0.266) 
Property Rights -0.218 0.266 -0.060 0.981 -1.148 -0.166 -0.150 0.221 0.031 0.249 
 
(0.750) (0.739) (0.947) (0.565) (0.498) (0.864) (0.843) (0.778) (0.972) (0.756) 
Interest Rate Differential 0.016 -0.049 -0.005 -0.144 0.140 0.009 0.042 -0.043 0.005 -0.046 
 
(0.901) (0.658) (0.974) (0.277) (0.630) (0.966) (0.668) (0.707) (0.960) (0.680) 
GDP Growth Forecast -0.275* -0.468*** -0.338 -0.753** 0.095 -0.296 -0.443** -0.450*** -0.510*** -0.461*** 
 
(0.052) (0.003) (0.212) (0.031) (0.882) (0.556) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inflation Forecast -0.737** -0.645** -0.707** -0.508 -0.915** -0.727*** -0.801*** -0.654** -0.712* -0.648** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.031) (0.213) (0.048) (0.005) (0.009) (0.014) (0.058) (0.017) 
Political Risk -0.156 -0.011 -0.109 0.203 -0.435 -0.141 -0.108 -0.025 -0.052 -0.017 
 
(0.189) (0.923) (0.560) (0.450) (0.376) (0.729) (0.405) (0.829) (0.647) (0.886) 
          
 
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 660 568 660 568 660 
Number of Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 17 20 17 20 
R2 0.565 0.466 0.555 -0.046 0.197 0.564 0.574 0.484 0.527 0.529 
First-stage R2 (excluded instruments) 
 
0.2382 0.0111 0.0197 0.0128 0.0094 0.0995 0.2571 0.2907 0.2553 
Hansen's J-Statistic 
       
3.146 2.233 1.130 
P-Value               0.534 0.816 0.568 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 First-stage Regressions   Foreign Share of LC Debt 
Variables 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                    
 
Insurance and Pension Fund Assets 
 
0.168*** 0.299*** 0.277*** 0.260*** 0.274*** 0.120 0.159*** 0.109* 0.169*** 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.224) (0.004) (0.064) (0.001) 
Property Rights 
 
0.340 -2.244 -1.893 -1.543 -2.162 -0.299 0.846 1.577 0.560 
  
(0.868) (0.362) (0.432) (0.589) (0.397) (0.893) (0.694) (0.437) (0.767) 
Interest Rate Differential 
 
-0.272 0.275 0.288 0.394 0.444 0.427 -0.319 -0.280 -0.334 
  
(0.421) (0.227) (0.230) (0.142) (0.138) (0.204) (0.329) (0.470) (0.301) 
GDP Growth Forecast 
 
1.126*** 0.993*** 1.052*** 1.039*** 1.048*** 1.024** 1.194*** 1.302*** 1.178*** 
  
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Inflation Forecast 
 
0.118 -0.417 -0.388 -0.397 -0.496 -1.050 0.202 -0.130 0.175 
  
(0.796) (0.449) (0.510) (0.476) (0.379) (0.149) (0.613) (0.801) (0.682) 
Political Risk 
 
-0.270 -0.731** -0.668** -0.696** -0.670** -0.515 -0.287 -0.217 -0.283 
  
(0.219) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.125) (0.148) (0.337) (0.155) 
U.S. Shadow Policy Rate 
 
-1.396*** 
     
-1.406*** -1.399*** -1.415*** 
  
(0.000) 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FX Interventions 
  
0.062 
    
0.077* 0.091* 0.077* 
   
(0.188) 
    
(0.066) (0.053) (0.069) 
Correlation with S&P500 
   
6.741 
   
-0.183 1.328  
    
(0.123) 
   
(0.952) (0.695)  
Central Bank Independence 
    
0.864 
  
0.362 0.207  
     
(0.138) 
  
(0.565) (0.759)  
CME FX Futures 
     
2.735* 
 
-0.466 -1.551  
      
(0.092) 
 
(0.827) (0.518)  
Equity Trade Costs 
      
-0.224** 
 
-0.089  
       
(0.045) 
 
(0.296)  
          
 
Observations 
 
660 660 660 660 660 568 660 568 660 
R2 
 
0.427 0.257 0.263 0.258 0.255 0.331 0.441 0.473 0.440 
Number of Countries   20 20 20 20 20 17 20 17 20 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 27. U.S. Monetary Policy and EM Debt Maturity 
 
 Sources: DataStream; FRED database; authors’ calculations.  
Note: EM local currency government debt average life is value-weighted average life of JPM-
GBI indices for Brazil, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. 
 
Appendix 
 
Investor Classification 
The objective of the classification is to distinguish between non-residents in general and various types 
of domestic holders following broadly the guidelines set by the European Commission22 and the IMF. 
The rationale behind the classification goes back to inherent differences in investment objectives, 
investment horizon and risk aversion. In reality only a handful out of 16 countries considered in this study 
apply similar categorization. Number of investor categories and subcategories varies strongly between 
                                                          
22
 Further information on European system of national and regional accounts (ESA95) is available on the Eurostat 
webpage. IMF Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB) is available on the IMF website. 
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countries ranging from four in Bulgaria to 26 in Czech Republic. To circumvent this lack of consistency23 
between datasets it is essential to regroup original categories into standardized one according to investor 
characteristics. As presented in Table 2, we developed a bondholder classification that would ensure most 
consistent number of categories across countries and focus on key categories: non-residents, banks, 
general government, insurance and pension funds, mutual funds, households and non-financial companies. 
While the attribution is straightforward for banks, non-residents and domestic central banks, classifying 
other domestic actors requires certain assumptions on investor profiles in terms of risk, return and 
investment horizons. Accordingly, we assume that pension and insurance funds have long-term oriented 
and less liquidity-driven and can be merged into one group. In contrast, investment and mutual funds, 
more return-oriented and liquidity-prone, are compatible with objectives of financial auxiliaries like 
securities brokers.  
Data on bankholings is available for all countries, 14 countries publish series for insurance and 
pension funds, 12 for investment and mutual funds, 10 for domestic central banks and 8 for social security 
holdings. Last but not least, Statistics available for Indonesia and Mexico include a large share of 
unattributed holdings. To rectify this incoherence, WE assume that each investor group holds an equal 
amount of residual government bonds and attribute those holdings accordingly. 
                                                          
23
 Several datasets include negative figures, we.e. Japan Bonds 1998-1999 for Investment Funds, UK Bonds several 
observations between 2002 and 2008 for Banks, Denmark bills in 2005, 2011, 2012 for Pension and Insurance 
Funds, Germany Bills 2006, 2008 and 2009 for Banks. Negative values have been removed from the analysis. 
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Appendix Table 1 – Data Sources 
Country Form Frequency Data Availability 
Distinction for 
Maturity 
Form and 
Valuation Coverage Source 
India Perc Qrt 
03/2007 - 
12/2012 Total marketable debt 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Federal 
Government 
Reserve Bank of India. Database on Indian Economy. Statistics. 
Financial Market. Government Securities Market. Ownership 
Pattern of Government of India Dated Securities 
Indonesia Abs Mth 
05/1999 - 
03/2013 Total marketable debt 
Stocks, 
market value 
Central 
Government 
1. Bank of Indonesia. Statistics. Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
Government Finance Sector. Outstanding of Government 
Securities 
2. Directorate General of Debt Management. Statistics. 
Ownership of Tradeable Government Securities   
Malaysia Abs Qrt 
03/1996 - 
03/2013 Bills and bonds N/A N/A 
 
Central Bank of Malaysia. Publications & Research Paper. 
Periodicals. Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Table 3.1.5 Federal 
Government Domestic Debt: Classification by Holder 
South 
Korea Abs Qrt 
12/2002 - 
09/2013 Aggregate 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value     
Thailand Abs Mth 
01/2003 - 
04/2013 Bills and bonds 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Federal 
Government 
I. Bank of Thailand. Statistics. Financial Markets. Debt 
Securities - series from 2009 onwards 
II. Datastream based on Bank of Thailand 
Bulgaria Abs Qrt 
06/2002 - 
03/2012 Total marketable debt 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Central 
Government 
Bulgarian National Bank. Research and Publications. BNB 
Periodical Publications. Government Securities Market 
Czech 
Republic Abs Mth 
12/1996 - 
03/2013 
1. Bills and bonds  
2. By maturity: T-bills 
to 50y bonds 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Central 
Government 
Ministry of Finance. State Debt. Debt Statistics. Treasury 
Securities by Type of Holder. 
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Hungary Abs Qrt 
12/1997 - 
12/2012 Bills and bonds Stocks, N/A 
Federal 
Government 
I. Government Debt Management Agency. Publication, 
Statistics. Statistics. Ownership structure of government 
securities 
II. Hungarian Central Bank. Statistics. Statistical Data and 
Information. Statistical Time Series. Table XIII: Securities Data 
on securities issued by Hungarian residents with breakdown by 
issuer and holding sectors 
Israel Perc Mth 
01/2006 - 
12/2012 Bills and bonds 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Central 
Government 
Bank of Israel. Publications. Annual Reports. Bank of Israel 
Annual Report - by year 
Latvia Abs Mth 
07/1996 - 
12/2009 Bills and bonds 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Central 
Government 
Courtesy of the Monetary Policy Department of the Bank of 
Latvia 
Poland Abs Mth 
01/1996 - 
06/2013 
1. Bills and bonds 
2. By instrument, i.e. 
year of maturity 
Stocks, 
market value 
Central 
Government 
Ministry of Finance. Public Debt. Publications.  
1) Investors. Secondary Market.  Nominal T-bonds and T-bills 
outstanding   
2) State Treasury Debt 
Romania Abs Qrt 
09/2010 - 
06/2014         
South 
Africa Abs Mth 
01/2006 - 
06/2011 
Bills, short-term bonds, 
long-term bonds 
Stocks, 
market value 
Central 
Government 
Reserve Bank of South Africa. Publications. Publications and 
Noties. Statistical Tables. Ownership distribution of domestic 
marketable debt. 
Turkey Abs Mth 
01/2006 - 
05/2013 Total marketable debt 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Central 
Government 
Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of 
Treasury. Statistics. Public Finance. Central Government 
Domestic Debt Statistics. Composition of Domestic Debt Stock 
by Holders. 
Brazil Abs Mth 
01/2007 - 
05/2013 Total marketable debt 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Central 
Government 
I. Tesouro Nacional. Public Debt. Federal Public Debt Monthly 
Report.  
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Chile     
03/2010 - 
09/2013         
Colombia     
03/2010 - 
12/2013         
Mexico Abs Mth 
01/1999 - 
06/2013 Bills and bonds 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Central 
Government 
Banco de Mexico. Statistics. 
1) Financial system. Financial markets. Debt outstanding. 
2) Public Finances. Average Maturity of Government Securities. 
Peru Abs Mth 
11/2003 - 
11/2011 
By instrument, i.e. year 
of maturity 
Stocks, 
nominal 
value 
Central 
Government 
Courtesy of Dirección General de Endeudamiento y Tesoro 
Público de la República del Perú  
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Table 3: Comparison of Relative Holdings Data based on Datasets constructed using National Sources vs. 
International Databases (IMF) 
Country 
Difference in Share of 
Foreign Holders LC 
Difference in Share of Bank 
Holders LC 
Difference in Share of CB 
Holders LC 
Brazil 0% -3% n/a 
Bulgaria 1% -78% n/a 
Czech 
Republic n/a n/a n/a 
Hungary -1% -9% -1% 
India 0% -15% 0% 
Indonesia 0% -5% -50% 
Israel n/a n/a n/a 
Korea n/a n/a n/a 
Latvia -33% -31% 0% 
Malaysia 3% -9% 0% 
Mexico 0% -4% n/a 
Peru 0% -50% n/a 
Poland 0% -14% 0% 
South 
Africa n/a -9% -1% 
Thailand 1% -4% 1% 
Turkey 0% -21% -1% 
Total 
Average 0% -17% -7% 
Note: fields marked in light orange represent deviation above 10% between two datasets. 
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Appendix Figures 
Graphs below represent countries and investor types where the holdings diverge significantly. 
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CONCLUSION GÉNÉRALE 
 
To date empirical academic research on government debt focused predominately on bond 
prices, default risk and crisis episodes. The research contribution of this thesis is threefold. 
First, it sheds new light on the underlying dynamics of debt by introducing a new dataset on 
investor holdings of government debt in developed and emerging economies. Second, it 
applies econometric analysis to understand both the drivers and financial implications of 
changes investors’ demand for government bonds. Third, it identifies the drivers of 
development of local currency bond markets in emerging economies and shows how foreign 
participation in local currency bond markets can affect sensitivity of bonds to risk factors. The 
contribution of each of the four articles is summarized as follows. 
Building on a new broad dataset, the first article introduces the bondholdings dataset and 
aims to explain what factors drive demand for government bonds among different investor 
groups, namely private and official non-residents, domestic banks, domestic pension funds 
and insurance companies and domestic investment and mutual funds. Descriptive statistics 
show that the state and dynamics of the investor structure varies strongly across countries 
with Eurozone debt being held mostly externally, bonds of US, UK and Japan held 
predominately by domestic agents, whereas the share of foreign investors holding emerging 
market debt has been consistently rising and reached record levels in May of 2013. 
Econometric results show that in most countries demand from foreign private investors, non-
domestic central banks and domestic banks is relatively disconnected from macroeconomic 
variables and driven mainly by yields, fiscal situation, global market sentiment and policy 
uncertainty. Econometric findings indicate that prior to the crisis that international private 
investors, banks and investment funds behaved as return seekers that purchase government 
bonds when bond prices increase. Not surprisingly, perception of credit risk by international 
investors evolved over time. Prior to the crisis private international investors were purchasing 
bonds of countries with higher growth, rising public indebtedness and higher yields. However, 
from 2007 onwards international private flows were directed to countries with lower yields. 
As a result, private inflows are significantly associated with falling sovereign yields in some 
countries while outflows are associated with increasing yields in others. As for foreign central 
banks, they tend to purchase bonds with low yields and better credit ratings, and sell when 
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under rising spreads or rating downgrades. Last but not least, econometric findings on 
relationship between investor demand and yields indicate that greater foreign demand for 
local currency government debt tends to significantly lower sovereign bond yields in 
Peripheral Eurozone and Emerging Economies; the latter result is further investigated in 
Article 4. In terms of potential research extensions, one could focus on cross-country linkages 
between different investor groups in countries with different degree of financial integration, 
for instance impact of the change in Eurozone crisis on foreign holdings in emerging market 
economies. In general, the policy and investment implications of these research results 
indicate that the investor base is a highly relevant element of the financial architecture that 
requires data standardization, better data accessibility and above all consistent monitoring by 
the authorities and investors. 
The second article investigates empirically the impact of rating upgrades and downgrades 
on the dynamics of the investor structure and bond yields. Econometric analysis is conducted 
on a broad and heterogeneous panel of countries under consideration for different country 
types and rating agencies, anticipative effects related to rating outlooks, and general vs. serial 
rating changes vs. multi-notch rating changes. Findings for the full sample indicate that 
upgrades exert no consistent and significant impact neither on investor holdings nor on bond 
yields, no matter whether they are preceded by an outlook warning or not. In contrast, results 
on the full sample of countries indicate that sovereign yields and all types of domestic 
investors are affected by rating downgrades, in particular those preceded by negative 
outlooks. In case of Eurozone Periphery and Emerging Economies, foreign private investors 
and sovereign yields were influenced in particular by the second and third downgrades over 
two-year horizon. Downgrades by S&P and Moody's in Peripheral Eurozone were associated 
not only with significant changes in holdings among non-resident private investors and non-
resident central banks, but also with intensification of yield volatility. In Emerging 
Economies, downgrades by Fitch affected the holdings of foreign investors, domestic banks 
and pension funds, and sovereign bonds. Last but not least, investors in Emerging Economies 
reacted differently to 1st and 3rd downgrades over a two year horizon and to multi-notch 
downgrades. Presented results convey meaningful policy and investment implications. First, 
rating changes not only affect the bond yields, but more importantly they change the structure 
of investor holdings. Even though at this stage of research the holdings-yields relationship has 
not been entirely identified, further research should investigate whether a change in investor 
structure following rating change may permanently affect the level and volatility of bond 
yields and, in consequence, overall debt sustainability in the long run.  
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The third article analyses how fundamental and political indicators embedded in the 
sovereign risk determine the local currency yields and foreign currency yields of bonds issued 
by the same government. The novelty of our approach consists in comparing local currency 
bonds with foreign currency bonds using a broad dataset of individual bonds for developed 
and emerging countries in combination with data for the currency structure of government 
debt and foreign participation in local currency debt. To provide a complete picture we 
investigate separately the unhedged LC yields, FC yields and the spread between FX-hedged 
LC yields and FC yields. Empirical findings can be attributed into three groups. First, in 
general LC yields react more to local risk factors than FC yields and the reactivity increases 
when the share of LC debt to total debt or foreign participation in LC debt increase. Second, 
Econometric results for all countries indicate that the spread between FC yield and FX-hedged 
LC Yield is significantly and positively related to credit ratings and political risk. 
Interestingly, both rising inflation and debt to GDP significantly increase the FC hedged-LC 
spread for emerging economies, but decrease the spread for advanced economies. Third, in 
emerging countries with high share of LC debt and high share of foreign participation, the 
estimated coefficients for political risk, inflation, credit rating and current account are 
significant and considerably stronger than for the full sample. Interestingly, under high 
foreign participation and high share of LC debt, the coefficients are also stronger for LC yield 
than for FC yield. These findings suggest also that higher foreign participation renders LC 
government bonds more vulnerable to local risk factors. The empirical results are relevant for 
policymakers, investors and governments issuing foreign currency debt. Policy makers need 
to take into account that countries with low foreign debt, but high foreign participation in LC 
debt are more vulnerable to political and macroeconomic risk factors. 
Following rather infamous history of sovereign and currency crisis, between 1996 and 
2013 foreign investor participation in local currency debt markets in emerging economies 
increased from 5% to 21% on average. The objective of the fourth study is to determine 
empirically what factors shape the development of the domestic bond markets in emerging 
markets on one hand and what attracts foreign investors on the other. Empirical results show 
that foreign demand is a key driver of the growth of local currency debt in emerging markets, 
and that the main culprit of that increased demand is the low interest rate environment brought 
about by the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy. The second motive of 
foreign currency participation is speculative, as FX interventions of central banks in emerging 
economies tend to attract foreign investors. While growth and inflation forecasts remain 
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important indicators for both the development of local currency debt market and foreign 
participation therein, we find that institutional factors like political risk, bondholder protection 
or central bank independence play a very limited role in both processes. After nearly a decade 
of zero interest rate policy in the US and other advanced economies, the incertitude about 
investors’ behavior remains a night breaking dilemma for issuing governments, policymakers 
and investors. Our results call for close monitoring of foreign investors’ behavior during the 
period of interest rate normalization in advanced economies. 
This thesis sheds new light on the structure and dynamics of the investor base and the 
presented data and findings constitute a solid starting point for further research on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. 
